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 El rugir de las olas 
del incesante clamor 
en aguas transparentes 
y desordenadas 
con despertares irreverentes 
e inaprensibles 
de llamadas sencillas 
pero inmoderadas 
y a veces cuando cansados 
condenados a soñar 
de ser libres  
al fin 
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 Por Curpa deros Chirenos 
 
(Transcription of an audio-recorded conversation obtained from the beginning of the song Eromai tepu 
of unknown editor, authorship or copyright.  This extract was part of a larger meeting that took place in 
the early 2000s at the Governor‟s offices) 
 
 
Piru: …por curpa deros chirenos!  
Official:  pero si usted no quiere ser chileno, renuncie a Chile! 
Piru: pero si yo no soy chireno nunca dirigí chire!... nunca en mi vida! 
 y ustede‘ viene‘ a tomar la posesione‘ con este?! 
Official:   Estamos respetándonos… 
Piru:  Dónde señor!  
Usted pidió autorización a nosotros lo‘ Rapanui? 
Aquí están lo‘ Rapanui!  
Aquí somos ministro de nuestra tierra… 
[¡Quien soy tu? pa‘ venir a repartir, cosas que no son tuyo!] 
somos ministros de nuestra tierra, de herencia 
tenemos herencia heredera, ancestrales señores! 
y usted los chirenos…no tienen curtura!  
Por favor,  
Saca tu bandera! 
¡Saca tu gente! 
 Súbete al avión… 




Manifiesto by Víctor Jara. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=en8yqVxuT-U 
 
Yo no canto por cantar 
ni por tener buena voz 
canto porque la guitarra, tiene sentido y razón 
tiene corazón de tierra y alas de palomita 
es como el agua bendita, santigua glorias y 
penas 
aquí se encajo mi canto, como dijera Violeta 
guitarra trabajadora con olor a primavera 
que no es guitarra de ricos ni cosa que se 
parezca 
mi canto es de los andamios para alcanzar las 
estrellas 
que el canto tiene sentido cuando palpita en las 
venas 
del que morirá cantando las verdades 
verdaderas 
no las lisonjas fugaces ni las famas extranjeras 
sino el canto de una lonja hasta el fondo de la 
tierra 
ahí donde llega todo y donde todo comienza 
canto que ha sido valiente siempre será canción 
nueva. 
I don‘t sing just for singing,  
nor for having good voice 
I chant because the guitar has sense and reason 
it has heart of land and wings of little dove 
it is like the holy water, it blesses glories and 
sorrows 
here my singing gets stuck as Violeta said  
working guitar with spring 
smell 
which is not a guitar of rich people or 
something alike 
my chant comes from the scaffoldings for 
reaching the stars 
the singing has sense when it beats in the veins 
of who will die singing the truthful truths 
not the shooting flatteries nor the foreign fames 
but the chant of a strip, up to the bottom of the 
earth 
there where everything arrives, and where 
everything commences 











Atención, señoras y señores, un momento de atención: 
Volved un instante la cabeza hacia este lado de la republica, 
Olvidad por una noche vuestros asuntos personales, 
El placer y el dolor pueden aguardar a la puerta: 
Una voz se oye desde este lado de la republica. 
¡Atención, señoras y señores! ¡un momento de atención! 
(El Peregrino, Nicanor Parra) 
 
This project is an ambitious attempt to review the tie between Chile and Rapanui according 
to law.  According to Gonschor the people of Easter Island are entitled to obtain political 
decolonisation according to the United Nations‟ parameters and international treaties of 
which Chile is signatory.1  This means that the thesis supports the proposition that Easter 
Island is “the” Chilean colony in Oceania, a belief shared by an important, though so far 
unquantifiable number of the island‟s citizens who have internationally raised the question 
no fewer than three times, in the recent past.2 
 
                                                 
1 “Law As A Tool of Oppression And Liberation: Institutional histories and perspectives on political independence 
in Hawai‟i, Tahiti Nui / French Polynesia and Rapa Nui” by Lorenz Rudolf Gonschor, a thesis submitted to the 
graduate division of the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in Pacific Islands Studies, unpublished, personal records, 2008. 
2 In 1983, the Council of Elders „[…] sent a well publicised letter to the United Nations and to several world leaders, 
demanding justice for the Rapanui […] Chileans feared that the Committee wished to promote independence.‟ 
See “Rapanui and Chile. An example of Land and Colonialism from the Pacific” by Grant McCall, Indigenous 
Affairs, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen Nº 4, 1994, 37; „In 1998, 1,200 Rapanui 
signed a petition to the UN decolonization committee and asked for a referendum on independence, with 
apparently no reaction.‟ See n. 1, 157 quoting “Bilingualism, Social Change and the Politics of Ethnicity on 
Rapanui (Easter Island), Chile, unpublished dissertation, Yale University, copy in UH Hamilton Library, by Miki 
Makihara, 1999: 139; In 1998 the Council of Elders 2 remained for several months in the catholic church‟s 
courtyards displaying placards such as: „Rapa-Nui requires the fulfilment of the treaty made between the 
government of Chile and King Atamu Tekena on 9 September 1888.‟ See “Scenarios of Tourism Development in 
Easter Island” by Francesco Di Castri, International Journal of Island Affairs, INSULA, Vol. 8, 1999, 36; Another 
placard said: „The people of Rapa Nui request the return of their lands seized by the Chilean state.‟ See “Cultural 
Politics and Globalization on Rapa Nui” by Riet Delsing, Rapa Nui Journal , Vol. 12 (4), Easter Island Foundation, 
Los Osos, CA, USA, 1998, 102; „[T]he Secretary of the Decolonization Committee (C-24), […] remembers 
speaking to some people from Easter Island around 2000, 2001 regarding participation in the UN's decolonization 
seminar and the C-24's substantive session.  He explained to them at the time - that the C-24 is only mandated by 
the UN General Assembly to deal with the Non-Self-Governing Territories on the C-24 list (currently 16), so their 
participation was not possible. Since then, there have been no further contacts.  In other words, for these reasons, 
no petition from Easter Island was ever put before the Committee.‟ Lone Jessen, personal communication, May, 
2009, Political Affairs Officer, Decolonization Unit, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations, NY. 
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Basically, political decolonisation is initiated when a territory is formally declared to be a 
Non-Self-Governing-Territory [NSGT] before the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on the initiative of the administering power.  In the case of Rapanui it would be Chile which 
would move that it be included on the UN Committee on Decolonisation 24 list.  The C-24 
supervises gradual processes on decolonisation of colonies from their colonial administering 
powers. Chile has been a member of C-24 since 1962 (see footnote 497). 
 
Apart from the unruly Senator A. Navarro who apparently supports the Rapanui protest for 
C-24 inclusion3, there are clear signs of Chile‟s unwillingness to support this point of view.  
To accept the double responsibility which the recognition of Rapanui as NSGT involves is 
difficult.  It would serve to focus attention on Chile‟s international responsibility for 
maintaining a colonial territory in the Pacific without declaring it and despite its membership 
in the specialised committee established exactly to deal with that.  The thesis will not go into 
conspiracy theories which may explain the inconsistent official behaviour yet, given the 
actual state of affairs and, in order to get concrete inclusion of the island on the C-24 list, the 
thesis proposes a specific means to achieve it: the notional-legal basis upon which the 
judicial decolonisation of Rapanui could be accomplished. 
 
In other words, the thesis builds an imaginary case of political decolonisation, with coherent 
legal arguments through courts of law, in order to get the island onto the C-24 list.  This will 
be done either by “recommendation” of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
[IACHR], or by the “binding sentence” of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [the 
Court] both of which are part of the judiciary of the Organization of American States [OAS] 
of which Chile is member. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter one contains the author‟s personal motivations for carrying out this MA project as 
well as commenting on the Pacific scholarship related to the issue.  In other words, by giving 
an account of scholarship relevant to what Pacific Studies should be, as he sees it, the author 
places this thesis clearly within Pacific Studies. 
 
                                                 
3 Rafael “Rinko” Tuki Tepano, personal communications, May, 2010. 
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By using a deconstructive historical method, chapter two is dedicated to western reading of 
the legal notions of the Rapanui people when land use is involved.  Chapter two establishes a 
notional basis for the political decolonisation of Rapanui by the rescue of a pre-colonial 
conception to be used in the present.  This serves to understand the insider viewpoint when 
western concepts such as sovereignty and land ownership are rendered in Rapanui terms of 
reference. 
 
Chapter three establishes the legal basis upon which the political self-determination of 
Rapanui may be accomplished.  It argues on the basis of international law theory and 
practice.  It proposes and argues a novel interpretation by re-periodisation of Rapanui 
colonial status and a re-definition of the legal status of the Rapanui people which contrast 
with traditionally accepted views. 
 
Finally, chapter four lays the foundations for a future practical implementation of the 
notional-legal argumentation developed in the thesis.  It does so by offering a judicial 
doorway for the Rapanui struggle for self-determination.  It is based mainly on the legal 
status of Rapanui according to which the human right of collective self-determination could 
be claimed before courts of law.  To do that, a novel interpretation of the law of the 
Organisation of American States and the Chilean Constitution is developed to convert the 
raw political debate into a refined legal conversation. 
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Chapter one: a Rapanui4 place in Oceania 
 
 El autor no responde de las molestias que puedan ocasionar sus escritos: 
(Advertencia al lector, Nicanor Parra) 
 
The self in Rapanui  
 
What today has become my Master‟s project started six years ago, in June 2004, when 
working for the appointed Governor of Easter Island, Chile.  My part-time job consisted, 
basically, in writing minutes and giving legal advice to the “Commission of Development of 
Easter Island” over which he presided.  Codeipa5, as it is known, is a peculiar institution 
when compared with others within Chile‟s constitutional framework and is becoming 
increasingly notorious, perhaps, by reason of the democratic nature of the Rapanui 
participation in the debates or simply due to the fact that the government is innovating in 
allowing the people of Rapanui to participate in the policy-making process when use of the 
state-owned land of the island is involved.  We can certainly say that land ownership as 
much as self-determination are probably the main issues in the politics between Rapanui and 
Chile as peoples and territories. 
 
One of the peculiarities I found during Codeipa‟s meetings was to hear from either Rapanui 
leaders or officials, and the Governor  too, the constant reference to “the Deed of Cession 
of 1888” [Deed 1888] through which the sovereignty of the island was ceded to Chile 122 
years ago.  A scanned-copy of the deed hangs on the walls of the meeting room where 
Codeipa has it sessions.  It contains a bilingual version of the agreement and it is tirelessly 
affirmed by everyone as fundamental and indicative of the legitimacy of Chilean presence in 
Rapanui. 
 
In 2001, two important facts had converged: one, the Chilean President of that time, set up 
“The Commission of Historical Truth and New Deal” [CVHyNT] which aimed to reset 
                                                 
4 I am following Fisher‟s proposition in calling the people and the island as Rapanui.  See “Rapanui or Rapa Nui?” by 
Steven Roger Fisher, Rapa Nui Journal, Vol. 7 (4) December 1993, 73 – 75. 
5 Ley Indígena No 19.253 in URL http://www.bcn.cl/leyes/pdf/actualizado/30620.pdf. Created by articles 67 to 70 of 
the „Indigenous Act of 1993‟, the committee of 15 members is presided by the appointed Province Governor of 
Easter Island and integrated by the Major, the President of the Council of Elders; five Rapanui representatives 
elected by popular suffrage every four years and seven other Chilean official representatives. 
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relationships between the Chilean state and its ethnicities based on one agreed historical 
truth.6  Thanks to that an Australian Ph.D. in anthropology and leading scholar in Rapanui 
studies, Grant McCall, was invited to participate in the CVHyNT.  And, by using the 
contingency McCall revealed to the Rapanui community something hitherto unknown: in 
1974 Juan Riroroko Mahute the son of the last king of Rapanui, Riro, gave him the duplicate, 
or one of the two original copies, of the Deed of Cession.  McCall‟s revelation was stunning. 
Until that date Rapanui and Chile were just aware of the Spanish version of the Deed but 
never of the insiders‟ counterpart which apparently told a slightly different story on the issue 
of cession of sovereignty.  Besides, it looked like people never knew that an alternative 
version existed. As far as we know, the government lost track of the duplicate.  Many people 
were not even aware that “the” treaty was actually real, and that it had been held in secret by 
the last king‟s son and from 1974 by Dr. McCall.  
 
In 2003 the report of the CVHyNT was finally published.  It sanctioned both versions of the 
deed, Spanish and Rapanui, and concluded that the state of Chile had to ratify the treaty in 
order to incorporate it into the Chilean legal order and secondly by reason of the normative 
provisions of the agreement the government had to grant Easter Island a Statute of 
Autonomy. 
 
So, here I found myself, in the midst of political struggles of which I had previously been 
completely ignorant.  A young lawyer starting a new life a new job in a place of dreams, the 
typical depiction of Pacific islands, but, after discovering all of these affairs and trying to 
locate myself I rapidly became fascinated by these matters.  I changed my relaxed mood, and 
I got serious about my job.  I realised that I had an important position even though I had 
not looked for it, but since I was in the middle of grave issues (those to which others were 
committing their lives) I put all my energies into becoming a good advisor and looking for 
legal answers to the legal questions in front of me.  My first feelings regarding the Deed 1888 
were curiosity and mistrust, on the linguistic veracity of the translations which was done by 
politicians and also on the authenticity of the novel duplicate brought to Easter Island by Dr. 
McCall who is said to be “anti-Chilean”.7 
 
                                                 
6 Informe de la Comisión de Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato de los Pueblos Indígenas [CVHNT] entregado a Su Excelencia el 
Presidente de la Republica de Chile, el 28 de octubre de 2003, Cuerpos I, II, III, Gobierno de Chile, 2003. 
Established by presidential Decreto Supremo No 19 del 18 de enero de 2001, que crea la Comisión de Verdad y Nuevo Trato. 
7 When asked directly by me he denied it. Grant McCall, personal communication, April 2009. 
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If you live on an island of 4,000 people and you do get involved in politics, you will soon 
know who is who.  Most of the persons who participated in the translation are well known 
by reason of their so-called radical stances.  So, I thought maybe all these guys made a plot.  
Why not?  Dirty politics were quite normal in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s.  By 
accommodating a convenient translation of a bizarre document you probably will be able to 
impose an agenda of self-determination and by doing so get a negotiated doorway to obtain 
political autonomy while keeping Chilean citizenship.  In my opinion, this moderate view 
(between independence and integration) is probably the wish of most of residents of Easter 
Island either ethnic or non ethnic Rapanui people.8  So far, the state of Chile has not 
followed the recommendations proposed by the CVHyNT report.  Hence, positions have 
been radicalising since then. 9 
 
Until July 2007 I continued my job in Codeipa. Just before coming to New Zealand I lost it 
due to disagreements with the appointed Governor of that time.  I was already identified as a 
sort of “double agent”: working for the government but taking sides with the Rapanui 
activism to get political autonomy.  Indeed, I participated in the drafting of several either 
official or anonymous documents supporting Easter Island‟s self-government.  Such work is 
seen as contrary to Chile‟s national interests.  To Rapanui activists, on the other side, my 
work was useful due to the combination of two fundamental elements which are still rare for 
them: legal knowledge and a particular fluency in the Spanish language. 
 
During those years, especially in 2005, and regardless of my inner commitment with Rapanui 
activism, I was still thinking of those Deed 1888 issues.  I began my own research in two 
naïve ways: one, to get an alternative linguistic translation of the treaty (which in the end 
came to be very similar to the official one), and two, to seek the other duplicate which I 
believed (wrongly) to have been mislaid in archives in the mainland.  Two unexpected 
outcomes, far from discouraging me to continue researching, stimulated my appetite for 
further exploration.  In 2006 a delegation from New Zealand arrived on Easter Island and I 
became aware of the possibility of studying these issues in a comparative way.  In New 
                                                 
8 There is some confusion amongst people about the practical meaning of the legal concept of “autonomy”. To me 
is “political”, to others “ethnic” or simply “administrative”. See for instance “Voces del Pacifico. Una Comunidad 
en Busca del Reconocimiento Autonómico” by Bárbara Escobar and Ximena Lagos, Tesis para optar al grado de 
Licenciado en Antropología y titulo de Antropóloga Social, Escuela de Antropología, Universidad Academia de 
Humanismo Cristiano, Santiago de Chile, 2009, 200-207. 
9 Proem News from Rapanui, May 2010. The Rapanui Parliament alongside with sympathisers, are planted in front of the 
newly appointed Governor‟s cabinet. 
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Zealand analogous issues were being discussed so I imagined myself in Aotearoa studying 
the Treaty of Waitangi vis-à-vis the Rapa Nui Deed of Cession and, I thought: “I could 
compare the Rapanui attitudes towards land vis-à-vis the Maori situation.”  Obviously the 
themes and the politics are different as well but initially that was my approach to what is 
culminating here. 
 
During those years I met a lot of people, no less that half of the indigenous population.  
People went to Codeipa to get solutions, mainly on mundane matters, but and also looking 
for approval, political support for their “illegal” occupations or takeovers on state-owned 
land.  I will explain why I say “illegal” but it sufffices here to refer to the well known fact 
that the state of Chile took 100% of the land without the permission of the owners and 
retains it despite the questioned legality of the appropriation and the clamour of the people.  
Around 80% of the land is owned by the state of Chile and many generations of islanders 
have struggled to recover the possession of their ancestral kainga.10 
 
After dealing with amazing personalities and listening to diverse and sometimes apparently 
contradictory positions, I started thinking about the idea I have developed in chapter two.  I 
launched myself into believing that Rapanui minds converge and are concomitant in at least 
one thing: most of the people I encountered did not make a clear distinction between 
sovereignty and land ownership.  For me, a man educated in the western school of thought, 
it was quite simple to distinguish it.  But to many of them it was not.  I began to convince 
myself that this perception was more than a trickery to get benefit from the government by 
mixing up private and the community-as-a-whole‟s interests.  Land ownership issues were 
and are confounded with sovereign matters without awareness of the theoretical divergence 
of approach to each theme. 
 
Let me exemplify it.  I am an MA candidate occupying a prefab at 16 Kelburn Parade and by 
this sole fact I believe that Victoria University of Wellington has to listen to me to decide 
what to do with the real estate which lies underneath my working place. Ridiculous?  Well, 
many can relate accounts of how influential politicians from Chile‟s mainland have come to 
the island, sat down at the negotiation table very open to listen Rapanui demands, suddenly 
shift in their chairs when they realise that the Rapanui are determined to use their own ways 
                                                 
10 See “Articulating Rapa Nui: Polynesian Cultural Politics In A Latin American Nation-State” by Maria Riet Delsing, 
a dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Anthropology, University of California Santa Cruz, USA, unpublished, personal records, 2009, 125 – 126. 
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to negotiate common issues.  To even set up the terms of reference of negotiations across 
cultural and political divides in Rapanui is difficult and one of the reasons for that is, in my 
opinion, the content of their notional-legal representation of the world, especially when 
dealing with henua or land of their ancestors. 
 
The self in Oceania  
 
What is Pacific Studies? After two years, I am still wondering about it, yet the first idea 
that comes to my mind is the individuality behind the Pacific scholar.  In chapter one 
and in the epilogue, the reader will find my personal point of view and the individual 
drivers which motivates my studies.  I would like to warn as well that this section might 
not seem entirely academic and the reader might feel some perplexity due to my style 
of writing and my propensity towards unveiling hitherto self-repressed desires of 
methodological libertinage.  Tony Angelo wants to call it “stream of consciousness”, 
Teresia Teaiwa describes it as my post-modern approach; to me it aims to be anti-
poetical.  Certainly, I am neither James Joyce nor Nicanor Parra.  Perhaps the reader 
will find this section academically very unconventional but I believe that as long as 
coherency and clarity are respected we cannot afford to constrain researchers to certain 
patterns, especially in arts. 
 
Pacific Studies is about this; it is something revisionist in that it seeks epistemological 
alternatives for building knowledge.  Pacific Studies wants to capture further terrain.  
Yesterday decolonisation was confined to politics but today Pacific Studies involves 
methodological decolonisation.  In other words, Pacific Studies, and particularly, 
Native Studies of indigenous populations of the Pacific region, wishes to enter in an 
academic post-colonial stage of researching for roots, rescuing of ancestral knowledge 
applied to modern needs and circumstances.  This is precisely, that it is what I want to 
do, especially in chapter two.  Scholars such as David Gegeo for instance have done it 
in a practical way by getting into the thinking of the Kawara‟ae people‟s (from 
Solomon Islands) and their epistemological approaches which far from being 
traditional and fixed are constantly evolving in reciprocal and challenging relationship 
with reality.  To Gegeo that is „indigenous knowledge‟.11  Linda Tuhiwai-Smith has 
                                                 
11 “Indigenous Knowledge and Empowerment: Rural Development Examined from Within” by David W. Gegeo, 
The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 10, No 2, Fall 1998, 289-315; also “The Pacific imaginary: Shifting Paradigms in 
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called us to overcome colonial legacies by decolonising our methodologies.12  Jeffrey 
Sissons has argued that „[c]ontemporary indigeneity is not simply about preserving 
traditions and meanings‟ but also the ability to transform them to adapt to the 
circumstances of outsiders‟ policy-making ruling. 13 
 
As a field, Pacific Studies wants to see its own „cultural renaissance‟ targeting exactly 
what to western societies are just ways of, say, artistic expressions. 14  Pacific Studies 
wants to regain the territory lost by the negative influences of colonialism and its 
written-word ship by bringing epistemological alternatives to western paradigms of 
knowledge construction.  I am not sure whether this will be truly alternative to the 
Cartesian mathesis15.  Yet I am still a believer that oratory, critical discussion, poetry, 
dreams, dance, songs, enlightened dialogue, cultural events, meetings (Talanoa, Fono, 
Ho‘oponopono, Matauranga) land-human interactions, intuition, spirituality (beliefs, 
worldview) daily awareness, participant observation, and other proceedings 
symbolizing indigenous holistic-understanding such as the Kakala in Tonga, are all 
ways of valid epistemological renascence.  Vilsoni Heneriko from Rotuma has been a 
leader of the hosts of Pacific writers and artists for re-vindicating all those renewed 
ways of knowledge.16 
 
None of these Pacific epistemological ways are strange to me.  The Rapanui people are 
already regaining their decolonising space through the arts which is „the only thing they 
cannot take away from you.‟17  Although, I guess, most of Rapanui people are not 
completely aware of today‟s Pacific academic revolution and, are unaware of the fact 
that they still are in the previous basic stage of political decolonisation, amazingly they 
have been capable of adapting to their the circumstances given by its political reality.  
                                                                                                                                     
Pacific Scholarship: Towards Island-Based Methodologies, Epistemologies and Pedagogies” by David W. Gegeo, 
Session 1, Fono, Fale Pasifika, University of Auckland April 16th to 18th 2008. 
12  Decolonizing Methodologies. Research and Indigenous Peoples by Linda Tuhiwai-Smith, Zed Books Ltd., London, 
University of Otago Press, Dunedin, New Zealand, 1999. 
13 First Peoples: Indigenous cultures and their futures by Jeffrey Sissons, Reaktion Books Ltd., London, 2005, 15. 
14 “Future Directions for Pacific Studies” by Stewart Firth, The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 15, No I, spring 2003, 140. 
15 Through the epistemic principles of mathesis knowledge can only be acquired intuitively or by deduction, by pure 
observation or by valid inference from indubitable premises. A genealogy of sovereignty by Jens Bartelson, Cambridge 
studies in international relations, series 39. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 143. 
16 “Indigenous Knowledge and Academic Imperialism” by Vilsoni Hereniko, Remembrance of Pacific Past: An invitation 
to Remake History, Borofsky, Robert, (ed.), University of Hawai‟i Press, Honolulu, 2000, 78-91. 
17 Galumalemana Alfred Hunkin, Senior Lecturer Va‟aomanu Pasifika, personal conversation, March, 2010. 
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They are transforming and revitalising their understanding of their own inherited 
culture and the legacy they want to leave to their successors. 
 
But, let me return to the idea of individuality.  Individuality does not mean necessarily 
individualism.  Teresia Teaiwa warns us to be aware that, in practice, Pacific Studies is 
not a place where you will find people who do not have highly personalised 
expectations targeted towards certain directions.  My individual circumstances triggered 
in me inner wishes of justice which I want to share with the people to whom I owe my 
awakening.  My cooperative individuality has likewise carved inside of me awesome 
liberating forces. 18 
 
I need again to warn the reader that far from hiding agendas I have for the sake of 
Pacific Studies goals, to open my intentions.  Pacific Studies was once a fertile land for 
ethnographers and anthropologists and others who believed, wrongly or not, they were 
doing well by analysing people like laboratory mice.  Today this approach is 
unacceptable and seen as the unwished sibling of „European imperialism and 
colonialism‟19 because the ultimate rationale rather than understanding was to 
influence. 20 In chapter two, I reread those “laboratory ethnographies” between the 
lines and by so doing I try to dismantle those representations to reconstruct a rescued 
one. 
 
Terence Wesley-Smith has said that apart from the classical „laboratory rationale‟ in 
order to justify studies in Pacific islands the so-called „empowerment rationale‟ is 
acceptable.  I felt touched when he reminded us that „[t]he decolonization of the region 
remains incomplete.‟21 To him the „empowerment rationale‟ is one of the responses to 
„Western academic hegemony‟22whereas to me it means to empower myself in 
searching for a solution for the contemporary colonialism practised on Easter Island.  
Even more I do maintain as Terence does that we need to adopt a „selective 
adaptation‟ of western academic tools to create genuine „universal forms of 
                                                 
18 “L(o)osing the Edge” by Teresia Teaiwa, The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 13, Number 2, Fall 2001, 352. 
19 N. 12, 1. 
20 “Rethinking Pacific Islands Studies” by Terence Wesley-Smith, Pacific Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1995, 115-137. 
21 N. 20, 124. 
22 N. 20, 125. 
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scholarship‟ for the needs and circumstances of non western societies and cultures.23  
My ambition goes further to becoming an intellectual bridge between islander and 
mainlanders colleagues.  Throughout the writing a place of priority is given to my first-
hand experience which does not mean renouncing to truthfulness and veracity 
demanded by legal and honest indigenous analyses.  I seek to bring the voice of those 
without academic voice or to make the voice more audible. 
 
The teacher says: “What is the common ground of the Pacific?” (Mmmmm, cultural 
diversity vis-à-vis common roots?) “Geography!” I said.  Wrong! The Pacific region once 
was colonised and divided by artificial boundaries drawn in the sea, but today is a region of 
independent countries (or in ways to be) fully diverse in ways of living, knowing, thinking, 
being, etc… “There is no Pacific at all”, she says.  “What is the Pacific?” Oh, well, it is not 
“the Pacific” but Oceania… 
 
Epeli Hau‟ofa‟s Oceania is a „sea of island‟. 24  Oceania is no longer the outcome of colonial 
legacies which have wrongly made islanders believe in their condemnation to depend for 
ever on something located overseas.  He said that Oceanic peoples need to believe in 
themselves in their capacity, amongst others, to inter-connect their kin, souls and islands.  
He died wishing to see Oceania in expansion as the Big Island of Hawai‟i expands as a result 
of volcano eruptions.25  How does Rapanui fit in the Pacific-Oceania redefinition? Rapanui, 
paraphrasing Epeli, is not an island in a far sea as historically represented by aliens.  Rapanui 
wants to belong to the post-colonial era of „sea of islands‟.  It does not want to be relegated, 
not anymore, to the Pacific backyards but to be integrated into the “sea of islands” rationale. 
 
It is true, “me Chile” acknowledges political responsibility for convincing Rapanui people to 
believing that they need me even to survive.  I recognise that is no longer true, if even it was 
true.  What? What are you saying? Yes my brother we have behaved badly! Believe me… I 
know you are responsible but anyone may be blamed because of this.  I know, I know, you 
never were taught about this, nobody told you about the oppression which was having place 
not too much time ago.  Have hopes because there is a time for change and you and me are 
no longer predators but friends of the island of in the sea of islands.” 
                                                 
23 Concept from n. 20, 125 quoting Alatas 1993, 312. 
24 “Our Sea of islands” by Epeli Hau‟ofa, A New Oceania: Rediscovering Our Sea of islands, Naidu, Vijay, Waddell, Eric, 
and Hau‟ofa, Epeli (eds.), SSED, USP in association with Beake House, Suva, 1993, 65. 
25 N. 24, 69. 
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Following Epeli‟s thinking, I would like to see Rapanui in this sea, firstly by inclusion of it in 
the cartography of the so-called South Pacific.  “What? Yes my friend, there is nothing more 
annoying than to find that most of maps do not include Rapanui in the conciencia colectiva of 
Oceania.”  Apart from that, I would like to see Rapanui included in the post-colonial game 
of political decolonisation.  “Do you think that the cartographic obliteration is indicative of 
world‟s oversight of the fact that the Moai (big stone statues) were actually built by the 
ancestors of these still alive Polynesians? Oh yes I do, actually the oblivion was determined 
by that, but not completely, and you know why? There is always a series of factors, some 
unintentional others unlucky and, well, others… but the thing is that today the legal reality is 
becoming visible thanks god, and we don‟t need maps to tell us!”  Rapanui is proud of being 
people and Polynesians, or Oceanians, in constant evolution, culturally flexible as the sea of 
island.  And sooner rather than latter, both the continent and the “incomplete-sea of islands” 
will realise the need to respect that. 
 




The self in the Oceania epistemology 
 
My methodological approach is not quite inter-disciplinary, which is another clue to 
understanding the field of Pacific Studies.  For the most part, my background is basically 
legal including Political Theory, Roman Law, History, International law, and Constitutional 
Chilean law.  Actually, chapters three and four are mainly legal.  I guess only in chapter one 
and in the epilogue I am on purpose experimenting and crossing academia frontiers.  I 
acknowledge that this comes mostly from my fluid contact with Teresia Teaiwa and in the 
last stage thanks to professor Angelo.  In chapter two, as I said, I will reread colonial 
ethnographical and anthropological resources to represent in a deconstructuive way.  
Personal communications are brought as well to be analysed through the lawyer‟s lens, and 
scaterred-in-my-mind memories of six and half years of living in the island are included too. 
To represent it in a “Pasifika way”, methodologically my aim is to cross fearlessly accessible 
knowledge to build a new approach towards the Rapanui matter.  I want to follow the 
                                                 
26  Raga. Approche Du Continent Invisible by J.M.G. Le Clezio, Editions du Seuil, Paris, France, 2006, 9. 
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pattern of tuku tuku, or the Rapanui system of foreshore fishing with a net. 27  You throw and 
pull it back then you walk a few metres to then put it again into the sea.28  By overlapping 
your own area of fishing then you get something in the end: being intuitive and methodical 
at the same time.  I am a just fisherman of all the Habermasian inter-subjectivity, where 
knowledge „is the by-product of dialogue, or of something exchanged with others‟.29 
 
Metaphorically, as well, I want to become the builder of the roof of a hare. Commonly the 
hare is the house. Here, is the hare is the Rapanui‟s dwelling of liberty and sovereignty or the 
essential first-place where social interaction is developed amongst human beings and the 
place where pu‘oko, head, is protected from the avatars of life.  The current hare of 
sovereignty has no roof.  It is at the beginnings of its construction, only the “floor” is done, 
or the endless cry for freedom.  The methodological walls of knowledge are not there 
(because they are still in the minds and dreams of them and because they are not meant to be 
made before the roof).  The legal roof will cover the intimacy of this noble country and 
culture, but it needs to be built in relationship, in conjunction with them, and not only with 
my representations. That is why this does not need to end here but only to start… 
 
                                                 
27 Diccionario Ilustrado Rapa Nui Español Ingles Frances by various authors, segunda edición, Universidad Católica de 
Temuco, Pehuen Editores, Santiago, Chile, 2006, 54. 
28 Andres “Chapo” Ika, personal communication. 
29 “Our own liberation: Reflections on Hawaiian Epistemology” by Manulani Aluli Meyer, The Contemporary Pacific, 
Vol. 13, No 1, Spring 2001, 134. 
 22 





I am proposing a project towards the political decolonisation of the island of Rapa Nui 
which should not be circumscribed to the discussion on sovereignty but also on the matter 
of land ownership, altogether.  As Kuehl argues, I think that a polity-based international-
level approach to address the theme of human rights of indigenous peoples is needed.31  In 
other words, the matter of superseding post-colonial era by avoiding neo-colonial practices 
and through a new delimitation of the liberal political structure, the egalitarian system of 
freedoms upon which all cultures and its comprehensive moral conceptions can live 
altogether.32  The political theory‟s proposition I am presenting in chapter two aims to 
theoretically enlarge the area of influence of first-peoples polities and cultures within the 
conceptual framework of liberal societies.  
 
Having in mind that chapter two‟s starting point is philosophical.  It wants to explore up to 
the limits of the western representational bond with land and it does so by following a 
deconstructive method.  The concepts of sovereignty and ownership are seen as two sides of 
the same western-legal coin: The bipolar way whereby occident represents, through 
individuals or collectively, respectively, its nexus with land.  This notional representation will 
be contrasted with those apparently observed in early Polynesia.  From a legal point of view, 
is conjectured that some pre-contact Polynesian societies (Samoa, Tonga, Marquesas, Tahiti 
Nui, Huahine, Rapanui and New Zealand‟s Maori) seemed to have mixed, in one concept, 
what to us functions as two overlapping ideas: the sovereign power of state asserting 
domination over land and the individual right to possess that same land.  The thesis 
                                                 
30 Here I am playing with the Easter and Eastern Island nomenclatures. Easter, due to the date of western first 
contact, Easter Sunday of 1722 and, Eastern, due to its geographical marginal location within the so-called 
Polynesian triangle. 
31 “Towads a Fairer Game: Taking Measures Against Polity-Based Discrimination Of Indigenous Peoples Under 
ICERD” by Melf Kuehl, LLM research paper LAWS 524: Indigenous Peoples & International Law, Faculty of Law, 
Victoria University of Wellington, unpublished, personal records, 2009. 
32 A Theory Of Justice by John Rawls, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1971. Also, Political Liberalism by John Rawls, New York: Columbia University Press, c2005. 
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conjectures on the „political dimension‟33 of the land tenure system in ancient Polynesia to 
conclude that a “unified” legal and political concept was behind it.  According to this 
redefinition, ethnographers and anthropologist used to (and also today) misrepresent the 
unified concept by resembling it to law-of-property‟s nomenclatures such as land ownership. 
 
Chapter two suggests a political science‟s reformulation towards the so-called “traditional 
land tenure system” in terms of diverting the analysis from the law of property rationale to 
the theory of state and power but from the perspective of indigenous-polities.  It is depicted 
as inappropriate the current analysis of the theme of land tenure system because, inter alia, 
assumes too easily the notional components of the Roman Law‟s ownership faculties which 
are absoluteness, perpetuity, exclusivity and indivisibility.  In contrast, when applied in 
Oceania and specifically Easter Island, it is argued that the land theme should not be 
discussed without considering both sovereignty and land ownership as part of the same 
Oceanian paradigm. 
 
This chapter is an attempt at deconstruction34 of the cultural-notional basis of the legal concepts 
of ownership and sovereignty.  It reviews their historical evolution having in mind the 
contemporary political science discourse of „meta-sovereignty‟ proposed by Jens Bartelson35 
and the idea of finding an appropriate approach towards the Sissons‟ „Indigeneity project‟36 
in order to imagine a decolonised Rapanui polity. 
 
I am arguing that the absolutist “supreme” idea of power in western societies is notionally 
underpinned by Roman law of property‟s components such as absoluteness, indivisibility, 
exclusivity and perpetuity.  It does so through two overlapped legal conceptions concerning 
the governance of territory: land ownership and modern sovereignty.  Both constitute the 
two sides of the same legal coin.  On the other hand, I am arguing that both, the early 
“loose” possessive and the “lax” ownership Polynesian37 conceptions of apprehension and 
                                                 
33 Māori Custom Law by Eddie T. Durie, Wellington, New Zealand, personal records, unpublished, available in Pacific 
Studies school library, Victoria University of Wellington, January 1994, 64. 
34 N. 15, 20. The philosophical strategy of deconstruction is a way of exposing the meaning of concepts to internal 
criticism, addressing precisely to that which is taken for granted or regarded as unproblematic by a scientific 
analysis.  
35 “The concept of Sovereignty Revisited” by Jens Bartelson, The European Journal of International Law vol. 17 no. 2, pp. 
463-474, 2006. 
36 N. 13. 
37 By “Polynesians” I am referring to peoples of Samoa, Tonga, Marquesas Islands, Tahiti Nui, Huahine, Rapanui 
and New Zealand. 
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dominion and, the Eddie Durie‟s flexible-variable character of Maori (from New Zealand) 
customary law  come from the same notionally relativist paradigm.38 
Normally, law is conceived as being accompanied by governmental coercive apparatus and 
the absolute imperium of its „enforcement agencies‟.39  Therefore, can we conceive “law” 
without enforcement agencies?  Although a question for another paper it is still pertinent as 
far as international law effectivity concerns.40  It was not until western contact when the 
institutionalisation of force became reality in the Maori society of New Zealand.41  Does it 
mean then that the lack of institutionalised force diminishes “Maori law”?  Was Maori law 
then just a bunch of customary practices?  Maori people actually did have an oral customary 
law but, unlike western law, which gave consistency and auctoritas (authority) to the 
customary practices and what gave to Maori law its imperative character required by every 
legal order was, basically, the ideology of mana and tapu.  From this early magical platform 
the apparent “legal vacuum” was filled. 
 
The western propensity to classify the reality has been widely described.  By replicating the 
Hellenistic model, Roman law distinguishes amongst persons, actions and things to 
determine the law applicable.  Polynesian societies instead did not classify, like Greco-
Roman societies did.  For example, they did not differentiate between public and private 
spheres, or individual and common interests, or the capability of the thing to be moved or 
not, that is, between moveable and immoveable property.  However, it seems that pre contact 
Polynesians drew distinctions when assessing the value of “land” or, in legal-Roman terms, 
“immovable property”.  In fact, the whenua42 understanding was (and is) a core cultural value 
and political driver.  Analogously, the nowadays holistic concept of Gaia43 would be the 
equivalent to that Maori notion. „People belonging to land‟ or the tangata-whenua relationship 
is one of the basic ideologies of Maori people.44 
 
                                                 
38 Eddie T. Durie was Chief Judge of the Maori Land Court. 
39 Concept from PhD Danny Keenan, “Issues in Traditional Maori Society”, MAOR409, Te Ao Onamata, School of 
Maori Studies, Te Kawa a Maui, Victoria University of Wellington, 2008. 
40 The Maori Magna Carta. New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi by Paul McHugh, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1991: 167. 
41 N. 39. 
42 N. 39. Land, sea, rivers and in general the entire environment, habitat, fell under the scope of whenua. 
43 Gaia: a new look at life on earth by J. E. Lovelock., Oxford University Press, New York, c1987. The earth is a self-
regulated living being, a super-organism of which we are a part of. 
44 N. 33, 62. 
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Like the Romans, Polynesians regarded movable things as part of the human commerce or 
capable of constituting personal property.  But, unlike Romans, their notions were embraced 
by “loose” conceptions of possession and embedded in “lax” understandings of ownership.  
They ruled social exchange, trade and their whole polity accordingly.  I am reinterpreting 
ethnographical sources to arrive to that conclusion.  What also constituted a special feature 
distinguishing ancient Polynesian societies from Romans it was what today we call “real 
property”.  Real estate was not a commodity and not considered object of ownership.  In 
other words, rather than monopolizable by exclusion the land was conceived to be collectively 
controlled, tribally distributed, familiarly occupied.  And, beyond poetry, the alleged bond 
between tangata (people) and whenua (land) was, in consequence, very political and disputable.  
I am arguing that depicting this “bond” as common or collective ownership is inexact. As mode of 
example I have identified three scholars following the already classic common place 
depiction: Haunani-Kay Trask for Hawaiians; Riet Delsing for Rapanui and Richard Hill for 
Maori people.45 
 
In my opinion, this special understanding of “the control of whenua” is not analyzable 
through the law of property prism but from the perspective of political theory.  
Furthermore, neither common nor individual ownership would fairly represent the 
“Polynesian land tenure system”.  Logically, and in contrast, the Roman institution of 
dominium (absolute ownership and control of property) was not built upon “loose” or “lax” 
notions of possession and property. Rather, the Roman Law was constructed from within 
and upon its own cultural framework, that is, upon the idea of absolute, indivisible, exclusive 
and perpetual supremacy and power.  Firstly, I will take a step back by dismantling the 
ideology, the conceptual framework, the cultural notions lying behind these legal 
“specimens”; sovereignty and its ideological begetter the Roman ownership.46 
 
Secondly, I will reread key linguistic and ethnographic sources, which will allow me to 
speculate on the legal nature of an ancient Polynesian conception of personal property and 
                                                 
45 From a native daughter: colonialism and sovereignty in Hawai‘i by Haunani-Kay Trask, Honolulu: University of Hawai‟i 
Press, 1999; also “Self Determination or Integration? The Uneasy Relationship between Rapa Nui and Chile” by 
Riet Delsing, paper presented at symposium Politics of Sovereignty. Colonial Legacies in Oceania, Americas Forum, 
Center for the Americas, Weslyan University, pp. 1-28, 2006; also “Tangata Whenua/The People of the Land: The 
Role of the Land in the Maori Struggle for Rangatiratanga/Autonomy in Aotearoa/New Zealand” by Richard 
Hill, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Gesellschaft für überseegeschichte, Universität HAMBURG, Perceptions 
of land in Societies outside of Europe from the 17th to the 20th century. Hamburg, 2 June 2007. 
46 „Although, they are distinct and separate, ideology and law have an indisputable kinship and internal relationship.‟ 
Law and politics in the Middle Ages. An introduction to the sources of medieval political ideas by Walter Ullmann, The Sources 
of history: studies in the uses of historical evidence. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975, 27. 
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land governance. Also I will see how this conception might be contrasted with or to be 
compared to the Roman and western conception of ownership and sovereignty, respectively 
and alternatively. 
Tangata whenua resilience, Indigenism and alternative Global Politics 
 
On the one hand, my argument is based on the Indigeneity project of Sissons which is „a 
distinctive form of identity politics within post-settler states‟47 which contrasts with the more 
generalized projects of eco-ethnicity48 and cultural survival.49   On the other, it is also 
encouraged by my experience on Rapanui.  I believe in the existence in modern Rapanui 
society of, paraphrasing Kawharu, an „ideological core‟ that „would seem to accord fairly well 
with views held in the past‟.50  I am not intending to explain how this land ideology has 
persisted over time but rather to stress the today‟s stubborn Rapanui stand when land is 
involved.  I witnessed resilient behaviours which to me are based on traditional land tenure 
understandings still alive, in some way, in present times.  Although “the” understanding does 
not manifest itself always through coherent discourses yet it seems to be sincere and not a 
product of fake impostures as some have adopted in retort to colonial and neo-colonial 
impositions. 
 
I interacted with several voices claiming something not known for my western-legal trained-
mind, a distinctive point of view in regards to landholding.  The relevance of indigenous 
kinship and its „ongoing relationship‟ or „long-standing bond with‟ the land and natural 
environment, has been amply highlighted by Sissons, Mason Durie and Haunani Trask.51   
In the Maori worldview, „[l]and ownership still retains a largely symbolic significance by 
underpinning kin group membership and a person‟s status as tangata whenua (someone who 
belongs to land)‟.52  Analogously, to the Rapanui people the kainga concept implies that 
                                                 
47 N. 13, 17. 
48 N. 13, 17 – 24. The eco-indigenism discourse equalises indigenous peoples with having subsistence economies and 
being close to Mother-Earth or relative closeness to nature. This speech has primitivized or called into question 
the authenticity of those who adopted urban lifestyle. Eco-indigenism is a discourse that seeks to revalue 
primitivism and tribalism in relation to destructive western rationality and individualism. 
49 N. 13, 12.  Historically, the project of the settler nationhood has sought the elimination of indigenous identities 
and therefore contemporary first peoples can view their cultures only as cultures of survival. 
50 Maori Land Tenure: studies of a changing institution by Ian Hugh Kawharu, Oxford New York, Clarendon Press, 1977, 
37. 
51 N. 13, 33; also “Race and Ethnicity in Public Policy. Does it work?” by Mason Durie, The Social Policy, Research 
& Evaluation Conference 2004, What Works?, Academy for Maori Scholarship and Research, Massey University, 
Wellington, 25 November 2004: 2; also n. 46, 115 – 117. 
52 N. 13, 27. 
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people are in „umbilical connection to the land‟ and that land therefore „cannot be 
transferred or ceded.‟53  According to Delsing it was not until the end of the 19th century that 
„some Rapanui were beginning to lose their intimate contact with and deep connection to 
the ancestral lands‟ kainga54, which used to determine „tribal affiliations and customary 
practices in which the land was intrinsically inalienable‟.55  In the same manner, according to 
Trask, pre-contact Hawaiians rather than as owners they considered themselves as „stewards‟ 
of the land.56 
 
My question is therefore how, within the post-colonial57 political context, to give legal shape 
to this alleged holistic worldview entirely unknown to settler European cultures by avoiding, 
at the same time, eco-indigenism impostures? How might I give legal content to this 
noteworthy concept which has proved to be an endless „foundation for cultural resistance‟?58  
How might societies build alternative global politics within nation-states to create a system 
that addresses as much of each system as possible?59  
 
The western coin of Ownership and Sovereignty: Its origins and characters 
 
Ownership is the legal substratum of sovereignty.  It was the Roman classical conception of 
ownership on which sovereignty has erected (probably unconsciously) its successful political 
career.   
 
According to Sissons, Dr. Taiaiake Alfred has argued that if we accept sovereignty as such, 
we are endorsing a set of values and objectives in direct opposition to the values and 
                                                 
53 “Vaai Hanga Kainga Giving Care to the motherland: conflicting narratives of Rapanui” by Santi Hito, State 
University of New York, Empire State College, New York, USA, Journal of Intercultural Studies, Vol. 25, No 1, 2004, 
26; Also on the meaning of the concept of henua in earlier Polynesian societies, see When Home Is The Navel Of The 
World. An ethnography of young Rapanui between home and away by Olaug Irene Røsvik Andreassen, A thesis submitted 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Sociology and Anthropology, University of New South Wales, 
March 2008, iv. 
54 Delsing n. 45, 7 footnote 5 quoting Metraux, 1971 and Kirch, 2000, 272. „The concept of kainga has more than 
one meaning. I use it here as territorial unite, constituting the estate of a clan or descendent group.‟ 
55 Delsing, n. 45, 7. 
56 Trask, n. 45, 115. 
57 N. 13, 154, post-colonialism „is a process that involves the disengagement of colonizers and colonized from their 
former relationship of mutual entanglement and definition.‟ Post-colonialism is a condition of both post-settlers 
nations and indigenous peoples as they seek to redefine the terms of their relationship with each other. 
58 N. 13, 34. 
59 Melf Kuehl, personal communication, April 2010. 
 28 
objectives found in most traditional indigenous philosophies.  Even non-indigenous 
politicians recognize the inherent weakness of a position that asserts a „sovereign right for 
peoples who do not have the cultural frame and institutional capacity to defend or sustain it‟.  
Alfred has exhorted indigenous people to detach themselves from the notion of sovereignty 
and „its legal, western roots‟ because sovereignty does not understand its own relationship to 
the land by „traditional values of sharing‟ but through territorial control and domination.  To 
him, the post-imperial world should return to traditional values of caretaking ‗rather than 
perpetuate western models of sovereign domination and control.‟ 60  Moreover, to Sissons, 
both the ambiguous Eurocentric notion of sovereignty and the idea of self-determination are 
inappropriate for indigenous peoples‟ goals.  To Sissons, the territorial integrity of states is 
„crucial‟ whilst for indigenous leaders the aim to pursue is „political and cultural autonomy 
within states‟.61 
 
Leon Duguit (1859-1928) argued against the unacceptable consequences of the 
individualistic system of property and the prevailing ideas of sovereignty.  To early twentieth-
century Duguit, the social function of property was meant to replace the individualistic and 
metaphysical conception of subjective right which came from individualistic Roman 
ownership. 62  Based upon Comte‟s positivism63 Duguit argued that the individualistic system 
of property allowed the existence of capricious owners who may choose to not use, to not 
dispose or „derive benefit from‟ land but instead to leave it unproductive and useless to 
collective purposes.64  To him, saying that a possessor had a right was equivalent to saying 
that he had a power superior to and prescriptible upon the will of other individuals.65  What 
to me is remarkable here is he was already capable of identifying our main postulate by 
                                                 
60 N. 13, 123 quoting “From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political Discourse” by Dr. Taiaiake 
Alfred, Indigenous affairs, 2001, no 3, 28. 
61 N. 13, 127. 
62 “Le droit social, le droit individual” by Leon Duguit, in The Progress of continental law in the nineteenth century, by various 
authors. The Continental legal history series, v. 11, South Hackensack, N.J., Rothman Reprints, reprint of the 1918 
ed., 1969. 
63 The question of social use of property in Auguste Comte (1892). Système de politique positive, quoted by Duguit 
in various authors n. 62, 134. 
64 „[…]to leave his lands uncultivated, his city lots unimproved, his house untenanted and unrepaired.‟ Duguit, n. 62, 
132. 
65 „The dominium of the individual is no more intelligible as a right than the imperium of the Government as the seat of 
force.‟ by Duguit, various authors n. 62, 133. 
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affirming that „[d]ominium and Imperium are two legal conceptions from the same source that 
always move [in] parallel‟.66 
Likewise by 1921 and a propos of the concept of sovereignty Harold Laski argued that, on 
the one hand, lawyers by mere description of the ultimate source of rights, had described a 
state „whose sovereign organ has unlimited and irresistible power‟ whereas on the other, 
philosophers have only „reinforced the legal concept‟ through teleological justifications and 
only „drawing attention to the greatness of the purpose by which the state has been 
informed‟.67  To Laski, the conceptual weakness would explain why the legal theory of 
sovereignty could never offer a basis for a working philosophy of state because from the 
beginning it takes its stand upon the „beatification of order; and it does not inquire […] into 
the purposes for which order is maintained‟.68  Eventually, Laski made a call for a new 
philosophy of the state because in his opinion „the implied corollary of our purpose [was] the 
widespread distribution of power‟.69 
 
Following Bartelson‟s proposition, I also believe that the history of the concept of 
sovereignty has to be studied not in isolation or within a narrow temporal frame but in 
relation to other concepts.  In consequence the question is how the very concept of 
sovereignty rose from the perspective of „larger discursive wholes‟.70  Historically, the legal 
and political expression “sovereignty” comes from Latin and has come to English from the  
French soverain which means „a supreme ruler not accountable to anyone, except perhaps to 
God‟.71  According to Ullmann the concept of the ruler‟s sovereignty Rex in regno suo est 
emperor is a juristic scholarship elaboration which as „supreme and inappealable governmental 
power‟ could only be viewed in terms of Roman emperorship‟.72   
 
The concept of sovereignty has two facets, one “internal” which encompasses the notion of 
„domestic authority‟ or absolute local supremacy over all other potential authorities within 
the state‟s boundaries.  This would encompass three prerogatives: final judicial decision 
                                                 
66 Duguit, various authors n. 62, 131 quoting “Le droit social, le droit individual” Duguit (1911). 
67 The foundations of sovereignty, and other essays by Harold Joseph Laski, Freeport, N.Y., Books for Libraries Press, (first 
published 1921), 1968, 26. 
68 N. 67, 29. 
69 Ibid. 
70 N. 15, 2. 
71 Law, power, and the sovereign state: The evolution and application of the concept of sovereignty by M. Fowler and J. Bunck, 
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, 4. 
72 N. 46, 102. 
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(jurisdiction); the making of law through the legislative power, and; the enforcement of law 
through the executive power. 73  Then, the “external” sovereignty would embrace the idea of 
independence of states reciprocally seen as relative equals on the international community in 
the belief that a sovereign state‟s rights and duties „expresses responsibility as well as 
authority‟.74  The latter feature seems to come from the second and third centuries A.D. 
when the language of pagan Roman Law was assimilated to Christian ideology and the 
relationship between God and Man began to be conceived of in terms of rights and duties.75   
 
The dual and constitutive character of the concept of sovereignty provides „an ordering 
principle for what is “internal” to states and “external” to them‟.76  This principle has 
originated in the idea of absolute political power within the society and the principle that no 
supreme authority exists over and above the collection of communities.77  According to 
Bartelson, the problem with this dual and constitutive character is that it has led to 
„structuration theorists‟ (Wendt and Dessler) to turn sovereignty into a basic constitutive rule 
of the international system withdrawing sovereignty itself from study, leaving it 
unquestioned.78 
 
The sovereign state is a thing “indivisible” whether taken as a whole or in a specific locus 
within the same state.79  From Jean Bodin (1530-1596) onwards, the theory of sovereignty 
„placed the sovereign above the law and made him the sole source of right and wrong in the 
state‟.80  The “supreme” reason explains why, in my opinion, Bartelson considers sovereignty 
„prima facie incoherent‟ since it signifies the political power constituting the law and 
restraining that very power.81 
 
Bartelson, as well as Fowler and Bunck, have argued that the rhetoric of sovereignty may be 
traced back to early philosophers of international law.  Jean Bodin, a French philosopher, 
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popularised the term in 157682 by his famous statement: „“Sovereignty is the absolute and 
perpetual power of a commonwealth”‟83 not limited in power, in function, or in length of 
time.84  To Bodin, it is “perpetual” because it persists independently from the people or 
„“trustees of a power that was confided to them for a definite period of time”‟.85  It is 
“absolute” because it „“consists of giving the law to subjects in general without their 
consent”‟.86 
 
Even though there is some discussion about who were the genuine outliners of the concept, 
according to Ullmann, the idea of „territorial sovereignty‟ or internal sovereignty was not 
firstly developed by Bodin but by John of Paris, Clement V in 1313.87  Also that it was Raoul 
de Presle (1361-64) who developed it in its internal and external aspects.88  Moreover, it was 
Bartolus de Sassoferrato during the fourteenth century who devoted special monographs to 
„political‟ problems89 by conceiving sovereignty as a „classical instance of applying Roman 
law to contemporary conditions‟.90  Bartelson suggests that „the very term sovereignty was 
not present within political discourse until Beaumanoir introduced it in the thirteenth 
century‟.91  Bodin however was the first one to stress the feature of indivisibility and its 
functions as a mark of individuality of the state in legal terms.92  The state becomes the 
individual and consequently borrows the subliminal Roman attribution of being lord, master, 
owner and absolute possessor. 
 
Regardless of determining “the” ideologists of the theory of sovereignty, the absolute, 
perpetual and indivisible sermon, which in the terms of Jacques Maritain (1969) „admits no 
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degrees‟93, still dominates most of political science theory though polished by contemporary 
discourses of the “rule of law”, respect for human rights and democracy. 94   According to 
Fowler and Bunk, it was Hans Blix who stated that the monolithic „chunk‟ approach of 
conceiving sovereignty as ownership or as „bundle of rights‟ has moved from absolute terms 
to depict it in relative terms as a „bundle of competences‟.95  Thus, by way of example, thanks 
to this “basket” approach, the “chunk” conception of sovereign immunity rather than being 
understood as applying to all „judicial processes of a foreign state‟ is today solely seen in 
relation to public acts and not private or commercial ones.96 
 
The discourse of sovereignty required a concrete political act to emerge.  In fact, it is widely 
agreed that the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 delineated for the very first time the modern 
European system of sovereign states.97  This particular political act was the starting point of 
modern international relations which presuppose the existence of “states” or independent 
political communities asserting sovereignty „in relation to a particular portion of the earth‟s 
surface and a particular segment of the human population‟ .98 
 
Deconstructing sovereignty and land ownership 
 
According to Bartelson, the theoretical foundation of sovereignty is conceptualized in logical 
interdependence with the physical space „right from the start‟.99  Sovereignty is a necessary 
condition of a bounded territory and, vice versa, a delimited territory is a necessary condition 
to sovereignty.100  The significance of space in political theory is vital.   The “space” is a 
physical fact because any human configuration must occupy a piece of it; an environmental 
fact because it is there where humans find their resources for subsistence; a theatre for human 
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activities and rivalries, and also a geopolitical fact „since the sense attributed to space is 
determined by a particular configuration‟ of those relations.101   
 
Correspondingly, the “territory” or the “space” is the premise shared between sovereignty 
and land ownership.  The modern idea of sovereignty might have been conceived from the 
strong ideology of classical private law, in regards to land ownership, and, the post-classical 
Imperial Roman law “maxims” of government.  According to Ullmann, one of the „crucial 
Roman law notions‟ was jurisdiction: „the power to fix in a final manner what is right and 
just, to determine what is the law‟.102  The emperor or princeps „disposed of the authority to 
lay down the law for his subjects‟.  The guvernator or governor „had jurisdiction from which 
no appeal lay to any higher court‟.  The guvernatio was essentially the exercise of jurisdiction, 
and that was the foundation on which the development of political ideas in the Middle Ages 
rested.103 
 
The Christian standpoint, which „found its most conspicuous expression in the law‟104, and 
consequently in the jurisprudence, also played a major role in the development of political 
ideas in the Middle Ages.  Applied Christian doctrine, and its „character of indivisibility in 
regard to thought and actions‟105, fertilised the very idea of supreme (sovereign) power.   
Thus, it seems that upon the medieval Christian stance, the revival of Roman classical 
conceptions of law (ownership) and the post classical maxims of guvernatio, the theory of 
sovereignty found fertile ground. 
 
For Imperial Rome and for the Catholic Church of the High Middle Ages, the notional 
source of all legitimate authority was upward.  The so called descending theory of government 
and law understood the “power” to have descended „from a transcendental sphere above‟.106  
Hence, while the Supreme Being for Imperial Rome was the princeps (Latin “first one,” or 
“leader”), to the wholeness of the Church doctrine which covered all aspects of human life, 
the Supreme Being, or the source of all original power, was God.107  The medieval temporal 
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ruler was believed to receive this power from God and it was the ruler who then, distributed 
it downwards.108  This “descending” conception, according to Ullmann and Bartelson, 
replaced the previous “ascending” theory (the power from the people) which came from 
Germanic tribes109, old Roman Republic110 and ancient Greece.111  Ulpian „referred to lex 
regia, according to which the Roman people had transferred all its powers to the Ruler.‟112 
 
With the descending medieval theory of power the social body was just a passive recipient of 
its animating force.  However, as a result of the penetration (through the Church) of pre 
imperial law (classical) and, the revival of Aristotelian philosophy, during the 12th and 13th 
centuries, the theological descending discourse was superseded.113  With Aristotle‟s ideas, 
that the law-making power was located in the people itself, the ascending theme „made its 
reappearance after centuries of hibernation‟.114  The ruler‟s legitimacy derived from profane 
sources. „[P]ower and authority flow[ed] from the immanent source of an earthly 
community‟115. 
 
Unlike the descending theory which conceived the medieval subditus116, the ascending 
terminology politikos carried the connotation of a ruler circumscribed by the law and the 
community.117  The notion of “state” is man-made and its purpose is a „purely terrestrial 
one‟.118  In fact, to Machiavelli, lo stato (the state) was an object of action which cannot act by 
itself, tied to the agency of a ruler, yet „as something existing independently of him‟.119  
 
                                                 
108 N. 46, 31. 
109 N. 46, 78 „Between the mid-twelve and mid-thirteenth centuries Roman law became a source of inspiration, 
imitation and accommodation, and one of the most conspicuous results was the strong accentuation of the 
Roman base of government and the concomitant abandonment of the hitherto unquestioned Germanic and 
customary bases.‟ 
110 N. 46, 56 Through the ascending theory the Roman People who originally possessed imperium voluntarily 
renounced its own republican powers to the prince. 
111 N. 46, 30 – 31. 
112 Ibid. 
113 N. 15, 92. 
114 N. 46, 271. 
115 N. 15, 101. 
116 N. 46, 271. 
117 N. 15, 102. 
118 N. 15, 103. 
119 N. 15, 112. 
 35 
Thanks to Thomas Aquinas the Christian faith was reconciled with the Aristotelian reason, 
and ultimately allowed the re-emerging of the ascending theory of government.  The political 
animal, the rational citizen, takes part „in the shaping of his own community, the State, by 
creating the law‟.120  The state was understood, from then onwards, as „a body of citizens 
sufficing for the purposes of life‟.121  Aristotle‟s bipolarity of thinking that „man and citizen 
correspond to two different categories of thought‟ replaced the Platonic-Christian uni-polar 
wholeness by distinguishing individuals into political and ethical categories.122  In other 
words, the good citizen is not necessarily a good man, and vice versa the good man does not 
need to be a good citizen.123  
 
The intrinsic characteristics or the notional suppositions underlying both Roman classical 
and post classical conceptions of ownership and government, ideologically fed the “baby”, 
which latter became the canon of medieval thinkers.  The medieval scholars nearly 
reproduced the notions inherited from classical law and from the principles of imperial 
Roman Law.  The difference was their belief in the Christian-God as the only legitimate 
source of power.  For republican Rome the ascending theme was the belief, for imperial 
Rome the descending theme was the belief.  Eventually, the supreme power originated in the 
medieval “God” is later and again replaced by the “popular” or “terrestrial” modern idea of 
sovereign power and its “ascending” inspiration. 
 
The Roman Law constituted the most familiar legal corpus for the Anglo-Saxon and 
continental refined-elitist culture of renaissance Europe.  Roman law institutions were, 
therefore, the most familiar intellectual tool for the fledgling academia.  The resurrection of 
the Aristotelian philosophy occasioned the revival of classical Roman law and consequently 
the revival of its notions.  The revival of the Roman Law occasioned, likewise, the 
resurrection of German customary bases and its ascending beliefs.124 
 
According to Balke, Michel Foucault used to stress that if we want to analyse “power” we 
have to get away from the inherited legal political theory of sovereignty which dates from the 
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Middle Ages to the emerging absolute monarchies, as a result of „the reactivation of  Roman 
law‟. 125  The discourse of sovereignty, Foucault stated, has prevented us from thinking about 
a power that has long ceased to function according to the model of sovereignty‟.126  Foucault 
depicted the genesis of sovereignty „as a process of increasing estrangement between the 
king and his ancestral people‟.127  The king became a sovereign when he successfully rose 
above his former people in order to make his position of power invulnerable.128  According 
to Balke, Foucault was a great admirer of Georges Dumezil who drew on the Roman 
version of the „Indo-European system of representing power‟, the classic Vedic three order 
pattern or model of trifunctionality which was represented by the Priest, the Warrior and the 
Farmer. 129  The Roman sequence of Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus  provided the framework to 
Foucault‟s depiction of sovereignty as „juridical and magical at the same time‟: In the Indo-
European system of representing power, power has always had two faces: one juridical 
through obligations, oaths, commitments, and the other magical function of dazzling and 
petrifying through power.130  Jupiter is an „eminently divine representative of power‟, the god 
who binds and „the god who hurls thunderbolts‟.131   
 
Foucault explained that “our” history has been Jupiterian „with the form of discourse 
emerging at the threshold to the 17th century‟132 but unlike the Indo-European ternary order 
the new discourse is bounded by a binary perception of society and men, which is „opposed 
to both organic and bodily models of society‟133 and it divides between „ “…them and us, the 
injust and the just, the masters and those who must obey them, the rich and the poor, the 
mighty and those who have to work in order to live”‟ and so on. 134 
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From my deconstructive standpoint there are no differences between both western systems 
of representing power, either ascending or descending.  The western indivisibility is 
notionally present in the conceptions of government and law, namely ascending or 
descending themes.  To Bartelson, the indivisibility „hovers between legal fictions either 
concentrated in the hands of one man or dispersed in the general will or in the consent of 
majority‟.135   The state „is seen as an individual, in the sense of being indivisible‟.136  
Therefore, and paraphrasing the humanist John Wyclif (1320- 84), if the nation-state is 
nothing but the citizen writ large137 then indivisibility standardizes both conceptions of 
individual and state and hence via replication the individual concept of ownership 
intellectually shapes the collective concept of sovereignty. 
 
The underpinnings of the supreme power are, according to Foucault, juridical and magical, 
at the same time.  The western depiction, of the origin of power and the inherent faculties 
attached to it, belongs to the enigma of absolute supremacy in regards to the governance of 
the “territorial space”.  Ownership and sovereignty are the representation of how some 
people of western culture understand their relationship with the land.  From these premises, 
the western conception of power arose to become the already denounced (by Duguit and 
Laski) theoretically out-of-reach theory of sovereignty.   
 
The underlying belief of the theories of government, namely descending or ascending, is the 
existence of first and untouchable source which is very mystical.  “Mysticism” of this kind is 
not exclusive to western knowledge.  In Polynesia, the representation of power did not 
incarnate as “land ownership” or “sovereignty” but rather it did so by divinizing people and 
things and excluding them from the rest of the people.  The coherent philosophy of mana 
and tapu138 replaced the western logic of land ownership and sovereignty and also enabled 
the exercise of power bypassing enforcement agencies.139 
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The dichotomous Zeitgeist: The Greco-Roman tradition and the distinctions of 
Roman Law 
 
When and how did the indivisible, absolute, perpetual and exclusive representation of power 
emerge?  Did the Vedic-tripartite and Greek-binary dialectics furnish the Roman concept of 
ownership with “categorical imperatives”?  When thinking of ownership or sovereignty, I 
wonder what confers on its assumptions the character of maxims.  Probably, the answer is 
“cultural notions” or, paraphrasing Bartelson, the unthought parts of our political 
understanding are what make the concept of sovereignty intelligible.140 
 
According to Fukuyama, Hegel argued that human consciousness was limited by the 
particular social and cultural conditions, of „the times‟.141  Human history is not just a 
succession of different civilizations but more importantly a succession of different forms of 
consciousness namely ways of thinking about fundamental questions, beliefs, and the 
manner in which men perceive the world.142  In the same manner, the zeitgeist reasoning can 
be applied to law.  According to Stein, the German jurist Von Savigny affirmed that the law 
grows „“by internal silently operating forces, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver”‟ .143  Law 
therefore would not be a mere construct of reason but a product of the tradition and ethos 
of a particular society.  Each nation‟s institution such as language and laws „reflect this 
popular character and should change as society changes‟.144   
 
What we owe to Rome is Roman Law which fairly reflected the spirit of the time which has 
lasted to the present day.145  Roman Law not only „shaped intellectual habits and created a 
mode of thinking which was unique in the history of civilization‟146 but also „played an 
important role in the creation of the idea of a common European culture‟.147  Scholarly 
examination of Roman law was the first academic discipline in the history of Europe 
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beginning between the mid-twelfth and mid-thirteenth centuries.148  Roman Law became a 
source of inspiration, imitation and accommodation „and one of the most conspicuous 
results was the strong accentuation of the Roman base of government and the concomitant 
abandonment of the hitherto unquestioned Germanic and customary bases.‟149 
Ullmann argues that it was only in combination with scholarship that Roman Law attained 
the all-pervading influence which it actually commanded.150  For example, it was through the 
writings and teachings of the civilians that the ancient Roman idea of universality became 
one of the most favoured public law maxims151.  „The Roman law was to be the general and 
basic norm applicable to all mankind‟152 but most importantly „the civilians‟ theses formed a 
bridge to the late medieval and modern conception of sovereignty possessed by the lay 
Ruler.‟153 
 
Although Romans were not interested in the philosophy of law they imported the Hellenic 
tradition to shape their law.  According to Jolowicz, the Hellenistic „dialectical method‟ 
involved the division between „subject-matter into parts, and the distinction of genera and 
species‘.154  Cicero thought that the „law might be reduced to an ars, and even wrote a book on 
the subject.‟155  In his „rhetorical treatises‟ he commonly distinguished between persons and 
things.156  Thus, according to Jolowicz, the historical origins of the tripartite Roman-Gaius 
division of law, was, apparently, originated in Greece through Cicero or more specifically 
from the Hellenistic model157.  According to Stein, under the influence of Greek methods of 
classifications, the hitherto casuistic Roman Law was systematised for the first time at about 
100 BC158, but it was not until the middle of the second century AD when „a major advance 
was made in arranging the substance of private law.‟159  From the 11th century the Justinian 
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Corpus Iuris Civilis came to be the main „source of rules and arguments in western Europe.‟160  
It declared that „the whole of our law relates either to persons or to things or to actions.‟161  
The second category, “things”, included anything to which a money value could be 
attributed162 and comprehended both „res corporales, things which could be touched (a table, a 
house or a piece of land) and res incorporales or abstract things, things which could not be 
touched‟163 which only exist in the mind‟s eye (eg. a debt, a right of way).164 
 
Based on the „physical quality of mobility‟ of the thing, res corporales or physical things can be 
further divided into immoveables and moveables. 165  This classification distinguishes land, its 
natural productions (trees and fruits hanging upon their trees) and the buildings (permanent 
structures erected upon land) which go with it, from all other property.166  Movable things 
were those which „from their nature are not stationary and therefore can be carried away, 
including animals which move themselves.‟167  From classical Roman Law, the distinction 
between land and other forms of property became prominent.  Although modern legislation 
had established particular variants for practical uses, the binary essence and its characteristics 
are still „strongly maintained‟ in two separate species of property. 168 
 
The distinction between public and private law, attributed to Ulpian (228 A.D.) also became a 
prominent feature in the “Justinian Law”.169  In continental Europe and Latin America it 
remains of fundamental importance.  Public law was concerned with the functioning of the 
state including constitutional and criminal law and, Private law was concerned „with relations 
between individuals.‟170  Later it came to delimit the spheres of several codes being the base 
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of the continental modern doctrine of the separation of powers and law.171  Public law dealt 
with matters affecting the administration of government and connected with political power, 
sovereign dominion „and regards the welfare of the State‟ .172  Private law instead dealt with 
matters relating to the interests of individuals namely private ownership or the dominion of 
a private owner as distinguished from public ownership or public rights.173   
 
For my deconstructive purposes, there are no differences between the distinction since 
Ulpian‟s “public law maxims” are only fair representations of the Roman zeitgeist of 
(absolute, exclusive, perpetual, indivisible) supremacy.  The implicit notions upon which 
Ulpian drew are just replicas of Roman dominium.  The Ulpian‟s maxims were basically: 
jurisdiction, the law-creative power; imperium „the sum-total of unappealable governmental‟ or 
„the supreme power to lay down the law‟174, and constitutions or the „binding rules created by 
the Ruler.‟175  Ulpian‟s statements of „“what pleases the prince, has the force of law”‟ and 
„“the prince was not bound by the laws”‟176 fairly depict the personal sovereignty of the Ruler 
(the descending theme) by which the princeps forms an estate of his own being „the source of 
the law and therefore stood outside and above the people.‟177  According to Ullmann, the 
Law of Rhodes (contained in the Justinian Code too) proclaimed that Roman emperor was 
dominus mundi and the „lord of the world.‟178  This was not only a statement of legitimacy but 
also of superiority over all other kings and rulers.179   
 
To sum up, the imperium of the ruler became, just a large-scale duplication of the Roman 
land-owner‟s potestas (powers, faculties).  To grasp the complexity of the relationship between 
people and land, Roman jurists recreated, through maxims, the underlying existing notion of 
supremacy established through the law of property. 
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The Roman concept of individual ownership in modern civil law: the human will and 
univocal possession 
 
To classical Roman Law, proprietas or dominium was „the mastery or the absolute control over 
a thing except as one may be restrained by law.‟180  Ownership was simply the difference 
between mine and thine, the ultimate right, the right behind all other rights.181  Ownership 
involved total rights over a thing, in the sense of the most comprehensive rights over the 
thing which the positive law admits, the so called plena in re potestas.  Roman ownership was 
indivisible.182  A man was either owner or not owner.  His title must be good against the 
whole world or against no one.  The owner was entitled to use the thing (ius utendi), to enjoy 
its products up to its entire consumption  (ius fruendi/abutendi) and also the owner had the 
right to dispose of it absolutely (ius disponendi) or alienate it at will. 183  The absoluteness 
concept also comprehended that ownership was not the better of competing rights but the 
best right, the only one of its kind. 
 
The idea of absoluteness underlies the law in France, Germany and Chile.  To the French 
Civil Code (Art. 544) ownership or propriété „is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the 
most absolute manner, subject to the laws and regulations in force‟.  In German law (Art. 
903 B.G.B.) the owner or eigentümer „in so far as the law and the rights of third parties permit, 
deals with the thing as he pleases and restrain others from interfering with it.‟184  According 
to article 582 of Chilean Civil Code185, dominio o propiedad „is the real right over a corporeal 
thing to enjoy and dispose arbitrarily of it, not being against the law or another‟s right.‟186 
 
Thus, modern ownership is inviolable since „a man cannot lose ownership without his 
consent.‟187  Whoever is recognised as owner will therefore be the only person entitled to the 
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totally of rights which ownership entails.‟188  To Ryan, „the exclusive character of the right of 
ownership is a cardinal principle both of later Roman law and the present civil law.‟189  To 
Planiol and Ripert, who were the “ideologists” of the French Civil Code, a thing „could not 
belong in its totality to two persons‟190 and only one person can be an owner.191  This is the 
exclusive and individual character of dominium, the attribution to a single person of the 
ownership of the thing itself.192  
 
By reinforcing Roman insights, the cultural representations of dominum and imperium 
permeated modern philosophies.  In this regard, the idea of “Roman possessio‖ might have 
played a major role.  According to Stein, Savigny insisted on a particular mental and physical 
relationship between the possessor and the thing possessed as having general application to 
all developed legal systems.193 
 
According to Watson, “Roman possessio” was the physical contact over a thing, which one 
exercises either directly or through another person.194  A person acquired possession when 
he firstly „had sufficient physical control over the thing‟ or corpus and secondly when he had 
animus or „the requisite intention‟195 to control it by exclusion of others.  Savigny believed 
that the „central principle of possession‟ was a manifestation of the human will.196  Moreover, 
according to Burdick, during the earliest times of Roman society „ownership was associated 
with the thought of power, physical power.‟197  Violence and force were the common modes 
of getting and retaining what one desired.198  Therefore, in my opinion, the conscious-primitive 
desire of “retaining” things via physical power, violence and exclusion of all others, 
underpinned the later unconscious-civilized idea of classical Roman Law: the safeness given by 
the protection of ownership via absolute and invulnerable legal barriers. 
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Rationalism, codification, individualism and property 
 
By the end of the 17th century Roman-civil law, had already permeated the protestant culture 
of northern Europe.199  During the 17th and 18th centuries „the new rationalism of the school 
of natural law‟ appears „believing that the law for any society could by the use of reason be 
derived from principles inherent in the nature of man and society‟.200  Natural law ideas led 
to the codification movement to replace „irrational‟ Roman Law features with logic in law, 
that is, a set of consistent principles and rules systematically arranged into a single system of 
written codes.201  The efforts towards codification were inspired as well by the belief that the 
ancient regime must be overthrown and replaced by another „founded upon rationalistic 
principles.‟202  The rationalist natural law philosophy proclaimed that a complete set of laws 
could be simply and rationally stated and that the existing complexities were to be 
eliminated.203  The Roman Law „was caught up‟ by the codification movement, under the 
umbrella of the intellectual movements of the Enlightenment.204  This also brought a second 
life for Roman Law by replacing it with the civil law or the successor of the continental 
common law (droit commun).  The codification gave to Roman Law „a new life‟ and extended 
it to territories into which it could never otherwise have entered.205 
 
The aim pursued by 19th century philosophers, ultimately, was to allow „maximum freedom 
to the human will‟206 or under Savigny‟s interpretation, to allow the free expression of the 
principle of Roman possession.  The predominant philosophy of the 19th century was 
inspired by individualism207 and the consequence is to grant the greatest possible liberty to 
the individual.  Individualism was to govern not only relationships between individuals and 
the State but also between individuals themselves.208  This approach is intelligible since the 
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previous centuries were characterized by royal despotism, inequality in personal status and 
land ownership, obstacles to industrial freedom, commerce and industry.  Reasonably, social 
philosophers strove to set up the conception of individual and property as bases of social 
organization and law.209  As to the Romans, the 19th century scholars distinguished between 
public and private law. The former they desired to entirely reconstruct from pure reason.  
The new foundations were constituted by „the unrestricted and private right of property 
(unburdened by all feudal charges210), the guarantees of the rights of man, the sovereignty of 
the people, and, the separation of the powers of government.211 
 
In the case of private law, liberty of the individual was still the ideal but delimited by rules by 
which „the liberty of each could co-exist with the liberty of all‟.212  They resolved the 
intellectual overlap caused by the interaction of both absolute individual and collective 
principles by saying that individualism „was in no wise inconsistent with the recognition of 
the supreme power of the State, which was regarded as sovereign merely in order to assure 
to each citizen a maximum of liberty‟.213  On the basis of individualism the modern „law of 
property looked upon (a) the will of the individual as autonomous, (b) his activities as free 
and (c) the rights acquired voluntarily and freely by an act of his will as inviolate.‟214  The 
right of ownership was proclaimed as absolute, exclusive, and perpetual.215  Absolute because on 
the one hand the owner „could partition the land at will, and work it or not at his pleasure‟216 
and on the other hand due to the right to transmit property by will, the owner or title-holder 
had the power to dispose of „his property both during his life and also for a time after his 
death.‟217  Then, such rights were exclusive, because no one could acquire his title against his 
will, or effect a dismemberment of it, no matter how great the advantage that might accrue 
thereby to society.‟218 
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The Polynesian dichotomy: The “loose” possessive 
 
At the beginning I affirmed that Easter Islanders are bearers of non-Roman legal 
conceptions.  This, however, does not clear up the complexity of historical process, nor does 
it explains how such phenomena may survive despite centuries of colonial intervention.  
These anthropological questions will not be answered here.  The argument here is that the 
existence of “notional elements” are unrecognised components on which the Polynesian 
paradigm, underpins its conscious structure. 
 
During the 20th century, Saussure in linguistics, Levi-Strauss in anthropology and Jacques 
Lacan in psychiatry, depicted cultures as „systems‟ and universal cultural patterns as products 
of the invariant structure of the human mind and even determinant of kinship relations, 
beliefs, art, religion and tradition.219  By assuming that the structure of mind, common to 
mankind, drives basic discernment and even universal values and that the Hegelian 
historical-process determines the cultural distinctiveness, understanding and knowledge, the 
language or the „mirror of the mind‟220 comes to be, ultimately, just a patent representation 
of people thoughts.  Consciousness would be constrained, not only by environmental and 
biological needs, and linguistic appreciations, but also, by historical circumstances.  All those 
factors, altogether, mold the human psyche progressively, in order to build distinctive 
knowledge and different appreciations of reality. 
 
Three mutually geographically isolated Polynesians cultures, namely Marquesas Islands, 
Hawai‟i, and Rapanui, had, and maybe still have, two distinguishing possessives.  Unlike 
western univocal-possessive and its resulting unilinear-possession, “the” Polynesian linguistic 
possessive distinguishes between two different forms of possession or apprehension.  One, 
is intimate/ strong/ inherent/ inalienable/ near, and; the second form is accidental/ 
contingent/ acquired or distant in relationship with people or objects. 
 
In Hawaii, according to Trask, Hawaiians distinguish between “inherent” and “acquired” 
status of possession.  On the one hand, there is a ko‘u which denotes inherent status such as 
my body, ko‘u kino; my parents, ko‘u mâkua; or my land, ko‘u ‗âina.  And, on the other hand, 
there is a ka‘u which denotes an acquired status in relation to „most material objects‟, such as 
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food ka‘u mea‘ai.  Hawaiians „show possession in two ways: through the use of an “a” 
possessive, which reveals acquired status, and through the use of an “o” possessive, which 
denotes inherent status.‟221   
 
In the Marquesas Islands, according to Thomas, „like other Polynesian languages, Marquesan 
had two series of possessives, one to‘u expressing an intimate, strong or inalienable 
relationship between object and possessor which would be used in relation to land, parts of 
the body, certain classes of inherited personal property, etc.‟222, whereas ta‘oe „implies a more 
accidental, loose, or contingent relationship with the land and also with bought or otherwise 
acquired property.‟223 
 
In Rapanui, according to father Englert, there are two kinds of possessives. Tooku which 
refers to „objects which in the native‟s feeling are closer‟, such as the body, dresses, thoughts, 
the house, the horse, watercraft, the land, and lineal ascendants.  And, on the other hand, 
taaku which refers to distant objects in the possessor‟s feeling such as husband, wife, 
offspring, dog.224 
 
All the possessives psychologically differentiate between the “strong” or “weak” relationship 
with the object.  The relationship with land, through the “o”, belongs to the inherent and 
inalienable relationship.  Metaphysically, the land would not belong to the self by univocal-
possessive and unilinear-external attachment but the self and the land reciprocally share a 
sense of belonging.   
 
The linguistic logic makes intelligible to westerners what for them was the unusual reasoning 
of not considering land as a commodity but, on the contrary, an inalienable human feature, 
as the “o”-body.  According to Trask, Hawaiians pre-contact „could not own or privately 
possess the land any more than they could sell it.‟225  According to Chief Judge Durie, to 
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Maori people „the land was not a marketable commodity but held as an ancestral trust.‟226  
According to these depictions the Roman power of ius disponendi was unimaginable, in the 
sense that nobody was entitled to sell or buy the land but only to use it. 
 
The “loose” Polynesian ownership and the Maori “flexible” law 
 
The following quotations from relevant ethnography show implicitly the loose and flexible 
character of the possessive and the law, respectively. 
 
According to Williamson, „Samoans clung to the system of common interest in each other‟s 
property with great tenacity.‟ 227  Not only a house, but a canoe, a boat, a fine, a dowry… 
tools, garments, money etc., were freely lent to each other, provided they were connected 
with the same tribe or clan.  „If a man possessed that for which he was asked, he would 
either give it or tell the lie, either that he had it not, or that he had promised it to some one 
else.‟228  „The community of property, especially of food, was most noticeable. Everything 
appeared to belong to everybody –that is, if it were asked for […]‟229  „[S]tealing from the 
plantation of a relative was not considered wrong, and in fact was not called stealing; it was 
simply a part of a communistic system under which no man could rise above the level of his 
fellows.‟230 
  
In Tahiti, „a man divided everything in common with his friend, and the extent of the word 
friend was, by them, only bounded by the universe.‟231  In Huahine, French Missionaries 
proposed a law „concerning the protection of private property which was submitted to 
with reluctance‟232.  „Tahitians were accustomed to share a part of their food with every one 
about them…‟233  The Tahitian word „aiata means either to eat another‟s food or to take his 
property without leave or consent.  The Tahitian word hamumu means to be burdensome to 
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others by eating their food.  The Tahitian word taia means to die from supposed effect of 
eating without giving to the neighbours.‟234  According to Williamson, „community of 
ownership of private property prevailed to a greater or less degree in the Society Islands, as it 
did in Samoa and Tonga.‟235 
 
In Rapanui, according to Metraux, „the fields were planted and the crops harvested in 
common by the members of a household or by the people living at the same place 
lineage.‟236  The workers were rewarded with a feast or hatu.  To Metraux, it was impossible 
„to determine what system of property was applied as regards poultry because on the one 
hand, „hens undoubtedly had a great value and were used for exchange‟, but on the other 
hand „today everyone gives freely of his clothes and of cooking and tilling implements‟.237  
He added, „between relatives there is a constant exchange of gifts conforming to patterns of 
reciprocity‟. 238  „Children are permitted to use anything they need from the houses of either 
their paternal or maternal relatives.‟ 239  Then, he affirmed that „the few boats on Easter 
Island are joint property of all those who have contributed to their building, either in work 
or in furnishing wood.‟ 240 
 
Also on Rapanui and according to Routledge‟s depictions, „the absence of security of 
property was perhaps the greatest barrier to native progress.‟241  From her western 
standpoint she observed that Easter Islanders „steal freely from one to another, as well as 
from white men, so that all individual effort is rendered nugatory.‟242  At the same time, she 
observed, „they are curiously lacking in pugnacity, and if detected in theft quietly desist or 
return the property…‟ 243   
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Routledge‟s depictions coincide with those made by La Perousse more than hundred years 
before.  La Perousse was one of the first Europeans to land on Te Pito O Te Henua.  He 
observed that Easter Islanders were avid for sailors‟ hats, handkerchiefs and, in general, for 
every species of animals that the crew left on the island.  The only exception to this were 
their „muskets‟ which „they returned a few minutes afterwards, renewed their caresses, and 
watched a favourable moment to commit new thefts.‟244 
 
In Aotearoa/New Zealand, according to Eddie Durie, Maori society yet widely accepted 
rights of property only a few possessions were not held in common, and; 
 
„[…] it was not unethical to try to advance one‟s fortunes, or those of one‟s kin, by tricky 
conduct.  It was more shameful to be caught out or demonstrably to fail […] Thefts were 
occasionally committed in a spirit of boldness and daring, offenders readily admitting their 
actions […] With the exception of heirlooms and personal ornaments, personalty was not so 
much owned as imbued with the mana of those who expended labour on it, and a number of kin 
might feel entitled to access the object because of their connections with the persons concerned 
or with the figures associated with the ornamented carvings […] Few would dare to touch the 
possessions of a high ranking rangatira however […] Powerful people deliberately broke rules to 
prove that they were strong and possessed of great mana.‟
245 
 
According to Durie, Maori pre-contact institutions and the dynamics of custom and oral 
tradition were flexible, fluid, plastic and adaptable.246  Central to Maori self-identity was 
whakapapa (genealogy) which worked for mana tupuna (ancestors) ideology where „all things 
came from ancestors, land rights, status, authority, kinship, knowledge, ability.247  Maori 
tikanga (law) or the Maori principles of justice did not operate by finite rules alone but by 
reference to principles and values not necessarily achievable.248  Without reference to 
institutional organs or super-ordinate authority, tikanga was pragmatic, flexible and not 
bounded by rigid rules but subject to reinterpretation according to circumstances.249  „The 
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Maori legal conception was thus values orientated not rules based250 and custom „served to 
guide, not bind‟ because „rules were not as important as their origins and purpose, and 
decision making was based on pragmatic needs of survival.‟251  „The adherence to principles, 
not rules, enabled change while maintaining cultural integrity.‟ 252 
 
According to Keenan, Maori customary law was characterized by the absence of 
„enforcement agencies‟ (Courts, Army). 253  Although practices varied, from place to place, 
the nature of power in Maori pre-contact society was „spread‟ and „diffused‟ in the sense of 
decision making.  He affirms that Maori traditional society operated by reference to 
principles, goals and values which, not always achievable, were defined by the tikanga.  The 
Maori worldview depended upon being connected.  Mental constructs were cycles not lines 
and nothing existed in isolation.  The society was shaped by principles which were always 
attributed to ancestors.  The colonisation however marked the beginning of „static customs‟ 
as well as the sense of „right and wrong‟.  With the influence of Christianity, Maori practices 
of tattooing, dancing, polygamy, warfare, muru (or „plunder to appease offences […] or to 
appease a breach of tapu or taking of mana‟254) etc… became acceptable or unacceptable 
according to those Christian principles.  
 
The Mana and Tapu philosophy: The implicit coercion 
 
In legal terms, the “flexible” character of Maori customary law and the Polynesian “lax” 
sense of ownership (permitted by the “loose” linguistic possessive) are related to the 
philosophy of mana and tapu.  Social control‟s sustainability did not depend on enforcement 
agencies or imperium but in the metaphysical faith of believing in exceptional representations 
of power and control.  In western societies the equivalent to this is the auctoritas of law. 
 
Also, the philosophy of mana and tapu is perhaps comparable to the Foucaultian facets of 
“power”: one „juridical‟ by obligations, oaths, and other „magical‟ of petrifying through 
power.255  The ideology of mana and tapu could have fulfilled the role played by the juridical 
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and magical notions which still seem to underpin western beliefs.  What the mana and tapu 
ideology and the descending and ascending theories of law and government have in common is 
the juridical and magical role they play. 
 
Mana was “supreme” though it depended on the ability of the community to sustain it 
through the appropriateness of each established tapu.  To Maori, „power was the product of 
mana, not of institutionalised structures‟256.  Maori customary law was not respected because 
of its imperium but by reason of its auctoritas.  Without institutions to enforce the law, the lax 
legal understanding needed to have something mystical or morally transcendental to attract 
people.  Law needs to be respected to be considered as such otherwise is not law but just an 
unfixed social convention.  Mana and tapu gave to customary law the necessary authority to 
keep the body of rules coherent.  To a greater or lesser degree, depending on local variations, 
these two basic constraints gave auctoritas and brought people together under the customary 
law, whatever its worthiness. 
 
In Maori society „mana described the personal and political dimensions of Maori 
authority…‟ 257  „The individual of whatever class or caste gained or regained mana through 
personal achievement and ability for the benefit of others.‟258  Mana was not absolute. 
Therefore, the rangatira, or political leader, of the hapu259 could increase, reduce or lose his 
mana according to his success or failure. 260 
 
According to Fischer, „only high-ranking individuals (and not everyone, as Durie states) 
possessed mana –that is, socio-spiritual power–  which ultimately derived from ancestors.‟261  
Moreover, „to maintain uncontaminated mana and ensure continued success, very early 
Polynesian society devised a ritual restrictive complex or tapu.‘262  „Tapu affected use of land, 
crops, buildings, precincts and the sanctity of individuals‟.  Tapu also „affected the behaviour, 
speech, diet, sexual practices, beliefs and attitudes‟ by embracing a way of thinking deeply 
rooted in Polynesian societies.  Tapu were not just rules over persons and things but „a 
                                                 
256 N. 33, 40. 
257 N. 33, 5. 
258 N. 33, 40. 
259 The essential political units for local governance and social intercourse. 
260 N. 33, 16. 
261 N. 33, 27. 
262 N. 33, 27. 
 53 
philosophy of life‟.  Tapu „was rigorously enforced social code against which the positions 
and actions of each member of the island community were daily defined.‟263 
 
According to Durie, nonetheless, there were not only mana and tapu but also other 
„conceptual regulators‟ to control the behaviour of Maori people. 264  Resources and 
rangatira‟s possessions could be protected by tapu, imposed by the tohunga265 or declared by a 
rangatira whose mana was tapu as well.266  The belief was so intense that Maori people 
attributed some physical and mental illnesses to breach of tapu..267 
 
In the Marquesas Islands „tapu was a hierarchical system which disabled some actors and 
constantly reordered associations with products.‟268  The extension of tapu created an 
indissoluble association between a thing and a person by constituting notions of ownership 
and prestations.269  Objects which accidentally became tapu were generally abstracted from 
common use and put in such places as the roofs of tapu houses.‟270 
 
During the early pre-contact era in Rapanui, the person and residence of the ariki mau was 
considered tapu.  According to Englert, the ariki mau  was a loose king who held limited 
political power over all the various larger kin-groups271.  Nobody could even touch the ariki‟s 
body and hair.272  By controlling a supernatural authority on the island, the ariki mau was 
respected for being a repository of mana. 
 
Common or collective ownership: The misunderstanding 
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From a specific legal perspective, I have been arguing that the classical depiction of 
Polynesian “land tenure” or the “clan system” misinterpreted the legal nature of the 
phenomenon.  It assumes that the pre-contact understanding must be tackled in terms of 
“common ownership” which is a form of “co-property”.  Naturally, the dichotomic Greek-
Roman cultural heritage leads to contrasting common to individual property and vice versa. 
 
According to Ryan, the phenomenon of co-ownership occurs when an „undivided res is held 
by several co-owners.‟273  The right of ownership is divided among the co-owners or among 
the subjects of the right whilst the object itself is undivided.  Each one has a fractional 
interest in it.  „Although the civil law refuses in accordance with Roman law to detach 
ownership from the object owned, it does introduce a notional concept when an object is 
owned by more than one proprietor.‟274  The right of ownership is divided among the 
subjects of the right whilst the object itself is undivided.275  
 
The legal idea is exceptional since understand that an “undivided” strip of land may, 
abstractly, be shared amongst individuals.  The contrast between common and individual 
emerges from the indivisible, absolute and exclusive character of the individual ownership.  
Indeed, both classifications draw on the individual as the centre of analysis.  The land 
remains undivided but the rights over it do not.  Then, the concept of common ownership 
supposes an exceptional and temporal state, not a perpetual one, because in the end, every 
“owner” may dispose of his share at will and, the “community of owners” is, ultimately, 
meant to come to an end, be concluded, finished or abandoned. 
 
To the Romans „the rights of co-owners [were] conceived as shares of the individual mass.‟276 
The Roman Law co-owner „can dispose freely of his shares even without the consent of his 
associates.‟277  Apparently, in contrast, the Civil law mitigated the Roman principle when 
stating that each co-owner is at liberty to dispose, as he pleases, but he cannot dispose 
without the consent of the other co-owners278.  There is no contradiction however since the 
co-owner‟s power is intact.  Indeed, it is exercised when compulsory repartition is requested 
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by “the rebel” to the rest.  According to French Civil Code (art. 815) and German Civil law 
(art. 749 BGB), common ownership is regarded as essentially a temporary state, and at any 
moment a co-owner can put an end to it by claiming partition.279  Thus, we can see that the 
absolute and indivisible character does not disappear through the common ownership or co-
ownership but, it is in fact confirmed. 
 
After the Chilean annexation of Rapanui on September 9 1888, the agent of colonisation, 
Pedro P. Toro, who stayed on the Island for four years (1888 – 1892) made „the first 
assessment of Rapanui land ownership seen through the eyes of a Chilean who had first-
hand knowledge of the situation.‟280  According to Delsing, even though „Toro had no 
insight into the Polynesian system of land tenure, which allowed for collective use of clan 
lands and he may not have been aware of the existing clan system‟ he described a situation 
very similar to others observed in the rest of Polynesia. 281  At the same time, he 
recommended, to the Chilean government, ways to introduce private property as way to 
make the island more productive.282  Pedro Toro left clear confirmation that „“Private and 
permanent ownership did not really exist in the countryside.  Each individual cultivates and 
sows a plot of land, which he abandons after the harvest to take another one later on”‟.283 
The oral account of the ceremony of annexation of Rapanui in 1888 tells that the king 
Atamu Tekena, while keeping for himself a piece of ground, gives to Policarpo Toro (the 
Chilean official and Pedro‟s brother) a fistful of grass which meant that even though 
sovereignty was given away, the inalienable and ancestral right to land was kept. 284 
 
„Según la tradición oral el entonces ariki Atamu Tekena como gesto simbólico y para reafirmar el acuerdo entre las 
partes, cogió un trozo de pasto con tierra entregándole el pasto a los comisarios, quedándose ellos con la tierra, 
queriendo decir con esto que otorgan la soberanía al gobierno chileno, pero se reservan el derecho inalienable y 
ancestral de su tierra‟.285 
 
                                                 
279 Ibid. 
280 Delsing, n. 45, 5. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Delsing, n. 45, 6. Delsing‟s translation of Pedro Toro‟s words: „The creation of private property would stimulate 
work, production and exchange. It would create healthy competition, since each indigena […] would see himself 
as exclusive owner of his property…‟ 
283 Delsing, n. 45, 5 translating Pedro P. Toro‟s words (1893, 205). 
284 N. 6, II, 62; also n. 10, 87. 
285 According to the CVHyNT, the account is based on Bienvenido Estella (1920) and Paloma Hucke (1995). 
 56 
In my opinion the classical depiction of describing this claim as “common ownership” is 
erroneous.  The fact that the agent of colonisation realized that individual ownership did not 
exist, does not means that common ownership is an alternative to describe the legal meaning 
of this form of land administration.  There is no enough evidence to conclude that 
individuals “shared fractional interests” of the island territory.  Shares which supposedly one 
may dispose of (alienate) at will, or with the consent of the rest of the associates, through 
partition.  The abstraction which represents the fact of imagining “shares”, “quotas” or 
“percentages” in the land was unknown to Polynesians.  The land was not an object of 
abstract division but only object of physical division through boundaries.  The borders 
which existed between tribes, namely mata, in Rapa Nui or hapu to Maori, belonged to the 
„political dimension‟286 of the land tenure system. 
 
This view is not new.  Adrian Tanner argues continuous misrepresentations of colonial and 
postcolonial officials which do not address the, still existing, complex system of indigenous 
Fijian land tenure.  This system comes from pre-colonial times.  The Fijian tenure system, 
 
„… is not based on simple collective (or communal) principles, but on a complex balance of 
individual rights and forms of sharing, embedded in the system of subsistence production, 
involving land, labour, and the redistribution of production. Here the term “collective” applies to 
situations where several individuals have equal rights and/or obligations, while “communal” is 
for more general collective arrangements based in social institutions that deal with a wide range 
of cooperative relations. Colonial authorities formalized their communal mischaracterization of 
land tenure…‟ 287  
 
„When British colonial officials decided to recognize, protect, and register native Fijian land, they 
needed to formalize its principles. They did so by declaring this land to be collectively held, the 
property of a particular patrilineal lineage group, known as mataqali […] Given this formal 
arrangement, native land appears to qualify as common-pool resources from the perspective of 
modern common property theory […] Yet […] the formal land-owning lineages do not actually 
exercise exclusive rights in common, there being a more complex system of rights. While some 
parts of a lineage‟s lands are indeed held and used in common, in other areas, particularly the all-
important garden land, exclusive rights are held by adult individuals, as are rights to other land-
based resources, including the right to harvest some particular forms of natural vegetation…‟ 288 
                                                 
286 N. 33, 64. 
287 “On Understanding Too Quickly: Colonial and Postcolonial Misrepresentation of Fijian Land Tenure” by Adrian 
Tanner, Human organization, Vol. 66, No. 1, spring 2007, pp. 69-77. The Society for Applied Anthropology, 2007, 
69. 
288 N. 287, 70. 
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Tanner‟s incisive account does not try (because it was not his aim) to analyze the legal nature 
of this particular understanding which seems to be eclectic and variable.  Rather, he stresses 
the anthropological features attached to it while implicitly recognising the continuous 
mistake of depicting the land tenure system as “common” or “collective” ownership. 
 
Reframing classical depictions of Polynesia land tenure system, and the legal nature 
of the Polynesian “land governance” 
 
According to Metraux, in ancient Rapanui, the ground belonging to a lineage was called 
„henua poreko ranga (the land where the ancestors were born).‟ 289 
 
„All the people were supposed to have about the same amount of land to cultivate.  Each estate 
was probably a straight strip of land (kainga) which stretched away from the shore toward the 
interior of the land.  Shares owned by the different families were subject to changes from one 
generation to the next, depending upon the deaths and resultants inheritance 290[…] Every family 
owned the land either hereditary, compulsory, or voluntary occupation put into its hands, and if 
you [European] intended to buy land, you had to buy the land s from all the individuals on the 
place in order not to cheat somebody.‟291 
 
According to Sir Kawharu the only primary foundation of the individual right of Maori 
people to landed property was, as in Rapanui, “occupancy”, or appropriation by labour, 
which was deduced from the phrase „“I ka tonu taku ahi, I runga I toku whenua.‖‘292 This means 
that „“my [a possessive] fire has always been kept alight upon my [o possessive] land‖‘293.  
This is consistent with the Marquesan, Rapanui and Hawaiian possessives analysed above. 
 
The Maori kainga was not only valuable because it was “appropriated by labour” a „field of 
operations‟ where „one concentrated on cultivation‟, but also „for dignity and rank that was 
attached to its ownership.294  The land rights, according to Kawharu, „were administered by 
family heads at the sub-tribal level and by representative sub-tribal elders at the tribal 
                                                 
289 N. 236, 142. 
290 N. 236, 143. 
291 N. 236, 142 quoting Roussel. 
292 N. 50, 41 quoting Smith (1942: 54) 
293 Ibid. 
294 N. 50, 45. 
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level.‟295  Kawharu describes this as a sort of “right of usufruct” which in my view is 
erroneous since it is done again through the prism of Roman law of property.   
 
Sir Edward Taihakurei Durie instead refused to depict this use of land as a “right of 
usufruct” because „customary land interests transcended “western ownership” having both 
proprietary and political dimensions. Land rights and rights of political autonomy and 
control were both fused and severable.‟296 
 
„The individual use of land may not be characterized as a usufruct or something less than 
“ownership”‟.  The group right however involved more than ownership and was akin to 
sovereignty. There was a principle of “territorial control” as distinct from land use 
entitlements‟ 297  […] „The term “ownership” is inappropriate in Maori customary, western 
“ownership” vesting the several rights of use, benefit, control, transfer, reversion and 
identification in a single proprietor divorced from community relationships”‟298[…] The Western-
Maori distinction would not appear to be between “individual tenure” and “communal tenure”. 
In varying degrees, western and Maori societies had elements of both. Maori use rights were 
vested in individuals. The distinctive feature of Maori tenure was that individual tenure was 
conditioned by community responsibilities‟ 299  […] „Proprietary interests thus pertained to 
resources not land blocks and individuals owned usufructs, not territory. The right was to use a 
particular resource for a settled purpose intermittently or at an agreed time or season or to 
cultivate or fish at same spot. Consequently many persons and groups had different and 
overlapping interests in any discrete area, one to collect berries, another to plant kumara, some to 
hunt pigeons at certain time and others to build or reside etc. There were also subsidiary use 
rights to traverse the area or to take water‟300. 
 
It can be seen that the overlapping Maori interests related to land do not align with 
classifications of western property.  There is no proper name to describe this but let me call 
it as “geographical control and care of the land” which could have been exercised by 
individuals or by groups of individuals.  Those in charge, those who “supervised” the kainga 
                                                 
295 N. 50, 58.  „The right of every individual to an equal share of his community‟s resources was recognized by giving 
him rights of occupation or access to those resources. These rights could not be taken away from him by anyone, 
even a chief, without the sanction of the community authority that assigned them. However, although his title 
might be inviolable to any other individual, it was at all times subordinate to the general interests of the 
community and could be revoked on the authority of the elders‟. 
296 N. 33, 64. 
297 N. 33, 64. 
298 N. 33, 67. 
299 N. 33, 67. 
300 N. 33, 68. 
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or the fields of operations had, also, the “stewardship” to derive benefit from the whenua, the 
integrated habitat. 
 
In the Marquesas, according to Thomas,  
 
„Some European observers of Marquesas society, who perhaps knew something of the other 
Pacific chiefdoms, assumed that in some sense chiefs owned all the land [but] in the Marquesas, 
parcels of land were individually held and […] there was no privileged chiefly ownership‟301.  
„It appears that this land was either inherited or seized, and that use rights might be allocated on 
various terms, but there is no suggestion that any larger system existed, or any kind of more 
general or regal ownership on the part of a chief…302‟ […] „Independently of the king, who is 
hereditary, and the village chiefs, who are also, […] property is recognized and respected on this 
island…‟.303 
 
In Samoa, a similar situation was observed; property was vested in the family, not in the 
individual.304  „The personal rights of some individuals to certain sites (in the villages) and 
lands were recognised, but as a general rule the lands belonged to the family as a whole…‟305  
According to Williamson „there was not, and could not be, any real title to land; the title was 
by occupation, and those who had once occupied had a right to a share, but no more than a 
share, of what was going.  Any member of a tribe that owned land could come and take his 
portion, but his right was only that of occupation.‟306  Williamson wondered whether „a 
group of owners, or an individual owner, [could] alienate their or his land 307?  „The selling of 
the land to a white man „in the sense of parting for ever with the ownership of it, for a 
consideration paid down or otherwise received, does not appear to have been an indigenous 
practice in Samoa.‟308  „Samoans did not know the custom of selling land.‟309 This description 
may represent the political dimension of customary land interests, described by Durie in 
relation to New Zealand Maori people. 
                                                 
301 N. 222, 48. 
302 N. 222, 49 and 51. 
303 N. 222, 49 quoting Roberts. 
304 N. 227, 236 quoting Stevenson. 
305 N. 227, 239 quoting Brown. 
306 N. 227, 237 quoting Goodenough. 
307 N. 227, 235. 
308 N. 227, 241. 
309 N. 227, 241 quoting Stuebel. 
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Williamson stated that “selling” „had been done under white men‟s persuasion and 
temptation, though it was contrary to Samoan customs.‟310  In the past, he argued „ownership 
had simply been a right of permission to occupy‟ and also that there were no methods of 
alienation. 311  „There appears to have been a system analogous to what we call “letting” of 
land –that is, allowing someone else to have use of it‟312. 
 
Goodenough tells the story of a white man „who apparently thought he was buying the land, 
was only acquiring the authority to come and cultivate.‟313  Nevertheless, according to Ella, 
„the land was held, not only by tenure of inheritance, but also by gift or purchase‟ yet „it 




„the idea of an out and out sale of land seems to have been unknown to the native mind prior to 
contact with white men.  The missionaries say the land was not sold, the natives having no 
knowledge of anything similar to real estate (immeubles); but the chiefs, who sympathized with 
them, would willingly cede the necessary land, and although the soil would still be regarded as the 
chiefs‟ property, the missionaries would be able to erect their own constructions…‟ 315 
 
Even though the customs present variations, one can find fundamental differences by 
contrasting those legal worldviews with the concepts of ownership and sovereignty and the 
notions behind them.  The very old ethnographies quoted by Williamson unconsciously 
depicted, wrongly, those customs through the “lens of ownership” as they describe the 
Durie‟s „political dimension‟ of the use, control and transference of land in ancient 
Polynesian societies, by resembling these customs as forms of property. 
 
Unlike the univocal western strong-possessive, Polynesian linguistics classified, either 
strongly or loosely, their owned-possessions.  Then, even though they did not classify 
between moveable and immoveable things, they actually were able to differentiate the land from 
                                                 
310 N. 227, 243. 
311 N. 227, 255. 
312 N. 227, 263. 
313 N. 227, 263 quoting Goodenough. 
314 N. 227, 263 quoting Ella. 
315 N. 227, 267. 
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the rest of things.  But, they did that, solely, to define the political consequence of the 
adoption of certain and distinctive philosophies to control the land and its resources.  In 
fact, they did not classify as a means to exercise ownership, namely individual or common, 
but only in regards to the government of the territorial space.  They distinguished land from 
the rest of the things but only in order to determine the governance of it by the collective 
corpus. 
 
By way of conclusion of chapter two 
 
It is very likely impossible that I de-contextualise myself from the framework given by my 
western culture.  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to hope, through the deconstructive method, 
to keep the analysis neutral.  Perhaps, it is an impossible dream to think, reason, and 
conclude from the personal circumstances of my legal training and even more some spurious 
outcomes may result from the theoretical exercise.  But, regardless of that fact I still believe 
that a re-contextualisation of western land approach is needed if there truly is a wish to 
respect the rights of the indigenous populations in present times. 
 
As land was extra-commercium it should not have been depicted from the perspective of the 
law-of-property but from the standpoint of political-science theory.  Rome, through its law, 
has been probably one of the most successful cultural paradigms in human history, but 
despite that there is a necessity, from my perspective, to reject any theoretical terms of 
reference which may be limited by alien logic: the western law-of-property paradigm.  
Rather, we should propose alternatives within the international political order to make the 
space for novel indigenous polities.  Land repossession must be understood in those terms. 
 
Are supreme notions capable of protecting societies from the imminence of human 
necessity or the proximity of social uprising?  Will the imperium of force stop, permanently, 
the endless call for respect and recognition?  It is through economic cooperation and the 
coherence of proper (not apparent) liberal principles that Rapanui will be able to organise 
effectively to cover their needs and to live better lives.  Within the boundaries of Oceania the 
Rapanui will recover their being. 
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Chapter three argues through international law theory and practice.  Here it is contended 
that the state of Chile has been breaching, systematically, voluntarily or involuntarily, several 
norms of international law regarding the right of political self-determination of peoples.  The 
case does not focus attention on the facts of colonialism, which is a common strategy, but 
rather it focuses on the question of identifying the time when those facts were committed, 
that is, whether it was within or outside of the formal colonial era.  It is said that Rapanui 
was a „Colony of Chile‟ in the period 1888-1966316 but to date the situation of political 
subjugation of the locals to foreign powers has not changed.  Executive, legislative and 
judicial competences are fully exercised by Chilean state organs and functionaries.   
 
The legal importance of this reasoning is the matter of “intertemporal law”317: What are the 
particular international law principles applicable at the time in question?  In international law 
temporality is essential to determine the rule applicable to the case.  The case depends not 
solely on the evidences of colonialism: not just evaluating “what” colonialism happened but 
also “when” it happened, thus it depends also on demonstrating its contemporaneity.  In 
respect to the “what”, all the Rapanui scholars agree, yet in respect to the “when” there is no 
legal certainty.  The thesis aims to shift almost entirely the legal standpoint of analysis in 
regards to the sovereign legitimacy of Chile on Easter Island.  It does this in two different 
but linked ways:  By re-periodisation of the common understanding which basically demarcates 
Chilean colonialism from the year 1888 to 1966. By re-definition of Rapanui international legal 
status, the period between 1888 and 1966 is, for the thesis, simply the preparation for the 
massive intervention which came after.  In 1966 the Ley Pascua or Easter Island Act was 
enacted and published by Chile.  By this Act, „after 78 years of virtual slavery‟ islanders 
officially became citizens318 of the Republic.  From 1966 the Chilean bureaucracy  has been 
                                                 
316 The South Pacific by Ron Crocombe, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South Pacific, Suva, Fiji, 2001, 689. 
„1965 unsuccessful revolt in favour of independence led to full civil government.‟ 
317 International Law by Malcolm N. Shaw, fifth edition, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2003, 429. 
318 “Chile's bitter Pacific legacy” by Grant McCall, Pacific Islands Monthly: PIM journal article; v.59 No 11, 1988, 44. 
„Rapanui became a full part of Chile in 1966, with islanders becoming full citizens after 78 years of virtual slavery.‟ 
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brought to the island progressively, or in crescendo, until our days.  Regardless of the positive 
advance that citizenship was, the thesis that the 1966 milestone to mark the finalisation of a 
sui generis proto-colonial319 period.  Hence it was only after 1966 that the island was 
effectively colonised or that the process of colonialism truly started from a legal perspective.  
The striking coincidence is that this happened when most of the colonised world, including 
Oceania, was in the midst of political decolonisation.   
 
The thesis casts into high relief this paradoxical fact. On the one hand, while the world, and 
Chile included, was signing the main UN treaty concerning political self-determination, the 
ICCPR320, Chile was beginning its own process of political colonisation in Rapanui.  The 
commonplace belief (held by both Rapanui and Chilean politicians) identifies 1888 as the 
critical date of sovereignty‟s cession to Chile.  This would happen when the Rapanui chiefs 
of the time voluntarily agreed in handing over the control of the island to the Chilean 
representative through the so-called “Agreements of Wills” or, the Deed of Cession and 
Proclamation of 1888 [Deed 1888].321  What this thesis argues, according to the international 
law of the time, is that the island‟s sovereignty was not ceded in this manner but rather that 
the island‟s sovereignty has been lost by Prescription: a mode of acquisition of territory also 
named effective occupation.  Instead of cession of sovereignty, the mode by which Chile 
acquired (or is acquiring) Rapanui was the presumption of the right of Chile above the right 
of the natives.  This assertion over the Oceanian territory has been based on a long-term 
exercise of power by Chile and its institutions on the island.  In other words, the way by 
which Easter Island became (or is becoming) Chilean is by virtue of international toleration 
of consolidation of Chilean institutions over time.  Hence, without foreign power opposition 
the only way to avoid final consolidation is insider opposition, which is what has been 
happening since, at least, the early 1980s.  The divergent point of view here presented, when 
assumed, weakens Chile‟s assertion of sovereignty because the animus of lord and owner 
needed to acquire territory by Prescription must be followed by the effective occupation of the 
territory.  From a legal point of view, acts of efficient colonisation have, it is argued, been 
                                                 
319 The proto-colonial concept thanks to Francisco Torres H., Franciso Torres, personal communications, August 2009. 
320 UNGA resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights” adopted by the 1496th plenary meeting, United Nations, URL: 
www.un.org/documents/resga.htm. 
321 Refer to Dr. Grant McCall who claims to archive one of the original duplicates of the Deed. Anthropology & 
Pacific Island Studies, Social Sciences & International Studies, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, University of 
New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia. 
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occurring only since 1966 when Chile realised (consciously or not) that it possessed a distant 
territory still awaiting domination.   
 
The aim of this reasoning targets the so called “critical date” that is to establish criteria to 
situate the effective occupation of the territory by Chile.  Colonialism was once a licit way to 
acquire territory but today it is not.  If chapter three proves the Chilean colonialism‟s 
contemporaneity, the theme should be re-evaluated in terms of international lawfulness.  If 
chapter four builds a theoretically competent judicial scenario, the theme, in Chile, should be 
re-evaluated as a “matter of state” because it points to the unconstitutionality of the current 
official stance.  Moreover, if the project is capable of displacing a very politicised issue from 
the arena of politics, activism vis-à-vis establishment, to judicial terrain, then, it will be not a 
question of mere political willingness but of law.  The thesis‟ goal is hence to appropriate an 
issue from one realm to another to then give it back: to transfer it from politics to law and 
from politicians to lawyers to then go back from law and lawyers to politics and politicians.   
 
The legal re-periodisation of the Chilean colonisation and re-formulation of the legal status of 
Rapanui is also made by contrasting nationality and ethnicity as modern conceptualisations of 
peoples which, in the end, have influence on the international legal status of first-peoples 
cultures. From a legal perspective both concepts are important in terms of determining who 
are entitled to the “political” right of self-determination or, on the contrary, who are just 
entitled to the “cultural” right of self-determination.  This distinction is determinant as far as 
law of decolonisation is concerned.  Nations are independent entities considered as such 
thanks to geographical, racial and linguistic considerations, whereas ethnicities are solely 
worthy of cultural respect since they are seen not as independent entities but “integrated” 
into or assimilated in and by the nation-state order, under which they struggle to survive.  
For the first group of nationalities, the law of decolonisation applies, eg. ICCPR, for the 
second group of ethnicities, the C-169322 and the GA Res 61/295323 apply.  Hence, depending 
on a simple legal distinction the culturally same nation-ethnicity may be depicted as 
“nationality” or “ethnicity”, which may look odious from the perspective of fairness and 
justice, though for the case of Rapanui might be beneficial in legal terms because it carries an 
                                                 
322 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO Convention 169 [C-169], 
International Labour Organization, adopted on June 27th 1989 Geneva, in Session 76th of the General 
Conference. URL: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm . 
323 UNGA Resolution A/61/295 of 13 September 2007, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples” [UNDRIP], adopted in sixty-first session, agenda item 68, 107th plenary meeting, United Nations, URL: 
www.un.org/documents/resga.htm . 
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important consequence from the perspective of international law. Chilean law since 1993 has 
depicted the people of Rapanui as an ethnicity and therefore applies on them the law of 
ethnicities above mentioned.  But, it is argued that this novel 1993-depiction displaced the 
former depiction which is thought was more proper. Until 1993, at least two Acts (1966 and 
1979) referred to them as naturales or originales which are interpretable as belonging to the first 
category of nationality. 
 
This chapter will not be different from the last in the sense of proposing alternative 
approaches concerning indigenous peoples, particularly the people of RapaNui.  It 
nevertheless, delves, into more concrete legal matters related to determining the international 
legal status of the people and territory of Rapanui.  To legally analyse the issue keeping in 
mind the difference between “public” and “private” spheres of action, according to the 
Chilean legal order, because that determines the law applicable.324  It is also necessary to 
recall the theme of sovereignty and land ownership as a unified concept when translated into 
Rapanui terms of reference. 
 
I will situate the government‟s relevant colonial intervention on the island as being from 1 
March 1966.325  I will propose a new legal timing of the colonial period of the island.  I argue 
that a legal redefinition of the status of the people of Rapanui is needed on the basis of the 
international law applicable to the case: a redefinition of the mode of acquisition of territory 
whereby Chile acquired Rapanui according to public international law.  Therefore, the island 
was not acquired in 1888 by cession as commonly thought but rather it has been acquired 
since 1966 by prescription. 326  The mode of acquisitive prescription as „the legitimization of a 
fact‟327 is the mode applicable to this hidden (conscious, unconscious or subconscious328) 
                                                 
324 Which is basically based on European- continental law mostly Spanish and French law.  
325 There are other disciplinary points of departure to situate the era of Chilean colonialism in the island. For 
instance, according to Douglas Porteous „[…] in the context of an analysis of centre-periphery relations, the 
island‟s development could well be divided into: (i) a colonial period, up to 1888; (ii) a neocolonial period, 1888-
1952; and (iii) a period of internal colonialism, which began in 1952 and has yet to terminate.‟ See The Modernization 
of Easter Island by Douglas Porteous, Western Geographical Series: Volume 19, University of Victoria, British 
Columbia, Canada, 1981, vi. 
326 Riet Delsing raised the question for the very first time. She argues, correctly, that „the only way for Chile to claim 
sovereignty today is through prescription‟ (N. 10, 93). The legal reformulation I am presenting here is not the first 
attempt in developing the matter, yet from a legal perspective it is.  I hope that this perspective may alter the 
course of the current politics of the island and the stance of Chile before international forums because it follows a 
reasonable line of thought. 
327 N. 317, 426. 
328 …deliberate, involuntary or simply determined by historical circumstances… improvised governmental attitude? 
What shaped the Chilean official culture towards Rapanui? Who knows… 
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process of colonialism which legally came to concretise the whole process of proto-
colonialism initiated long before.  Only, since 1966, has the island been acquired by Chile 
through acts of effective jurisdiction. 
 
The legal redefinition will be based too on a sort of Rapanui people‟s legal reframing of its 
culture.  As Gonschor, similarly argues, instead of framing them as Chilean ethnicity as a 
recent statute did, the thesis proposes to see them as a nation with full rights of statehood, in 
the traditional sense of the word.329  Since 1993 the Rapanui have been depicted as ethnic 
Chileans.  On the contrary, I argue that they should be seen as a large aggregate of people 
united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting the territory of Te Pito O 
Te Henua, that is, as a nation-people in the original sense of word. 
 
The modes of acquisition 
 
What is the legal tie between the Republic of Chile and Easter Island? Or, in other words, 
what is the legal nature of the political relationship between the Republic of Chile and 
Rapanui (people and territory) when the available historical evidences are interpreted 
according to law?  In order to decipher what “mode of acquisition of territory” applies to the 
Chilean assertion of sovereignty on the island, I will basically follow Malcolm Shaw330 
teachings in international law to argue that Easter Island has been becoming Chilean since 
1966 by prescription.  The mode of acquisition of territory by acquisitive prescription lays the 
foundations for a case of political decolonisation before the OAS judiciary, as chapter four 
will show.  Basically, international treaties concerning the collective self-determination of 
peoples are contemporaneous with this prescription and therefore arguable before courts, 
according to intertemporal law. 
 
This is a controversial view when compared with the argumentation of three Chilean 
scholars who have backed the Chilean assertion of sovereignty on the island and its legality.  
Having in mind the cause of Rapanui self-determination, I argue against the assimilationist 
standpoints of Vergara331 Lopez332 and Cousiño333 which uphold, on the contrary, the 
                                                 
329 N. 1, 230. 
330 N. 317. 
331 Isla de Pascua, Dominación y Dominio by Víctor M. Vergara, Publicaciones de la Academia Chilena de la Historia, 
Universidad de Chile, Chile, 1939. 
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position of the state of Chile.  On the other side, the majority of scholars from historical and 
anthropological backgrounds brodly agree in depicting the nature of the Chilean occupation 
of Rapanui as colonial.334  My proposition however states that what converted this 
colonialism into an unlawful matter is the application of the intertemporal law because it 
occurred in the era of the nation‟s political decolonisation.  The era comprehended between 
1888 and 1966 which to me is the proto-colonial stage of the Chilean presence on the island 
is actually colonial but, from anthropological, historical and private-law point of view.  In 
contrast, from an international public law point of view, the Chilean colonialism starts in 
1966 and not in 1888. 
 
It is said that on 9 September 1888 Chile took possession of the island through the Deed 
1888, whilst I say that from the perspective of international public law, it did not.  On the 
one hand, I argue that the Deed 1888 constitutes only an antecedent which marks the 
begginings of the proto-colonial legal period.  On the other hand, I argue that the Deed 1888 
marks the beginning of a private law type colonialism which is usually confused with the 
legal basis whereby Chile asserts sovereignty over the island.  In fact, in 1888 Chile did not 
take possession.  Through the Deed and under Chile‟s sponsorship, a series of private law 
transactions did follow smoothly, all involving the use of the land of the island.  In none of 
those transactions were the Rapanui people consulted.  In the end, the private commercial 
operations were used in favour of government‟s increasing of patrimony: the whole island‟s 
ownership was inscribed in 1933 by alleging it was terra nullius and consequently state-owned.  
According to international public law, acquisitive prescription is the mode of acquisition 
applicable.  It is as a sort of default mode which operates when other modes are not clear or 
sufficient to argue the validity of the acquisition of territory, as is the case of Rapanui. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
332 “How Did Chile acquire Easter Island?” by Carlos Lopez,  Menlo College, Consular Agent for Chile, San 
Francisco, California, Rapa Nui Journal, Vol. 12 (4) December 1998, pp. 118-122. 
333 “Estatutos de Relacion entre Isla de Pascua y el Continente” by Jose Antonio Cousiño C., Instituto de Estudios 
Internacionales Universidad de Chile in Informe de Avance Proyecto 899/92 FONDECYT; Proposiciones para una Politica 
Exterior de Chile en el Pacifico. Repercusiones para el Territorio Insular Isla de Pascua, unpublished paper available in 
Biblioteca W. Mulloy, Museo Antropologico de Isla de Pascua, MAPSE, Easter Island, pp. 1-12, n.d. 
334 As mode of example, see “Riro, Rapu and Rapanui. Refoundations in Easter Island Colonial History” by Grant 
McCall, Rapa Nui Journal, September, Vol. 2 (3) pp. 112-122, 1997; or “Colonialism and Rapanui Identity” by 
Alejandra Grifferos, Easter Island In Pacific Context South Seas Symposium, Proceedings on the Fourth International 
Conference on Easter Island and East Polynesia, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, August 5-10, 1997, 
Easter Island Foundation, Los Osos, CA, USA, edited by Christopher M. Stevenson, Georgia Lee, F. J. Morin, pp. 
365-367, 1997. 
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The Deed of 1888335 and the cession of sovereignty 
 
It is held by officials and local leaders that the Deed 1888 is “the” legal and political source 
by which the island became Chilean.336  At first sight this is true. According to intertemporal 
law, by 1888, international law accepted the mode cession of sovereignty, as mode of 
acquisition of territory, when local chiefs signed the cession.  Treaties of cession, in colonial 
times, were an accepted way by which European powers, or in the case of Rapanui, novel 
republics of western background like Chile, annexed territories.  Cession,  
 
„involves the peaceful transfer of territory from one sovereign to another (with the intention that 
sovereignty should pass)…‟337 „The basis of cession lies in the intention of the relevant parties to 
transfer sovereignty over the territory  in question.‟ 338 
 
In the post-1966 era, the islander‟s plea for political autonomy has been based mainly on the 
Deed 1888 popularly known as the Acuerdo de Voluntades or Agreement of Wills.339  The plea 
found further support after the official publication of the report of the Commission of 
Historical Truth and New Deal between the State of Chile and the Indigenous Peoples.340  
The CVHyNT report expressly recommended, to the State of Chile, that it confer autonomy 
on the Rapanui people:  „To grant an autonomy statute for Easter Island according to the 
normative basis established by the “Agreement of Wills”‟.341   
 
                                                 
335 See Appendix No 1. The CVHyNT worked based on one of the duplicates of the Deed. The remaining one was 
provided by the anthropologist Dr. Grant McCall who participated in the CVHyNT workshops. He gave a 
scanned copy of the duplicate which according to him is the Rapanui duplicate.  There is no official record of the 
Chile government‟s duplicate (the one upon which scholars such as Vergara based their conclusions and studies). 
336 Eg. “Project of Constitutional Organic Law Special Statute of Administration of Easter Island” (2005) in the 
Home Office Ministry‟s official documentation, in URL: http://www.subdere.gov.cl/1510/articles-
67988_recurso_2.pdf.  
337 N. 317, 420. 
338 N. 317, 421. 
339 Te Mau Hatu ‗O Rapa Nui. Los Soberanos de Rapa Nui. Pasado Presente y Futuro de Rapa Nui  by Alberto Hotus et 
al.,  Editorial Emision, Centro Latino americano Simon Bolivar, Chile, 1988, 301, 348 and 351. According to 
McCall, Alberto Hotus, a prominent Rapa Nui leader, coined the term Acuerdo de Voluntades to refer to the Deed 
1888. Grant McCall, personal communications, April, 2009. 
340 N. 6. The CVHyNT was aimed to build a new relationship between the state of Chile and its indigenous 
populations, of American origins and Rapanui.  In order to begin this “new deal”, many political actors were 
called to participate in it to generate a sort of consensus in historical debates related to the conflicting past 
relationship. Ultimately, the aim was to delineate the State‟s parameters for future policies towards indigenous 
communities who were seen and recognised an integral part of the Chilean identity. 
341 N. 6, III, 136. Otorgar un estatuto de autonomía para Isla de Pascua, de conformidad a los presupuestos normativos del ―Acuerdo 
de Voluntades‖.  
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According to the CVHyNT report342, the Spanish version of the bilingual Deed 1888 
established that the island‟s chiefs and the Capitan of the Navy Policarpo Toro 
“representing”343 Chilean government interests concurred in the following agreement:344 
On the one side, by Cesión, 
 
„Los abajo firmantes jefes de la Isla de Pascua, declaramos ceder para siempre y sin reserva al Gobierno de la 
República de Chile la soberanía plena y entera de la citada isla, reservándonos al mismo tiempo nuestros títulos de 
jefes de que estamos investidos y que usamos actualmente.‟ 
 
„We, the undersigned chiefs of Easter Island declare that we cede for ever and without 
reservation to the government of the Republic of Chile the full and entire sovereignty of the 
island reserving at the same time our titles of chiefs which we are using today.‟ 
 
Or as Lopez says, „[t]hey ceded the rights to the island to the government of Chile, forever 
and without reservation, but reserving their rights and privileges as chiefs.‟345 
 
On the other side, by Proclamación, Capitan Policarpo Toro “officially in the island”346 
declared acceptance of the cession of sovereignty „subject to Chilean government 
ratification‟347. 
 
Policarpo Toro H. Capitán de Corbeta de la Marina de Chile i comandante del Crucero Angamos oficialmente en 
esta declaramos aceptar salvo ratificación de nuestro Gobierno la cesión plena, entera i sin reserba [sic] de la 
soverania [sic] de la Isla de Pascua, cesión que nos ha sido hecha por los jefes de esta Isla para el Gobierno de la 
Republica de Chile.  
 
Thanks to the phrase salvo ratificación it has been understood since then that the Deed 1888 
established that Capitan Toro as Chilean representative acted subject ot ratification of the 
treaty, which until today has not happened.348  According to the CVHyNT report in the 
Rapa Nui version of the bilingual deed by Vaai Hanga Kainga the Rapa Nui chiefs rather than 
                                                 
342 N. 6, II, 69. 
343 I am arguing this very point. 
344 See also N. 331, 112 – 113 (anexos XII and XIII); N. 6, II, 69; N. 10, 86-87; N. 332, 120. 
345 N. 332, 120. 
346 I am going to argue this point. 
347 N. 318, 43. 
348 N. 6, III, 136. 
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ceding sovereignty declared their will to give the territory of Te Pito O Te Henua into the 
hands of Chile as hoa.  „[…] Chile would act as protector and “friend of the place”.‟349 
 
‗Juntos el Consejo de Jefes de nuestro territorio de te Pito o te Henua, hemos acordado escribir lo superficial. Lo de 
abajo el territorio no se escribe aquí. Ellos informaron en conversación con nosotros que nuestro territorio Te Pito o 
te Henua estará en la mano de la nación chilena como amigo del lugar. Escrito está en la mano del Consejo del 
territorio, el bienestar y desarrollo según nuestras investiduras impuestas por mandato Rapa Nui.‘ 
 
As McCall suggests (and Lopez acknowledges) the chiefs were „insisting that they had sold 
nothing and that the land was to be under the protectorate of Chile‟.350  In effect, the will of 
the Rapanui chiefs was not exactly to cede sovereignty but expecting protectorate from 
Chile.  On five, or at least three, times they had asked, through the catholic missionaries, 
protectorate status from France.351  Protectorates was the common way to influence without 
internal iresponsibility for internal government.352 Then, the idea of chiefs asking for 
protectorate and not ceding sovereignty is sensible from an insider‟s perspective.  According 
to Hito, Vaai Hanga Kainga rather than cession means “give care to the motherland”.353  It is 
worth recalling here the chapter two discussion on the divergent understandings when 
sovereignty and land ownership concepts are translated into Rapanui terms of reference.  To 
give care to the motherland might perfectly be rendered into western terms as protectorate. 
 
Despite the interesting issue of the real intention of the chiefs, I am going to explain why I 
think that current local leaders‟ insistence and activism on getting the Deed 1888 ratified by 
the National Congress, by statutory means, would be fruitless.354 Unless there is a profound 
change of official attitude the Deed 1888 will stay off the negotiation table.  The reality is 
                                                 
349 N. 318, 44. 
350 McCall n. 334, 114; also n. 332, 120. 
351 According to Grant McCall, the Rapanui people requested a Protectorate from France five times between 1868 
and 1886, personal communication, 2009. According to Di Castri „[a]t least three times, in 1871, 1874 and 1887, 
France rejected the local request to extend its protectorate to Easter Island.‟ See “Tahitian and French Influences 
in Easter Island, or the Zoopal Mystery Solved Thanks to Grant McCall” by Francesco Di Castri, Rapa Nui 
Journal, Vol. 13 (3) September 1999, 101.  
352 Eg. 1887 Tuvalu and Kiribati; 1889 Tokelau; 1881 Tunisia. 
353 N. 53. 
354 If ratified in the legislative system of Chile the “treaty” would be incorporated into the Chilean legal order and, 
ultimately, the political struggle for self-government would be not only consistent with the normative provisions 
of the Spanish version of the Deed1888 (as stated by the CVHyNT, n. 6, III, 69) but also supported by internal 
law. 
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that during the last decade the policy of the state in these matters is tacitly to remind 
islanders of the non-binding nature of the document.355   
 
The curiosity of the case though is the fact that official stances contradict themselves.  On 
the one hand, there is the tacit reminder whilst on the other official insistence on regarding 
the Deed 1888 as foundational for understanding Chile and Rapanui polities.  This 
paradoxical fact makes sense nonetheless of the easy adoption of the novel nomenclature 
“Agreement of Wills” to refer to the Deed, which until recently had been called simply the 
Toma de Posesión.356  It looks more decorous in international fora to speak of “agreement of 
wills” rather than “1888 taking of possession”.  The Chilean government has emphatically 
rejected considering Rapanui as a colony or a NSGT. 
 
Some comments concerning the official interpretation of the Deed 1888 which might 
influence the overall argumentation.  I argue two different things regarding the literal 
transcription done by the CVHyNT of the Spanish text of Proclamación. 
 
As we mentioned above, instead of reading that Capitan Toro was “officially in the island” 357, 
the document doubtlessly reads that Capitan Toro was “currently in the island”.  Then, I argue 
that he declared acceptance of the cession of sovereignty subject to Chilean government 
ratification.  Maybe, it rather reads that he declared acceptance but subject to Chilean 
government rectification. 358  I think that Policarpo declared acceptance of the cession unless 
rectified, that is subject to rectification.  In Spanish as in English the word salvo can either 
mean the conjunction “unless”; the prepositions “saving”, “excepting” or “with the 
exception of”, and; the adverbial phrase “subject to”.  I believe that the facts need to be 
considered more openly having in mind all the aspects of the annexation.  A very careful 
                                                 
355 According to that view it cannot be considered a “treaty” since it has not been ratified in Chile through the 
constitutional steps ordered by the Constitution in force by that time, the Political Constitution of 1833. See its 
article 82: Son atribuciones especiales del Presidente: […] 19ª Mantener las relaciones políticas con las naciones estranjeras, 
recibir sus Ministros, admitir sus cónsules, conducir las negociaciones, hacer las estipulaciones preliminares, concluir i firmar todos 
los tratados de paz, de alianza, de tregua, de neutralidad, de comercio, concordatos i otras convenciones. Los tratados, antes de su 
ratificación, se presentarán a la aprobación del Congreso. Las discusiones i deliberaciones sobre estos objetos serán secretas, si así lo 
exije el Presidente de la República; URL: www.leychile.cl/Navegar/?idNorma=137535&idVersion=1833-05-
25&idParte . 
356 Revista de Marina, Publicación Bimestral de la Armada de Chile, fundada el 1 de Julio de 1885, año CIV, volumen 
105, numero 785, Julio-Agosto 1988. 
357 N. 346. 
358 Curiously, Hotus et al. (N. 339) contradict themselves when in p. 351 say rectificación and after in p. 294 say 
ratificación. 
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examination of the original duplicate would probably solve the mystery, but here I prefer a 
systematic interpretation of the legal and historical facts rather than simply accepting 
something which seems internally inconsistent.  On the one hand, Vergara‟s transcription 
(which is the oldest known) coincides with me in reading “currently” but, on the other, the 
transcription of Vergara reads salvo ―ratificación‖ and not rectificación.359 
 
There is no evidence that Capitan Toro was representative of the Chilean government 
authorised to accept any kind of cession of sovereignty.  Policarpo Toro was not entitled to 
proclaim in the name of and representing Chile. 360  Capitan Toro lacked the mandate to 
accept a cession of sovereignty.  He was mandated by a Minister of President Balmaceda 
(1886-1891) but to buy lands from the natives, Tahitian-Scotch entrepreneurs and the 
Tahitian Catholic Church.  Although the official intention might have been to annex the 
island by mode of occupation, as official documents published by Vergara shown361, 
historians agreed that this was a personal-familial enterprise rather than a governmental 
scheme.  In fact, all the lands bought (legally or not) by Toro were bought not in the name 
of Chile but in his own name and responsibility.  Furthermore, Toro was never reimbursed 
by the government362, which supports my argument of these acts were of legal private nature. 
 
If we accept one of the two arguments presented here (literal re-interpretation and Toro‟s 
lack of entitlement) it is reasonably arguable that Capitan Toro was aware that he was 
exceeding his official powers.  There is no evidence that Capitan Toro had or displayed any 
document which authorised him to annex the island on behalf of the president of Chile.  To 
me, it is possible to think that he accepted the cession of sovereignty, under the negative 
condition of rectification, knowing that he was reaching public dominion competences and 
above the powers conferred to him. 
 
What may then explain the orders to buy lands but annexation purposes? He probably 
thought the order to buy lands was sufficient to annex and occupy the island.  The question 
                                                 
359 N. 331, 113, anexo XIII. 
360 In the case of the Treaty of Waitangi signed between the Maori people of New Zealand/Aotearoa and the British 
crown, the official representative of the British Queen to accept the cession of sovereignty made by the Maori 
rangatiras was Capitan Hobson.  „His instructions from Lord Normanby, the Secretary of State for Colonies, were 
to get “free and intelligent consent” of chiefs and to deal with them “openly”‟. See An Illustrated History of the Treaty 
of Waitangi by Claudia Orange, Bridget Williams Books, New Zealand, 2004, 19. 
361 N. 10, 79; also N. 331, 109 anexo X; also N. 332, 120. 
362 N. 6, II, 63.  
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is why he persisted in despite the contrary advisory opinion of two Chilean lawyers (as are 
quoted by Vergara). 
 
In April 1888, five months before the annexation, two government advisors, Hunneus and 
Renjifo, pointed out alleged that the buying of land was not enough to create valid title 
under international law. Acording to them, „ostensible occupation‟ was also needed to 
effectively occupy the island. 363  They rightly warned that international law demands 
„effective acts of jurisdiction‟ with public authority representatives such as, as they advised, 
by maintaining the catholic mission on the island (that one which the Tahitian church just 
had ceded to the state ecclesiastic authorities of Chile).364  Hunneus and Renjifo were right. 
Article 35 of the General Act of the Congress of Berlin of 1885 established the doctrine of 
effectiveness which displaced „earlier doctrines relating to discovery and symbolic annexation 
as in themselves sufficient to generate title.‟365 For my purposes, this means that even 
accepting the validity of the Deed 1888 as source of Chilean sovereignty on the island, 
without effective occupation of the territory, the initial act of occupation became null.  
According to Shaw, „[o]ccupation is a method of acquiring territory which belongs to no one 
(terra nullius)‟366; that was not the case of Rapanui. 
 
The ceremony which took place in September 1888 was totally symbolic in character.  After 
the signature of the document of annexation, a frustrated colonisation did follow.  Capitan 
Policarpo Toro left his brother Capitan of the Army Pedro Toro as agent of colonisation. 
Pedro Toro remained until 1892 when, poor and abandoned, he literally escaped from the 
island.367  „After the departure of the Toro interests no ships stopped at Rapanui for six 
years.‟368  Soon after the annexation of the island and observing the lack of Chilean interest, 
the Rapanui people, as Pedro Toro in his memoirs acknowledges, recovered their 
sovereignty and, the internal jurisdiction of the island was retaken by the Rapanui authorities 
headed by the king Riro.369 
                                                 
363 N. 331, 107 anexo IX “Informe sobre los antecedentes de Pascua” by Jorge Hunneus y Osvaldo Renjifo, Consejo 
de Defensa Fiscal, Santiago, 14 de Abril de 1888. 
364 Ibid. 
365 N. 317, 442. 
366 N. 317, 424. 
367 McCall, n. 334, 115; also n. 325, 48 – 51. 
368 N. 318, 44. 
369  Anexo a la memoria del ministerio de culto y colonización, presentada al supremo gobierno en 1892 by Pedro P. Toro, 
Ministerio de Culto y Colonización, Chile, pp. 187-216, 1892, 205. 
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According to Delsing, Vergara maintained that the island was acquired by occupation.371  
According to Porteous, Vergara „expounded the means by which, under international law, a 
nation might annex non-adjacent territories‟.372  I discount this mode in the case of Rapanui 
not only because, as Delsing argues, contemporary Rapanui would consider it „an insult to 
their forebears‟373 but also because by 1888 the particular international law principles 
applicable, according to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] 
were, 
 
„…territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organization were not 
regarded as terrae nullius. It shows that in case of such territories the acquisition of sovereignty was 
not generally considered as effected unilaterally through “occupation” of terra nullius by original 




Now turned to a related question, the matter of statehood.  According to the same Advisory 
Opinion, agreements such as the Deed 1888, „whether or not considered as an actual 
“cession” of the territory, were regarded as derivative roots of title, and not original titles 
obtained by occupation of terrae nullius.‟ 375  The ICJ when deciding the Western Sahara case 
avoided the discussion of whether or not such agreements could be considered cessions of 
sovereignty.376  Yet, to cede sovereignty it is necessary to be a state.  That is, if Chile says that 
the Deed1888 was “cession”, then logically it is recognising the existence of Rapanui 
statehood by 1888. 
 
                                                 
370 N. 318, 44, „under Riro‟s rule the island redeveloped […].‟ 
371 N. 10, 90.  
372 N. 325, 34. 
373 N. 10, 91. 
374 Western Sahara. Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, P. 12. 16, October, 1975. 
375 N. 374, 31. 
376 I guess it did so to avoid a debate around the issue of statehood of so-called „uncivilised‟ tribes. 
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The creation of statehood depends on recognition.377  There are two theories defining 
recognition: constitutive and declaratory, 
 
„the former theory maintains that is only through recognition that a state comes into being under 
international law, whereas the latter approach maintains that once the factual criteria of statehood 
have been satisfied, a new state exists as an international person, recognition becoming merely a 
political and not a legal act in this context.‟
 378 
 
According to 19th century international law, at first sight, there is no Rapanui statehood to 
consider seriously due to the fact that Rapanui people were “uncivilised” and not recognised 
as such according to the constitutive theory.  Rapanui was not a state, because it was never 
recognised as such.  Yet, according to Crawford‟s counterargument, regardless of what 
theory we choose it is thinkable to consider statehood of Rapanui in 1888.  To Crawford, the 
principle of the intertemporal law, 
 
„requires [the] transaction completed at a particular time be judged in accordance with the law in 
force at that time […] it does not require that one set of doctrinal or ideological justifications be 
preferred to another where these are not clearly incorporated in the transaction or practice in 
question. For the reasons given, the „European civilization‟ test for the status of indigenous 
peoples was not accepted in international law at any relevant time.‟379 
 
What are the four elements of statehood? 
Permanent population, defined territory, government and, capacity to enter into relations 
with other states.380  In the case of Rapanui, three elements are undisputable yet the 
requirement of “government” might be debatable on the historical evidence available.  
Nevertheless, the counterargument according to Shaw, is the report of the ICJ in regards to 
the Western Sahara case which clearly stipulated that by 1885, 
 
„For a political society to function reasonably effectively it needs some form of government or 
central control.  However, this is not a pre-condition for recognition as an independent country. 
                                                 
377 N. 317, 185. 
378 N. 317, 185. 
379 The creation of states in International Law by James Crawford, Second Edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006, 271. 
380 N. 317, 178 quoting the article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933. 
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It should be regarded more as indication of some sort of coherent political structure and society, 
than the necessity for a sophisticated apparatus of executive and legislative organs.‟381     
 
Hence, the question of whether Rapanui enjoyed statehood by 1888 is clearer.  I argue that 
they enjoyed statehood following the above reasoning of Crawford and Shaw.  Rapanui 
people actually exercised, paraphrasing Shaw, some sort of coherent political structure.  The 
Rapanui chiefs seemed to have been aware of the political consequences of the agreement 
albeit only from their own cultural and political terms of reference.  Since the bilingual 
meanings may reach different conclusions and categorisations of the understanding of 
exercise of power, as shown in chapter two, each party evidently understood different things 
when signing.  The idea of getting foreign friendship (protectorate) seems natural and 
sensible after the shocking events which preceded the annexation.382 But what does not 
seems reasonable is that they gave away sovereignty and land ownership. 
 
Moreover, since annexation by occupation of terra nullius is inapplicable to the case, when the 
Chilean government recalls the legal-political effects of the Deed 1888, the same government 
cannot then obliterate the Rapanui statehood at 1888 by contradicting itself.  There is no 
way of ceding sovereignty without statehood in both parties.  The government then could 
argue that, following the ICJ Advisory Opinion (1975), agreements signed with local chiefs 
were ways of acquiring sovereignty without having to discuss whether those „uncivilised‟ 
tribes could have had statehood.  However, as a counterargument, by reasonably accepting 
the following facts: insiders asking for protectorate to France just before the Deed 1888; 
Capitan Toro‟s lack of official entitlement; the issue of rectification-ratification, and the 
accepted fact that, after 1888, the colonisation failed noisily and notoriously (without logic of 
continuity) the initial title (the Deed 1888) lacks legal certainty at the least.  And, when a title 




                                                 
381 N. 317, 180. 
382 N. 318, 43. Eg. the Peruvian blackbirding of 1862. 
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Delsing has argued that „contemporary Rapanui can explore the possibility offered by 
international law‟ in terms of prescription383 as the remaining mode to apply to the case. 
According to Shaw, prescription is, 
 
„…a mode of establishing title to territory which is not terra nullius and which has been obtained 
either unlawfully or in circumstances wherein the legality of the acquisition cannot be 
demonstrated. It is the legitimisation of a doubtful title by the passage of time and the presume 
acquiescence of the former sovereign…‟ 384 
 
Hence, I cannot but conclude that prescription is the only mode applicable and that it 
challenges the Rapanui statehood.  If the will of the Rapanui people was to provide 
protection for the motherland: to leave the territory in the hands of Chile as hoa (friend) of 
the place that is protectorate in western terminology, the conclusion is that „the formal 
sovereignty remains unaffected and the entity in question retains its status as state.‟385  If 
Rapanui wanted a protectorate, its sovereignty has remained untouched since then.  This 
legal interpretation is reinforced by the facts, continuous struggle for self-determination and 
land repossession.   
 
The criteria to establish title by prescription are four: possession which „must be a titre de 
souverain, peaceful and uninterrupted, public, and endure for a certain length of time.‟ 386  
Here I will explain why the only incontestable requisite is publicity and why the other criteria 
are arguable.  The lack of entitlement of Toro to proclaim sovereignty is already evident.  
His initial possession was not a titre de souverain therefore was not an act of state jurisdiction.  
 
„[P]rescription requires that the possession forming the basis of the title must be by virtue of the 
authority of the state, or a titre de souverain, and not a manifestation of purely individual effort 
unrelated to the state‟s sovereign claims.‟387  
 
Besides, even were I to suppose (wrongly) that he was mandated to acquire sovereignty from 
the natives, which admits of Chilean possession since 1888, since public abandonment of the 
island followed the failed colonisation by the Toro brothers I could but understand that the 
                                                 
383 N. 10, 92. 
384 N. 317, 426. 
385 N. 317, 195. 
386 N. 317, 426. 
387 N. 317, 427. 
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animus of lord was interrupted.  The only debatable issue is whether to consider the period 
between 1888 and 1896 as sufficient to anul the initial physical possession. 
 
In September 1895 the government formally leased the island to the businessman Enrique 
Merlet388 who with his brother Numa (both Chileans of French ancestry) established a 
private company to farm sheep on the island.  They created the Sociedad Compañía Explotadora 
de Isla de Pascua [CEDIP].389 
 
By decree of 15 June 1896 there were two important outcomes, the Subdelegacion Maritima de 
Isla de Pascua was created, and the company‟s manager was appointed as Subdelegado.  For me, 
the 1896 decree might be considered as the first formal legal act of jurisdiction displayed on 
the island.390  Under this “company-state format”391 the so-called CEDIP ruled the island‟s 
destinies until 1953392 when the navy took full control and replaced the CEDIP 
administration.  However, Vergara does not consider the 1895 decree as one of the 
documents serving to support the domination of Chile of Isla de Pascua. To him, the Chilean 
effective annexation was based on the administrative dependency:393 
 
a) Decreto No 444 of 1916 through which Chile tried to annex effectively the island to 
the administrative and judicial regime by declaring Easter Island Subdelegacion del 
Departamento de Valparaiso and subject of colonisation through the Ministry of 
Colonisation.394  
b) The Ley No 3220 of 1917 which declared Easter Island subject to the Autoridades, 
Leyes y Reglamentos navales (authorities, laws and naval decrees).395 
                                                 
388 N. 325, 53. 
389 N. 331, 159 anexo XXX. 
390 Decreto firmado por Luis Barros Borgoño de 15 de Junio de 1896 “Creación de la Subdelegación Marítima” en 
Boletín de leyes y Decretos del Gobierno, 1896: 416-417 transcriben in Isla de Pascua. Horizontes sombríos y luminosos by Jesus 
Conte Oliveros, Centro de Investigación de la Imagen, Santiago, 1994, 163. 
391 According to Porteous (N. 325, 45) like other places of Chile in those times Easter Island became a “company 
state” because it was organised and maintained by aliens and because its capital was in another country. Also it 
became such due to its remoteness and lack of indigenous enterprise. To him, state companies in general are „able 
to exert social and even political control through its provision of housing, social services, and its monopoly of 
employment and of transportation to the hearthland […] The citizens of the company state look to the company 
rather than [to] their legal government, for the benefits normally supplied by government agencies.‟  
392 N. 6, II, 63-64. 
393 N. 331, 70.  
394 N. 331, 223 anexo LIV. 
395 N. 331, 224 anexo LV. 
 79 
c) Decreto No 8582 of 1927 which reaffirmed administrative dependency on the 
Valparaiso department.396 
 
A propos of the Ley 3220 of 1917, in theory, since 1917 the „Navy took over and submitted 
the Rapanui to its rules and regulations‟397 but, as historical sources show, that actually 
happened only from 1953.  In use of the faculties given to the Navy by the Ley 3220, the 
naval authorities enacted norms for living and working standard on the island under the 
CEDIP administration.  Through that Reglamento Interno de Vida y Trabajo en la Isla, (ordinary 
decree No 85 of 1936) living conditions on the island were supposed to improve but the 
reality is they remained as before, but from then naval authorities were supposedly 
guarantors of their fulfilment.398 
 
Peaceful possession is to Shaw „essential‟399. The requisite of peaceful possession, 
 
„reflects the vital point that prescription rests upon the implied consent of the former sovereign 
to the new state of affairs. This means that protests by the dispossessed sovereign may 
completely block any prescriptive claim.‟ 400  
 
Peaceful is not exactly the proper word to describe the endless struggle of the people of 
Rapa Nui for retaking control of their polity.401  Here is interesting to recall that between 
1944 and 1958 eight groups of Rapanui peoples tried or did escape in boats to either reach 
                                                 
396 N. 331, 70. 
397 N. 10, 92. 
398 N. 331, 225 – 239 anexo LVII. Reglamento Interno de vida y trabajo en la isla,  Decreto Ordinario No 85 de 1936. 
399 Ibid. 
400 N. 317, 427. 
401 Several well-documented uprisings have characterised the Rapanui struggle for self-determination. In 1899, Riro 
the last Rapanui king sailed to Chile to complain to the President of Chile against the company performance. See 
N. 318, 44; In 1914, a second uprising led by the prophetess Angata. See Rapa Nui. El diablo, Dios, y la profetisa. 
Evangelización y milenarismo en Rapa Nui 1864-1914 by Nelson Castro F., Rapanui Press, Museum Store, Museo 
Antropológico Padre Sebastian Englert, Rapanui, Chile, 2006. Also see “Colonialism and Resistance in Rapa 
Nui” by Riet Delsing, Rapa Nui Journal, Vol. 18 (1), pp. 24-30, Easter Island Foundation, Los Osos, CA, USA, 
2004, 26; In 1964-65 the revolt led by Alfonso Rapu provoked the enactment of the ley Pascua. See “METEI. A 
Canadian medical expedition to Easter Island, 1964-65” by James A. Boutillier, Rapa Nui Journal, Vol. 6, issue 2: 
21-23, 26-33 and issue 3: 45-53, Los Osos, California, USA, 1992;  Mentionable are as well the public complaints 
against Chile in the years 1983, 1998, 2001 (see n. 2). Not to mention the uprising of August 2009 when the 
Mataveri airport was seized by the Rapanui people who were protesting against indiscriminate mainlander 
immigration by arguing the seizure‟s legality based on their conviction of their legitimate ownership of the land 
usurped by the state in 1933 and 1966.  Nowadays, May 2010, the “radical” Rapanui Parliament is raising again the 
matter of independence from Chile by setting up placards and an improvised campsite in front of the Governor‟s 
office, Viki Haoa and Rinko Tuki, personal communications, May, 2010.  See Proem News from Rapanui, May 2010. 
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Tahiti or Chile.  Many of them died in the attempt.402  To me, there was no peaceful 
possession since the people trying to escape from the island show the contrary.  It shows a 
“hidden” struggle for self-determination. 
 
Then, the prescription requires a reasonable period (not fixed) of possession, which will 
depend on the circumstances of the case „including the nature of the territory and the 
absence or presence of any competing claims.‟403  I argue for situating the Chilean 
colonialism and its reasonable period of prescription from 1966 based upon the Miniquiers 
and Ecrehos case of 1953.404  In this case, the ICJ based its decision, 
 
„primarily on relatively recent acts relating to the exercise of jurisdiction and local administration 
as well as the nature of legislative enactments referable to the territory in question.‟405 
 
The history of the region in the Miniquiers and Ecrehos case dated from 1066, which is 
analogously applicable to the case of Rapanui and Chile which dates from 1888.  The ICJ did 
not consider the historical antecedents as much as the nature of the legislative enactments 
along with the effective exercise of jurisdiction over the territory.   
 
Therefore, on the one hand, the 1917 Act supports the official assertion whereas, on the 
other, the local administration was still weak from the perspective of state actions (rather 
than company actions).  The state yet implicitly approved the CEDIP actuations did not 
exercise effective acts of jurisdiction, because the facts (between the years 1917 and 1953) 
attempt against the apparent official will of annexing the island.   
 
One fundamental matter for the thesis is to determine the legal nature of the sheep 
company‟s rule and its manager‟s powers.  At first sight it is clear that the manager 
represented the state of Chile. Chile therefore, one may say, has possessed the island through 
the “state-company”.406  In my opinion, the first traceable legal public instrument regarding 
                                                 
402 “Aventuras marinas de Nativos de Rapa-Nui” by Sebastian Englert, in Revista de Marina, n.d: 465-475. Photocopy 
facilitated by Francisco “tio pancho” Haoa Pakomio. 
403 N. 317, 428. 
404 N. 317, 428 citing the ICJ Reports (1953, 47). 
405 N. 317, 428. 
406 N. 325, 45. 
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Chile‟s assertion of sovereignty on Easter Island dates either from 1896407 or as for Vergara 
from 1916 or 1917 when the subdelegation of Easter Island was created, left under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Colonisation and dependant on Navy regulations.  Regardless 
of those regulations and enactments, and according to Shaw, the exercise of sovereignty 
must be exercised by the state or, 
 
„by individuals whose actions are subsequently ratified by the state or by corporations or 
companies permitted by the state in such operations and thus performed on behalf of the 
sovereign. Otherwise, any acts undertaken are of no legal consequence.‟408 
 
In principle, Chile exercised jurisdiction through the private company‟s manager, 
nevertheless by ways of counterargument, according to Shaw, the ICJ Report in the 
Malaysia/Indonesia case of 2002 stressed that activities performed by private persons will be 
seen as effectivités only if they took place on the basis of official regulations or under 
governmental authority.409   
 
In the case of Rapanui it is proven that the company and its manager even though formally 
appointed as representatives of the government were actually de facto rulers of the island.  
They did not respect the minimum requirements that the state of Chile asked from them 
during most of their administration.  Actually Chilean public opinion‟s awakening and 
condemnation of the situation of the local people came after knowing of the abuses 
committed by the company.  Another fact is that a naval vessel sailed to the island only once 
a year and the rest of the year the company exercised total control of island affairs.  Another 
relevant factor to Shaw is that the facts must be „pursuant to the will of the state to acquire 
sovereignty.‟ 410  In regards to this interesting argument let me to develop two different ideas. 
 
On the one hand, when the private company was created as a corporation in 1903411 
according to its constitution (escritura de constitución), its aim was to acquire ownership of 
privately owned lands or to take land on lease from the state rather than to administer on 
                                                 
407 By Decreto de 15 de Junio de 1896 “Creación de la Subdelegación Marítima” in Boletín de leyes y Decretos del 
Gobierno, 1896, 416-417.  
408 N. 317, 434. 
409 N. 317, 434 footnote 135. 
410 N. 317, 435. 
411 N. 331, 159 anexo XXX. 
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behalf of the state of Chile. 412  The company was set up without having in mind the exercise 
of Chilean sovereignty on the island.  In other words, the company should not be considered 
company-state by reason of its nature, but on the contrary, it should be said that the “state” 
was the company itself.  The state did not set up the company to assert domination but on 
the contrary, the company was set up by private entrepreneurs and randomly used by the 
state for its dominant purposes. 
 
On the other hand, and regarding the animus domini of the state, according to Shaw the 
subjective factor requires 
 
„some connection between the actions undertaken and the assertion of sovereignty […].‟413 
 
If the Chilean state considers, as Vergara argues, that Easter Island belonged administratively 
to Chile since 1916 or 1917 there is no explanation for the open violation of the 
constitutional rights of freedom and equality before law of the Rapanui people, according to 
articles 12 and 10 of the Constitutions of 1833 and 1925 respectively.  Despite the 
regulations the company maintained its abusive administrative system with Chilean 
acquiescence.  
 
Certainly the subjective possession from Chile did not look so much willing to acquire the 
island as to dispose of it.  Chile tried unsuccessfully more than once to sell the island by 
auction to Japan, USA and Germany yet from the 1920s up to the 1930s.414  McCall has 
coined the term “uncertain sovereignty” to depict the Chilean ambivalent imperialist attitude.  
According to Fischer, 
 
„Chile‟s move to „nationalize‟ Easter Island was part of a larger dynamic that was militaristic and 
nationalistic (no longer mere patriotic).  It was designed to integrate the Republic‟s hitherto 
largely ignored and backward peripheries and to extend the centralist hegemony. From 1951 and 
especially from early 1952, an active campaign was underway to convince all Chileans that the 
Rapanui were also fully fledged chilenos.‟415 
                                                 
412 N. 331, 159 anexo XXX. 
413 Ibid. 
414 “Japan, Rapanui and Chile‟s Uncertain Sovereignty” by Grant McCall, Rapa Nui Journal, Vol. 9 (1) March 1995, 
Easter Island Foundation, Los Osos, CA, USA; see also “Declassified documents of the United States embassy” 
obtained from the archives of the Museo Antrpologico P. Sebastian Englert, MAPSE, Easter Island, personal records. 
415 N. 138, 196. 
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By way of preliminary conclusion, despite the fact that administrative regulations were 
enacted by Chile which would demonstrate its will to possess, it cannot be stated that Chile 
was willing to possess before 1953.  Chile left the island under the abusive and arbitrary 
control of the company until 1953 when it changed the nomenclature from „company island‟ 
to „Navy Island‟.416  Chile did not respond as expected before such arbitrary regulations until 
1966: insiders were living in an island without permission to leave it voluntarily.417  All the 
people who died between 1944 and 1958 in the attempt to reach freedom reflected the pain 
felt by the desperate who cannot any other solution to the pitiful situation than to take 
suicidal or at least temerary measures.418 
 
In the case of Cameroon v Nigeria, the ICJ has argued against the position of estimating „that 
peaceful possession coupled with acts of administration may in the absence of protest found 
the basis or a title by way of historical consolidation‟.419  Moreover, the ICJ has estimated 
that a twenty years period of state effective activity is „too short‟. 420  Furthermore, Shaw 
argues that in the case of absence of legal title (the Rapanui case) the effectivités „must 
invariably be taken into consideration.‟421 
 
„The acquiescence of a party directly involved is also a very important factor in providing 
evidence of the effectiveness of control.‟422 
 
In the Island of Palmas case, Judge Huber noted that effectiveness will depend also on „the 
geographical nature of the region, the existence or not of competing claims and […] 
international reaction.‟423  Hence, for example the UN recognition or opposition to validate 
an „unlawful acquisition of territory‟ is significant.424  It is said that the UN has been willing 
to include Rapanui in the process of decolonisation.  The prescrition in ths case cannot be 
                                                 
416 N. 138, 197. 
417 N. 6, II, 64-65. 
418 Islander‟s watercrafts were improvised in extreme.  
419 N. 317, 441. 
420 N. 317, 441, footnote 181. 
421 N. 317, 436. 
422 N. 317, 442. 
423 N. 317, 441, footnote 182. 
424 N. 317, 442. 
 84 
considered long enough therefore is arguably to be running in favour of Chile.  Besides there 




In respect of the exercise of effective occupation, both the nature of the territory inhabited 
or reachable from the continent and the uti possidetis rationale must be taken into account.  
The island is one of the most isolated places on earth therefore the distance of the territory 
in this case may benefit the Chilean position.  Nevertheless, with the uti possidetis 
argumentation the matter is different.  According to Shaw, uti possidetis „posits that a new 
state has the boundaries of the predecessor entity.‟425  Article 1 of the Chilean Constitution 
of 1833 never contemplated the territory of Rapanui as part of it. 
 
„El territorio de Chile se extiende desde el desierto de Atacama hasta el Cabo de Hornos, i desde las cordilleras de 




„The territory of Chile extended its domains from the Atacama Desert to the Cape Horn and; 
from the Andes Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, comprehending the archipelago of Chiloe all the 




When Chile became independent in 1818 its boundaries were defined by the Roman idea of 
uti possidetis frontiers.  Uti possidetis portrays the idea of what the Spanish empire effectively 
colonised and occupied until the independence of its colonies in the early 19th century.  
Today it is a principle of international law. In the case of independent Chile, the 
Constitutions of 1828 and 1833 officially confirmed that the boundaries reached not far 
from the Juan Fernandez archipelago which is 500 kilometres away from mainland Chile.  
Even though the Constitution was in force until 1925 and was several times amended, it 
never to included Rapanui.  One of the reasons is that the mainlander “consciousness” 
awakening about Easter Island began much later. As I argue, in constitutional terms, the 
island became effectively part of the geographical Chile in 1966.  Before that the island was 
practically abandoned to the sheep ranch administrators and its acts were acquiesced in by 
Chile through the Navy. 
                                                 
425 N. 317, 431. 
426 N. 355, article 1 of the Constitution of 1833. 
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The Easter Island Act No 16.441 of 1966 
 
Although initially one could say that Chile started its “effective control” regarding 
prescription in 1896, 1916, 1917 or 1953, to me the critical date is 1966.  In 1966, for the 
very first time the Congress enacted a statute concerning the political, administrative and 
judicial situation of Easter Island according to the constitutional law in force.  In practical 
terms, it was not until the enactment of the still in force Ley Pascua, No 16.441 of 1966 or 
“Easter Island Act”427, that the island was fully incorporated to the Republic of Chile: a fact 
which coincides in time with the peoples‟ awakening in the 1950s.428  
 
The previous decrees and statutes were just antecedents to the final constitutive act of 
colonisation, the concrete institutionalisation of the Chilean exercise of power in the island.  
The most important legal act occurred in constitutional terms when the legal existence of the 
natives of Rapanui was recognised on equal conditions to Chileans from the mainland.  The 
so-called “naturales”429 became full Chileans citizens with equal constitutional rights.430   
 
Unlike the previous years of legal proto-colonisation the island became politically 
administered according to the Chilean constitutional system (art. 1).  It also became judicially 
incorporated into Chile since for the very first time a Tribunal of Letters (art. 6) was created 
to establish the rule of law in the island (superseding the naval jurisdiction which till then 
had administered justice even against constitutional provisions431).  Likewise, a formal City 
Council (art. 4) was set up and an electoral system (art. 22) to allow the locals to vote on 
national elections was established for the very first time. 
 
As Shaw highlights when commenting on the Rann of Kutch case, the assertion of sovereignty 
depends on the nature of the exercise of sovereignty.  Sovereign‟s rights and duties differ 
                                                 
427  Ley Pascua No 16.441 in URL: http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar/?idNorma=28472&idVersion=1966-03-
01&idParte 
428 N. 138, 196. 
429 Article 38 of Ley Pascua refers to island-born citizens as naturales. 
430 McCall, n. 334, 118. 
431 The article 80 of the Political Constitution of 1925 ordered that the faculty to judge civil and criminal matters 
tribunals belonged exclusively to the tribunals established by law. Neither the President nor the Congress may 
exercise judicial functions […] La facultad de juzgar las causas civiles y criminales pertenece esclusivamente a los tribunales 
establecidos por la lei. Ni el Presidente de la República, ni el Congreso, pueden, en caso alguno, ejercer funciones judiciales, avocarse 
causas pendientes o hacer revivir procesos fenecidos. See Political Constitution of the republic of Chile of 1925 in URL: 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar/?idNorma=131386&idVersion=1925-09-18&idParte 
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considerably depending on time, place, and the particular political system.432 The 
constitutional system of Chile is republican. The main formal source of law is written law 
especially through statutes. Unlike the executive “decrees” that emanate from administrative 
authorities, statutes or leyes are the the formal representation of the popular will of the 
republican democracy.  Hence, according to Shaw, the case must be evaluated according to 
the legislative measures adopted, and in this case the prominent is dated 1966. The Easter 
Island Act was the first complete Act of both legal colonisation and integration.  Before, the 
Ley 3220 there was only a proto-colonial attempt to annex the island. 
 
During the early twentieth century the lease of territories was a way of obtaining control of 
strategic territories without annexing.433  The case of Rapanui under the international law 
practice would be unique due to its unilateral nature: only one state asserting doubtful title 
against no one.  Unilateral acts are evidence of the point of view of the state in question. 
According to Shaw, „while not [a] source of international law‟ they might be a source of 
international obligation and the state might be judged according to its unilateral acts.434 
 
The argument of unilateral nature of these acts and the favourable consequences which 
according to law apply to the Rapanui rights notwithstanding, I argue that the case might be 
of a bilateral nature if the thesis of Rapanui statehood is assumed.  It is true there has been 
no opposition from foreign states against Chile‟s assertion of sovereignty on the island but, 
the constant uprisings of the indigenous population of the island might account as well as 
the amount of possession and settlement which has been significant only from 1966 
onwards.  Besides, the international community, according to Teodoro Ribera, has been in 
the past willing to include Easter Island in the C-24 list.435  
 
The Private law type of the proto-colonial period (1888-1966) 
                                                 
432 N. 317, 435. 
433 N. 317, 459. 
434 N. 317, 115. 
435 “Segundo Informe de la Comisión de Constitución, Legislación y Justicia y Reglamento”, Boletines Nos 2.526-07 y 
2.534-07 de 18 de marzo de 2003, pp. 1 – 594 [Senado, 2003]: 23.  Acordado en sesiones celebradas los días 7 y 14 
de mayo; 4, 11 y 18 de julio; 2, 9, 16 y 30 de julio; 6 y 13 de agosto; 3 y 10 de septiembre; 2, 8, 15, 28 y 29 de 
octubre; 5 de noviembre; 3, 10 y 17 de diciembre, todas del año 2002; 7, 14 y 22 de enero, y 11 y 18 de marzo de 
2003, con asistencia de sus miembros Honorables Senadores señores Andrés Chadwick Piñera (Presidente), 
Marcos Aburto Ochoa, Alberto Espina Otero, Rafael Moreno Rojas y Enrique Silva Cimma. Sala de la Comisión, 
a 18 de marzo de 2003. Nora Villavicencio Gonzalez, Abogado Secretario. URL: 
http://www.cecoch.cl/htm/materiales/tpl/11.pdf . 
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Finally I would like consider the Chilean public proto-colonialism (1888-1966) as a private 
law type of colonialism.  In 1933 after complicated judicial battles and amid competing 
claims to the ownership of lands of the island which confronted the sheep company and the 
government, the whole island and its immovable property was inscribed as owned by the 
Fisco chileno, paradoxically, on the basis of occupation of terra nullius according to article 590 
of the Civil Code.436 
 
The Fisco is the State of Chile performing private transactions as legal person for private law 
purposes.  In my opinion, the Fisco is not the legal owner because the inscription is void: The 
argument of terra nullius is inconsistent with the Chilean position of acquisition by cession.  
Since opposition to this inscripción de dominio or registration of title has existed from the time 
the people have been aware of it, the time of prescription is not running against Rapanui 
interests.437  Going further by following the theory of inexistence the inscription does not 
exist since there is no valid reason or causa juridica at law to appropriate the land. 
 
This illegal act of appropriation of ancestral Rapanui lands was realised through the register 
of public lands in the mainland city of Valparaiso438 and cancelled to be done again by 
duplication in the new register of public lands of Easter Island in 1966.439  The Chilean 
government‟s official stance argues that the inscription of 1933 is explained by a desire to 
protect Rapanui interests from foreign interests and not because there was a public animus of 
appropriation. If that is so, then why was the 1933 inscription done again in 1966 bearing in 
mind that since 1953 there was no longer a foreign sheep farming company trying to 
appropriate the lands under its control? 
 
As I said before Enrique Merlet got in 1896 the Chilean governments‟ approval to 
administer and exploit the island.  Twenty years later he was trying to register the lands 
which according to his view did not belong to the state of Chile.440     In 1933, the Fisco 
registered in its own name the land when confronted with CEDIP‟s apparent better rights its 
                                                 
436 N. 10, 125. 
437 Francisco Haoa Pakomio once told me that the people became aware of the public inscription of fisco-ownership 
just recently in the early 1980s. Before that they did not know that it even existed. 
438 N. 138, 187. 
439 N. 427. The Easter Island Act of 1966 created the public notary of Easter Island and the public land register of 
the Conservador de Bienes Raices. In its first page the register replicated the Valparaiso inscription of 1933 by saying 
that the whole island was owned by fisco. 
440 N. 331, 166 anexo XXXIII. 
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will to own the same lands. During the 1910s when Merlet tried to register the lands in the 
public land register of Valparaiso he found government judicial opposition to his 
administrative request.441  While the tribunals were resolving to whom the lands of the island 
belonged, the Ministry of External Affairs made a decree, the Temperamento Provisorio of 5 
May 1917442 according to which the island was being leased again to CEDIP. Only in 1929 
the lease was ended by the Ministry of Defence arguing the company pretension of having 
better rights over the island‟s property.443  According to Fisher, the president of Chile „was 
planning legally to inscribe all of Easter Island as property of the republic alone‟, but the 
company resisted and nothing was achieved444 until 1933 when a commission persuaded the 
government „to inscribe all of the Isla de Pascua as national property before the nations of 
the world.‟445  
 
The complicated contractual relationship between the state of Chile and the CEDIP ended 
in 1953.  By that time all doubts on the island‟s land ownership have been removed.  In 1966 
through the Ley Pascua the inscription of 1933 was cancelled and renewed in the register of 
public land of Easter Island.446  In my opinion, none of those legal private transactions 
which originated in Toro and later Merlet‟s purchases of lands, can be argued as 
jurisdictional acts of the state.  Acts of jurisdiction should not be confounded with 
contractual acts.  Therefore, whether or not there was Chilean effective control from 1896 
or 1966, these acts do not count for determining the mode of acquisition of sovereignty of 
the island according to international law. 
 
Reframing the Rapanui people: Nationality rather than ethnicity 
 
I argue against articles 1 and 2 of the indigenous act No 19.253 of 1993447 which depict the 
Rapanui people as Chilean ethnicity.  This is due to the fact that I think they should be 
regarded rather as nation.  The legal consequence of that distinction is fundamental 
                                                 
441 Through the Oposición a inscripción, rol 15691. N. 331, 167 anexo XXXIV. 
442 N. 331, 183, anexo XXXVI. 
443 N. 331, 186, anexo XXXVII. 
444 N. 138, 185. 
445 N. 138, 187. 
446 Fojas 1 Numero 1 del Registro de Dominio del Conservador de Bienes Raíces de Isla de Pascua. Refer to Jacobo 
Hey Paoa, Conservador de Bienes Raíces de Isla de Pascua, Rapanui, Chile. 
447 N. 5, and N. 584. 
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regarding the judicial case developed in chapter four and the application of the 
correspondent statute.  The fact that insiders‟ citizenship was obtained only after the 
enactment of the Ley Pascua (which responded, in turn, to a political reaction provoked in 
Chile after the island‟s revolt of 1964-65448) makes sense in the light of the historical 
evidence.  The historical facts show contrasting national roots of Chileans vis-à-vis Rapanui.  
According to Xabier Alvo, the people of Easter Island are „tenuously linked to Chilean 
history.‟449  Nelson Castro450 wondered whether to bother writing the history of an island 
which had never belonged to the history of the Chilean nation: „Why write about 
populations and territories over which we do not have vital experience, either colonial or 
post-colonial?‟451 
 
The question of ethnicity and nationality must be addressed by contextualising the debate. 
The determination of the scope of application of the term “peoples” in the context of 
international law, appears relevant.  According to James Anaya, the term “peoples” due to its 
link with the principle of self-determination has been traditionally understood 
 
„in the sense of a limited universe of narrowly defined, mutually exclusive communities entitled a 
priori to the full range of sovereign powers, including independent statehood.‟ 452  
 
To Anaya, there are three variants to restrict the controversial scope.  The second and the 
third are more contemporaneous but the first variant „[…] only applies to the populations of 
territories that are under conditions of classical colonialism.‟453  Although Anaya considers it 
as insufficient, the classic variant  is for my purposes essential to understand the Chilean 
colonialism on Easter Island: Subjugation of locals by alien domination which, in other 
                                                 
448 “We are merely asking for respect. The reformulation of ethnicity in Rapa Nui (Easter Island 1966)” by Alejandra 
Grifferos, Pacific 2000. Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Easter Island and the Pacific, Kamuela, Hawai'i, 
August 7-12, 2000, Easter Island Foundation, Los Osos, CA, USA, edited by Christopher M. Stevenson, Georgia 
Lee, F. J. Morin, pp. 377-381, 2000, 378. 
449 “Andean People in the Twentieth Century” by Xavier Albo in The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the 
Americas Volume III, South America, Part 2, edited by Frank Salomon and Stuart B. Schwartz, Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 765-871, 1999, 871. 
450 Castro, n. 401. Nelson Castro Flores is a Chilean historiographer who wrote a thesis on the Angata uprising of 
1914. 
451 Castro, n. 401, 7. 
452 Indigenous Peoples in International Law by James S. Anaya, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2004, 100. 
453 Anaya argues that the classical-first variant was implicit in India‟s reservation to the article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  To India, self-determination „“appl[ies] only to the peoples under foreign 
domination and […] not apply to sovereign independent States or to section of people or nation–which is the 
essence of national integrity‟”. N. 452, 117, note 26. 
 90 
words, means political, cultural and economic suppression of insiders‟ prerogatives in favour 
of the political, economic, legal, judicial and social control coming from people who do not 
identify themselves with the nationality of the people of the namely independent territory. 
 
One of the three features of John Rawls‟ philosophical-liberal concept of “the Law of 
Peoples” (in terms of principles guiding the „mutual political relations between peoples‟454) is 
cultural. 455  To conceptualise peoples as cultures, John Rawls followed J. S. Mill‟s concept of 
nationality.  According to Rawls, Mill uses the „idea of nationality to describe a people‟s 
culture.‟456 
 
„“A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among 
themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others–which 
make cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be the same 
government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, 
exclusively. This feeling of nationality may be generated by various causes. Sometimes, it is the 
effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community of religion, greatly 
contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of 
political antecedents; the possession of national history, and consequent community of 
recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same 
incidents in the past. None of these circumstances, however, are necessarily sufficient by 
themselves.”‟ 457 
 
The desire of be governed by themselves; the identity of race and descent; the community of 
language, beliefs; geographic limits; community of historical recollections are amongst those 
from which Rapanui people identify themselves. Also to be highlighted is that Mill‟s 
characterisation of nationality as culture fairly represents the contrasting roots which exist 
between the people of Chile and the people of Easter Island. 
 
                                                 
454 Or the „particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international 
law and practice.‟ Law of the Peoples by John Rawls, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, 3 and 3 
footnote 1. 
455 N. 454, 23. 
456 N. 454, 23, footnote 17. 
457 N. 454, 23, footnote 17 quoting J. S. Mill (1862) Considerations on Representative Government, ed. J.M. Robson 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), in Collected Works, vol. XIX, chap. XVI, p. 546. 
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According to Alfred Cobban, one of the difficulties of accepting the collective right of self-
determination „arises from the problem of finding a definition for the nation.‟458  According 
to his view, „the nation is a community that is, or wishes to be, a state.‟459  He stated that 
although nationality theorists have been incapable of building one objective concept, it is 
possible to trace common elements: 
 
„Language, religion, traditions, territorial contiguity, natural frontiers, economic interests, race 
[…]‟460 
 
The place of birth is also a „decisive characteristic‟461 but not enough to Cobban because „the 
only certain test […] is essentially subjective‟462.  To him, any „territorial community‟ in which 
the members 
 
„are conscious of themselves as members of a community, and wish to maintain the identity of 
their community, is a nation.‟ 463 
 
In the case of Rapanui through Cobban‟s conceptualisations, either objective or subjective 
elements are present.  The majority of the indigenous people of Rapanui self-identify 
themselves first as Rapanui and only after that as Chileans.464  Besides, the national-political 
identity is manifested through the autonomous desire of becoming an independent polity, or 
in Cobban‟s words, a state. 
 
According to Jennings, the matter of nationality is related to the territorial change.  The 
transference of the portion of earth‟s surface, and its resources from one regime to another 
involves decisive changes „in the nationality, allegiance and way of life of the population‟.465 
For the case of Rapanui I argue this has been happening strongly since 1966. 
                                                 
458 The Nation-State and National Self-Determination by Alfred Cobban, Thomas Y., Crowell Company, New York, 
Apollo edition, 1970, 107.  





464 The sole factual detail of writing in a legal document that “I Jose X, Chilean, declare that…” sometimes has 
provoked quarrels with the Easter Island Notary‟s functionaries since some people instead prefers that the official 
writes “I Jose X, Rapa Nui-Chilean, declare that…” In my legal work I witnessed that several times. 
465 The acquisition of territory in International Law by Robert Y. Jennings, Manchester, England: Manchester University 
Press; New York: Oceana, 1963, 3. 
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The right of political self-determination of nations. 
 
Before a senatorial committee in 2003, the former Director of Legal Affairs of the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations of Chile, Mr. Claudio Troncoso, in the context of international law, 
explained what were the possible consequences of conferring constitutional recognition on  
the indigenous populations as “peoples of Chile” within the constitutional rationale of the 
Republic of Chile.466  He argued that there was no univocal sense for a expression (peoples) 
which therefore has experienced some evolution throughout time.467  To him the word 
pueblos has been historically related to the right of self-determination and distinguishes 
between „peoples subdued under colonial (racist or foreign) domination‟ to whom, as 
subjects of the international legal order, international law confers the right of exterior self-
determination and, „peoples constituted (organised or integrated) within the state‟ on whom 
international legal order only confers internal self-determination.468  To the first situation of 
peoples subdued under colonial rule, the state which is controlling the territory in question is 
seen by the international law as not the legitimate representative of those who inhabits it.  
On the other hand, peoples constituted within the state are seen as being legitimately 
represented by the state, and the principle of territorial integrity is privileged in order to 
avoid any pretension of secession of particular minorities within the state. 469   
 
The Rapanui situation perfectly fits into the first situation of peoples subjugated by a 
colonial foreign domination.  An interpretation of the UN resolutions concerning 
decolonisation through the lens of the island‟s history shows that the Rapanui were never 
and by no circumstances part of the process of construction of the national identity or 
boundaries, as officially depicted, especially since the enactment of the 1993 Indigenous Act. 
According to article 2 of the Indigenous Act, indigenous peoples are persons of Chilean 
nationality who are in the following cases:470 
                                                 
466 N. 435. 
467 N. 435, 11. 
468 N. 435, 12. 
469 N. 435, 12. 
470 N. 5, article 2: Se considerarán indígenas para los efectos de esta ley, las personas de nacionalidad chilena que se encuentren en los 
siguientes casos: a) Los que sean hijos de padre o madre indígena, cualquiera sea la naturaleza de su filiación, inclusive la adoptiva; Se 
entenderá por hijos de padre o madre indígena a quienes desciendan de habitantes originarios de las tierras identificadas en el artículo 
12, números 1 y 2; b) Los descendientes de las etnias indígenas que habitan el territorio nacional, siempre que posean a lo menos un 
apellido indígena; Un apellido no indígena será considerado indígena, para los efectos de esta ley, si se acredita su procedencia indígena 
por tres generaciones, y c) Los que mantengan rasgos culturales de alguna etnia indígena, entendiéndose por tales la práctica de formas 
de vida, costumbres o religión de estas etnias de un modo habitual o cuyo cónyuge sea indígena. En estos casos, será necesario, además, 
que se autoidentifiquen como indígenas. 
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In the same manner, another prominent constitutionalist lawyer Teodoro Ribera affirmed 
before that same senatorial committee that contrary to the idea of “ethnicity”, “peoples” has 
to be thought as „a group of individuals who belonging or not to an ethnicity have the 
conviction of constituting a unity different to others.‟471  This is a very interesting element 
added by Ribera which detaches the idea of race from the concept of nationality.  I argue 
that this is the case of Easter Islanders, who historically used to regard themselves as a 
country of people having as secondary element of consideration the fact of ethnic origin 
(this may explain partially why today several of the so-called traditional surnames are foreign 
names472).  
 
The trans-ethnical understanding used to transcend the narrowing depiction of the 1993 Ley 
Indigena.  Before the Indigenous Act enactment, the still-in-force Ley Pascua 16.441 of 1966, 
and the Decreto Ley or Law-Decree No 2885 of 1979 used to denominate as naturales or 
originales the people born on Easter Island regardless of their blood-line descendance.473  
These Acts therefore used the principle of ius solis, that is, the place of birth to determine and 
distinguish the law applicable between insiders and outsiders.  This may also explain, yet only 
partially, Ribera‟s acknowledgement that the United Nations has shown some interest to 
incorporate Rapanui in the process of decolonisation!474 
 
During the early 1990s when the Indigenous Bill was being discussed, some Rapanui resisted 
being seen as indígenas, since they argued they were Polynesians.475  Regardless of their 
resistance the 1993 Act established the ethnicity of Rapanui (as any other Chilean indigenous 
community) as Chilean-indigenous as long as one of two principles were fulfilled by the 
individual:  the principle of ius sanguinis or the principle of cultural self-recognition. They 
opposed again.  A more radicalised island sector showed fierce resistance to even 
contemplating the possibility that non-Rapanui Chileans might apply for a strip of land since 
they may self-recognised as Rapanui due to their link by marriage with a blood-line descent 
                                                 
471 N. 435, 18. 
472 Cardinali, Pont, Calderon, Edmunds or Rangitaki are family names adopted from foreign surnames. Today they 
are considered Rapa Nui‟s surnames; see “Anexo: Te ingoa Rapanui”, Las Fundaciones de Rapanui by Grant McCall, 
edición del Museo Antropologico Sebastian Englert, Chile, 1986. 
473  N. 427, article 38. Also see article 1 of Decreto Ley No 2885 of 1979 URL 
www.leychile.cl/Navegar/?idNorma=7028&idVersion=1993-10-05&idParte. 
474 N. 435, 23  
475 N. 10, 199. 
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Rapanui.476  In other words, they opposed because in their minds they saw possibility that 
mainlanders posing as Rapanui could have access to land ownership.  Due popular rejection 
it „took a full five years‟477 before the law came into force in 1998. 
 
As I have argued in chapter two there are some people of Rapanui who knowing ancient 
concepts are partially incapable of distinguishing clearly between the western concepts of 
sovereignty and land ownership.  It come to be clear that they did not want further foreign 
hands controlling more of their “unified” concept towards land: The kainga which already 
had been usurped by the Fisco, in 1933 and 1966, and previously lost by cession through the 
Deed1888. To those the meaning of the original (before the 1998 reform) Ley Indigena was 
going to be to give away more sovereignty and more land ownership to Chile and its people. 
 
Following the thesis presented in chapter two, a paradoxical fact emerged.  From my point 
of view, even though the Rapanui were trying to protect what to them is sacred or very 
political, henua, the only result they got was the creation of another element of social division 
and more colonialism than before.  Previously, I was told478, the island people did not 
differentiate regarding blood-quantum percentages but by the cultural involvement of the 
named person.  This makes sense if we see the constitution of modern families. 479  Many of 
them came from foreign surnames.  Today, most (not to say all) of the families are mixed-
blood.  Foreigners were seen as guests and if the people‟s love was gained they became 
another Rapanui with rights to participate in political affairs and perhaps by getting some 
“loose” control over a piece of land.  Through the ius sanguinis discrimination what the 
Indigenous Act has caused is today a vicious social contest concerning who is more Rapanui 
than the other or who is more pure than the other.480 
  
Paraphrasing Teodoro Ribera, the concept of self-determination has suffered several stages 
of chronological evolution. From just being a “principle” it became a “right” in 1952 
through the UN Resolution 637.  Then, the UN Resolutions 1514 of 1960 and 2200 of 1966 
                                                 
476 N. 10, 201. 
477 N. 10, 202. 
478 Personal communications with Jorge Pont Chavez and Francisco Haoa Pakomio. 
479 See Chapter IX of RAPANUI. Tradition and Survival on Easter Island by Grant McCall, 2nd edition, Allen & Unwin, 
Australia, 1994; also N. 138, 150. 
480 This social issue is reinforced by another legal provision of the indigenous act which permits mixed-blood 
Rapanui to place their “Rapanui” surname before the “foreign”.  This is an exception to the rule of the Civil Code 
which requires that children have first their father´s name and secondly theirs mothers‟. 
 95 
came to reaffirm equally the right of self-determination of peoples, especially through the 
latter resolution which approved the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966.  It was through Resolution 2625 of 1970 when the conceptualisation of the collective 
right was narrowed to be applicable only to the colonies and through that denying validity of 
application to existing states.481 
 
In 1966, the Easter Island Act caused public expectations in the mainland, and was regarded 
as very positive in the advance of Rapanui‟s overcoming of Chilean colonialism by reason of 
the recognition of their basic political rights and freedoms and human rights in general.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of Rapanui in the Indigenous Act was also looked upon as 
positive in the sense of further process of integration in the polity of Chile.  However, the 
legal consequences of both are negative from the perspective of their right to political self-
determination.  One the one hand, the Ley Pascua was the beginning of the final stage of 
political subjugation. On the other, through the Indigenous Act, the legal consequence of 
becoming “ethnic” was detrimental too to the Rapanui interests on self-determination.  
People characterised as ethnic are subordinated to one fundamental principle of international 
law: the principle of territorial integrity of states.  The principle of territorial integrity of 
states, 
 
„appears to conflict on the face of it with another principle of international law, that of the self-
determination of peoples.‟482  
 
If accepting that X people are ethnics of other nation-state, the principle of territorial 
integrity legally prevails over the possibly just claim to political self-determination.  On the 
contrary, if X people are a nation, the right of decolonisation prevails over the principle of 
territorial integrity of states.  Therefore, by proper interpretation of the factual and legal 
evidence the ethnic understanding should be superseded in the case of the Rapanui people.  
Through the current understanding the Rapanui became automatically no longer entitled to 
recover their sovereign right of external self-determination, that is, the right to politically 
determine authorities, laws and judiciary, but rather were converted into a legal Chilean 
ethnicity which, in terms of entitlement, means aspiring only to the right of internal self-
                                                 
481 N. 435, 19 – 21. 
482 N. 317, 443 doing reference to the Burkina Faso v. Mali, ICJ report (1986). 
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determination, at best.  If my proposition were accepted the logical consequence might alter 
today‟s theoretical understanding and consequently the political approach to the theme.   
 
I am arguing that the indigenous people of Rapanui are a colony in the sense of the 
resolutions recalled by Ribera.  Easter Island is entitled to the collective right to be 
decolonised. Also I argue that the people of Easter Island are being wrongly depicted as of 
Chilean ethnicity.  The ethnic concept introduced in the 1993 Act was followed by the 
CVHyNT report of 2003 and recently reaffirmed by the respective ratifications of both the 
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries of the 
International Labour Organization, [C-169] 483 and the UN Universal Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, [UDRIP].484 
 
According to article 1.1.b C-169 the Convention applies to, 
 
„peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent 
from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country 
belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state 
boundaries…‟.   
 
In my opinion, according to this logic C-169 should not apply to Rapanui people for all the 
reasons presented in this chapter (eg. the utis possidetis principle). 
 
According to article 1.3 of C-169, 
 
„The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications 
as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.‟ 
 
This means that indigenous peoples in independent countries are entitled only to internal, 
cultural, or ethnic self-determination and not political self-determination.  Article 1 No 3 in 
Rapanui language reads: the Haka Tano O Te ILO 169 O Runga I Te Tangata Hakatere Tuai O 
Te Henua: Te anga inga I rote ta‘toa‘a me‘e o te vananga nei ―He Tangata Henua‖ ina ko ai pe nei ee he 
me‘e ati o e tahi hihi hihi te me‘e parauti‘a hanga o raua mau‘a I rote ara o te henua ta‘ato‘a.485  
                                                 
483 N. 322. 
484 N. 323.  
485 N. 322 article 1 No 3 translated into Rapanui by Clementina “Kere” Tepano Haoa. Haka Tano O Te OIT 169 O 
Runga I Te Tangata Hakatere Tuai O Te Henua. 
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Article 3 of the UDRIP declares that, 
 
„Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.‟ 
 
Article 45 of the UDRIP declares that,  
 
„Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights 
indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future.‟ 
 
Both, articles 3 and 45 seemed very promising and were the reason why Australia initially 
voted against this Declaration, exactly by reason of the reference to self-determination.486  
 
The problem is with article 46.1 of the UDRIP, 
 
„Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the 
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States.‟ 
 
I think that both the C-169 treaty and the UDRIP declaration are, from a Rapanui 
decolonising perspective, a political neo-colonial ersatz.  The law of cultural self-
determination of ethnicities, on which Rapanui leaders focus their activism nowadays487, is 
useless from my point of view.  Hitherto, the 1993-ethnic reframing (and its international 
replications) went unnoticed.  By following conspiracy theory argumentations, one may 
think that the ethnic depiction was a strategic move of the state of Chile.  The Rapanui came 
to be part of the Chilean identity as nation-state and no longer should Chile worry about 
                                                 
486 „Australia‟s representative said his Government had long expressed its dissatisfaction with the references to self-
determination in the text.  Self-determination applied to situations of decolonization and the break-up of States 
into smaller states with clearly defined population groups.  It also applied where a particular group with a defined 
territory was disenfranchised and was denied political or civil rights.  Australia supported and encouraged the full 
engagement of indigenous peoples in the democratic decision-making process, but did not support a concept that 
could be construed as encouraging action that would impair, even in part, the territorial and political integrity of a 
State with a system of democratic representative Government.‟ See “Major step forward” UN Department of 
Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, Sixty-first General Assembly Plenary 107th & 108th 
Meetings (AM & PM) URL: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm  
487 For instance, Rafael “Rinko” Tuki Tepano, who in 2007 replaced the former prominent leader Alberto Hotus. He 
was elected by the Rapanui to represent them, according to the provision of the Indigenous Act. After Chile‟s 
ratification of the C-169 in 2008, he is insisting on implementing the C-169 to protect, according to his view, the 
Rapanui interests. 
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decolonisation issues because a gradual integration of its Oceanian first-peoples was on the 
move.  Actually what matters to the international community are mostly severe human 
rights‟ breaches.   
 
But, I do not believe in conspiracy theories.  While I believe in the good will of those who 
included the Rapanui ethnicity in the Indigenous Act, and of those left-wing supporters who 
pushed for the ratification of the C-169, I am also a witness of the nearly sickly attitude of 
my fellows, who are searching for roots to unify us as nation.488  
 
From a Chilean perspective the Rapanui people, as a people-nation, as a nationality, do not 
exist.489 Although culturally protected by the Chilean law they are considered an ethnic group 
amongst other indigenous ethnicities as depicted by the Indigenous Act of 1993.  They are 
an ethnic population fully deserving of cultural protection within the constitutional logic of 
the Chilean unitary-nation understanding.490  As will be argued next, the Rapanui demand to 
get their sovereignty and land ownership back, is not unconstitutional because they are not 
just an ethnicity but a nation with the full collective right of political self-determination 
according to both international and Chilean law. 
                                                 
488 About the factors which fed the Chilean national consciousness during the nineteenth century in “Orígenes de la 
conciencia nacional chilena” by Ricardo Krebs pp. 3-22 in Nación y Nacionalismo en Chile. Siglo XIX, Volumen 1, 
edited by Gabriel Cid and Alejandro San Francisco, Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, Santiago, Chile, 
2009.  According to the editors, the book is a non-nationalist historiographic study which does not represent the 
phenomenon of nationalism as “essence” that is as a collective identity with an invariable destiny but as a novel 
form of collective identification in which as much changes as the continuities have relevance. It is about the 
Chilean national identity which sees nationalism as a process in constant construction and reconstruction. URL: 
http://www.mer.cl/modulos/catalogo/Paginas/2010/04/11/MERSTAT007OO1104.htm  
489 In fact, one of the public debates raised by the left-wing parties is nowadays to push for a more comprehensive 
multicultural point of constitutional departure as elsewhere developed countries, such as Canada, have done.   
490 This has important consequences which will be analysed in chapter four. They are related to article 5 of the 
Chilean constitution and the “exhaustion of remedies” through the OAS judicial system. 
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The thesis argues for the human right of political decolonisation to which the people of 
Rapanui are entitled.  The question now is how put into practice the entitlement. As 
Gonschor stresses, the application of the law of decolonisation is inconsistent when applied 
to Hawai‟i, Tahiti Nui and Rapanui.  This is an attempt to find alternative scenarios as 
encouraged by Pacific Studies.  The thesis develops an interpretation of the law of the 
Organisation of American States [OAS] to lay the foundations for a future practical 
implementation of the notional legal argumentations developed hitherto.  Nevertheless it is 
only limited to setting up the basis for filing a case of political self-determination through the 
OAS judiciary.  It is thought that through the OAS judicial system an “OAS judicial 
decolonisation” might be accomplished.  It is argued that before the tribunals of OAS a 
constitutional debate could be raised based on systematic interpretation of the Constitución 
Política de la Republica de Chile [CPR] vis-à-vis the American Convention of Human Rights 
[ACHR].491   
 
Most Chilean constitutionalists agree in regarding universal human rights treaties, of which 
Chile is signatory, as a source of constitutional law as provided by the CPR itself.  Moreover 
those same scholars argue that these constitutional rules would have a prominent place in 
the hierarchy of the Chilean legal order.  This has a series of legal and political consequences.  
Therefore, the process of decolonisation becomes attainable.  The constitutional-legal 
dispute between two different nations would be the common situation in an imaginary trial, 
Chile and Rapanui debating on who has the right to govern the destiny of the “Island of 
Easter”. 
 
I contend that the right of political self-determination of peoples though not expressly 
mentioned or guaranteed by the ACHR or by CPR is indeed a right protected by those 
bodies of law, therefore, capable of being vindicated before a court of law.  The thesis 
examines how the hierarchical interrelations amongst international laws on human rights and 
                                                 
491 American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose Costa Rica [ACHR] adopted at the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 22nd November 1969. URL: 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm . 
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the relationship of these and the Chilean municipal law operates in favour of the Rapanui 
case for political decolonisation.  I am postulating that through a process of integration of 
sources of law, namely: OAS treaty law; the United Nations [UN] human rights law, and the 
CPR, we can find legal “windows” to build a judicial case and, ultimately trigger, through 
courts of law, the initiation of the process of decolonisation of Easter Island from its 
controller “administrative power”, the state of Chile. 
 
Upon these bases we will imagine a case before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights [IACHR], the place where persons or a group of persons may lodge petitions 
concerning states parties‟ acts or omissions which might be violating rights recognised in the 
ACHR or other applicable instruments.  The petition before the IACHR would contain a 
request for Chile‟s compliance with article 73 (e) of the UN Charter and other norms 
concerning political self-determination, by means of transmitting to the UN General 
Assembly information related to the colonial status of Easter Island.  The IACHR would 
recommend that to Chile and Chile should comply.  In the event of Chilean state opposition, 
that is, Chile‟s neglecting to action the IACHR‟ recommendation, ultimately, the IACHR 
could consider referring the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [the Court] 
for a final decision binding on Chile.  The hypothetical result, in practical terms, is believed 
to have the ability to push official recognition, and result in a voluntary commitment from 
Chile before the C-24 or, at least, give extra strength to the island‟s wish for self-
government.492 
 
By „Means of Protection‟ according to article 33, Chapter IV of the ACHR, 
 
„CHAPTER VI - COMPETENT ORGANS 
Article 33 
The following organs shall have competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfilment of 
the commitments made by the States Parties to this Convention: 
(a)  the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, referred to as “The Commission;” and 
(b)  the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, referred to as “The Court.”‟ 
 
One obstacle that an international case like this will find is the requirement of prior 
exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of admissibility for presentations filed before 
the IACHR.  This is linked with another but only apparent obstacle which is the need of 
lodging petitions within a period of six months following the date of notification of the final 
internal instance.  The thesis argues the inexistence of proper procedural ways to protect the 
                                                 
492 N. 10, 195. „Rapanui wishes for political autonomy have not been taken sufficiently into account.‟ 
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alleged right in Chile according to municipal provisions, then it must be proved this case falls 
into the exception contemplated in articles 31 and 32 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
IACHR and article 46 of the ACHR, which allow lodging lawsuits „within a reasonable 
period of time‟. 493  The municipal remedies capable of possible utilisation are reviewed at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
The other obstacle is found in Chapter II of ACHR which details the civil and political rights 
protected by the OAS judicial system.  The right of political self-determination of peoples it 
is not recognised explicitly there as one of the rights able of being alleged judicially.494  
Nevertheless, a more elaborate interpretation will conclude that the human right of political 
self-determination of peoples, which is guaranteed in diverse UN instruments (especially the 
ICCPR495) is an integral of the ACHR due to the interpretation of the Inter-American Court 
elaborated in 1982.496  Moreover, I am arguing that the UN laws on decolonisation bind 
Chilean state organs because they have been integrated into the Chilean law by means of 
article 5 of the CPR. 
 
This chapter also reviews the doctrines of incorporation and transformation to argue that 
article fifth of CPR, according to the doctrina Nogueira, has incorporated, automatically, the 
human right of political self-determination of peoples into the Chilean legal order since 
1989.  And, if not, the right has been already transformed into internal law through binding 
treaties, namely the ACHR since 1990, and the ICCPR since 1976 or 1989.  Furthermore, I 
am asserting that the human right of political self-determination of peoples is a right 
protected not only by ACHR or CPR but also according to articles 62, 64, 68, 29 (b) of 
ACHR, articles 1, 4, 5 of the ICCPR, several resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the 
reservation made by Chile by virtue of article 62 of ACHR, and, the 1982 Inter-American 
Court verdict, all of which are reviewed further below.  As a consequence, state organs 
should undertake measures to ensure for the Rapanui people the exercise of their right, or to 
comply with any recommendation of the IACHR and ultimately to implement any binding 
                                                 
493  RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
approved by the Commission at its 137th regular period of sessions, held from October 28 to November 13, 2009. 
URL http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic18.RulesOfProcedureIACHR.htm . 
494 N. 493, article 23. 
495 N. 320. 
496 Which is analysed further below. 
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sentence of the Court, in order to initiate the process of decolonisation through the UN 
Committee on Decolonisation, C-24 of which Chile is member since 1962.497 
 
This analysis begins with some brief thoughts on the relationship between international and 
municipal laws based on the ACHR.  This thought are based on the preamble and the first 
articles of the Convention.  Then, it will be analysed the role of the two judicial OAS organs, 
the ipso facto binding force of the Court sentences on Chile, and the interpretation of the 
Court regarding “Other Treaties” applicable through the ACHR.  Then, the thesis analyses 
article 5 of the CPR, the constitutionalisation of human rights in the Chilean legal order and 
the relationship with American and universal instruments on human rights.  Finally, it is 
reviewed the issue of exhaustion of internal feasible remedies along with a brief exposition 
of them. 
 
„Article 1 Obligation to Respect Rights 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized 
herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those 
rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social 
condition. 
For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human being. 
 
Article 2 Domestic Legal Effects 
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured 
by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures 




International law seeks equal relations between states.  In particular, since the establishment 
of the UN and its body of treaties on human rights, international law has aimed to shelter 
fundamental rights from government acts and omissions which may violate or jeopardise 
them.  The fact that states assert national sovereignty over individuals and communities no 
longer implies that persons who were afflicted by arbitrary or illegal decisions, decrees, or 
sentences do not have the right to solicit subsidiary protection when municipal provisions 
were not enough to correct the imperium of law.  Following the trend and through several 
agreements of the governments American states have committed themselves to performance 
in accordance with the international law of human rights.  The principle of action, in the case 
                                                 
497 UN GA resolution A/RES/1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962. URL: www.un.org/documents/resga.htm . 
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of American states, is to declare on a priori inclination to limit sovereign prerogatives of the 
state, namely legislative, executive and even judicial for the sake of human rights. 
 
In the Preamble of the ACHR when reaffirming their willingness to consolidate democratic 
institutions, personal liberty and social justice, States signatories recognise the necessity to 
comport themselves based on the essential rights of man which they assert are not derived 
from being a national of a certain state, but from the fact of simply being human.  These 
rights escape the absolute control of nation-states‟ sovereignty by means of proclaiming that 
the ACHR, also called Pacto de San Jose de Costa Rica, was not a mere capricious decision of 
„New World‟498 nation-states but supported by analogous instruments of a universal 
nature.499  The ethical validity therefore of the agreement would be worldwide.  The 
American states when presuming the pre-existence of essential rights under which they 
situate themselves as sovereigns, in legal terms, are making reference to imprescriptible and 
inalienable human rights.500  The protection of these rights starts with the limitation of 
national sovereignties by the human rights universal rationale.  The international post-WWII 
tendency is reflected likewise in the CPR when it proclaimed on whom the exercise of 
national sovereignty is bestowed and, how it ought to be exercised.  As will be shown the 
natural law501 premise of ACHR-essential rights existence was taken up by the doctrine of 
article 5 of CPR through its equivalent Spanish phrase: derechos esenciales or essential rights. 
 
The ACHR Preamble gives shape to this declaration of wills.  Articles 1 and 2 of the ACHR 
establish that states parties commit themselves to put into practice in their respective legal 
orders the „rights and freedoms‟ recognised in ACHR when legal municipal vacuums exist. 
This is consistent with article 27 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties when 
prescribing that states parties „may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.‟ 502  For the ACHR, international protection is 
                                                 
498 The New World concept comprehends the idea of Creole people of European cultural background ruling 
American nation-states to the detriment of the indigenous populations. N. 13, 20-21. 
499 The ACHR was not just a consequence of UN post-WWII law but also the result of a long-term dream which 
began more than two hundreds years ago in cradle of aristocratic elites criollas. 
500 In legal terminology, “imprescriptible” signifies that there are some rights unable to be taken away by prescription 
or by lapse of time. Likewise, “inalienable” refers to the concept of a nonnegotiable right which unable to be taken 
away from or given away by the possessor. 
501 In the context of positivism and natural law dispute. 
502 Article 27. Internal law and observance of treaties. A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46. See Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, Treaty 
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achieved by means of reinforcement and complementing of the judicial protection given by 
domestic legal provisions.  Yet later, this will mean not only reinforcement or 
complementing of municipal law but also its potential replacement when human rights are 
threatened by matters of a municipal nature. 
 
International and municipal arenas 
 
The ACHR has established a system of integration of sources between OAS and UN norms 
on human rights and, between international and municipal laws, rights and competences, 
according to ACHR articles 29 and 64. These norms are important for the case because they 
provide the legal ground for the advisory opinion of Inter-American Court which in 1982 
interpreted article 64 in the light of article 29 to conclude that the human rights protected by 
the OAS law encompass human rights guaranteed in universal bodies to which American 
states were parties. 
 
„ACHR 
CHAPTER IV - SUSPENSION OF GUARANTEES, INTERPRETATION, AND 
APPLICATION 
[…] 
Article 29 Restrictions Regarding Interpretation 
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: 
a    permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the 
rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is 
provided for herein; 
b    restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws 
of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; 
c    precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived 
from representative democracy as a form of government; or 
d    excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man and other international acts of the same nature may have. 
[…] 
 
CHAPTER VIII - INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Section 2, Jurisdiction and Functions 
Article 64 
1.     The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation 
of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the 
American states. Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the 
Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, 
may in like manner consult the Court. 
2.     The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may provide that state with 




                                                                                                                                     
Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, Copyright, United Nations, 2005. URL, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf . 
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The OAS also created a body of substantive and procedural norms to protect a person or a 
group of persons from particular actions or policies which might be infringing human rights 
guaranteed by the ACHR.  This integration between international and municipal 
competences by no means implies an OAS verdict‟s enforcement on the country involved.  
But, in theory, if human rights were jeopardised by domestic decisions (adopted by 
executive, legislative or judicial organs) the ultimate decision of the Court, which might 
conflict with those, will prevail over municipal provisions if the country involved has agreed 
to recognise the binding force of the Court‟s verdicts. 
 
„ACHR 
CHAPTER VIII - INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
[…] 
Section 2, Jurisdiction and Functions 
[…] 
Article 62 
1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this 
Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and 
not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Convention. 
2. Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a 
specified period, or for specific cases. It shall be presented to the Secretary General of the 
Organization, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other member states of the 
Organization and to the Secretary of the Court. 
3. The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the 
States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special 
declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement. […]‟ 
 
Chile signed the ACHR 22 November 1969.  Nevertheless, Chile is a party only since 21 
August 1990 when it deposited the instrument of ratification.503  On the basis of article 62 of 
the ACHR, Chile made a reservation.  In that statement, Chile recognised ipso facto the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  This is fundamental for the case of Rapanui decolonisation. The 
reservation of Chile was:504 
 
„a)          The Government of Chile declares that it recognizes, for an indefinite period of time and 
on the condition of reciprocity, the competence of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights to receive and examine communications in which a State Party alleges that another State 
Party has committed a violation of the human rights established in the American Convention on 
Human Rights, as provided for in Article 45 of the Convention. 
  
                                                 
503 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report Nº 42/08, ADMISSIBILITY, PETITION 1271-
04, KAREN ATALA AND DAUGHTERS, CHILE, 23rd July 2008. URL 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2008eng/chile1271.04eng.htm . 
504 “DECLARATIONS/RESERVATIONS/DENUNCIATIONS/WITHDRAWALS. B-32: AMERICAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS "PACT OF SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA"”. URL: 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm . 
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b)         The Government of Chile declares that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, the 
jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of the 
Convention in accordance with its Article 62. 
  
In making these declarations, the Government of Chile places on record that this recognition of 
the competence and jurisdiction of the Commission applies to events subsequent to the date of 
deposit of this instrument of ratification or, in any case, to events which began subsequent to 
March 11, 1990. Moreover, in acknowledging the competence and jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
Government of Chile declares that, when these bodies apply the provisions of Article 21.2 of the 
Convention, they may not make statements concerning the reasons of public utility or social 
interest taken into account in depriving a person of his property.‟ 
  
 
Transformation, incorporation and the ipso facto binding 
 
In the United Kingdom, according to Shaw, the role of international law before municipal 
courts is answered by two currents of thought505: the doctrine of transformation and the doctrine of 
incorporation.  The doctrine of transformation maintains that there are two different systems of law 
operating separately thus „before any rule or principle of international law can have any 
effect within domestic jurisdiction, it must be expressly […] „transformed‟ into municipal law 
by the use of the appropriate constitutional machinery, such an Act of the Parliament.‟ The 
doctrine of incorporation maintains that „international law is part of the municipal law 
automatically without the necessity for the interposition of a constitutional ratification 
procedure‟.506 
 
The ACHR might be taking elements from both doctrines:  
By ipso facto incorporation, article 29 (b), article 64 and article 68 allow integration of existing 
and diverse instruments of an international nature regarding human rights and, it does the 
same for municipal and international laws.   
 
By transformation and by means of articles 62 and 45 it demands a priori recognition of the 
country involved to be bound by the Inter-American Court‟s jurisdiction and recognition of 
IACHR‟s competence to receive and examine communications between State Parties.  
                                                 
505 N. 317, 120-174 Chapter 4, International and municipal law. 
506 N. 317, 129. 
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According to article 45 of the ACHR, the same demand of recognition of competence runs 
for the IACHR when disputes between States were lodged.507 
 
„CHAPTER VII - INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
[…] 
Section 3, Competence  
Article 44 
Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or 
more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party. 
 
Article 45 
1.    Any State Party may, when it deposits its instrument of ratification of or adherence to this 
Convention, or at any later time, declare that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to 
receive and examine communications in which a State Party alleges that another State Party has 
committed a violation of a human right set forth in this Convention. 
2.    Communications presented by virtue of this article may be admitted and examined only if 
they are presented by a State Party that has made a declaration recognizing the aforementioned 
competence of the Commission. The Commission shall not admit any communication against a 
State Party that has not made such a declaration. 
3.    A declaration concerning recognition of competence may be made to be valid for an 
indefinite time, for a specified period, or for a specific case. 
4.    Declarations shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American 
States, which shall transmit copies thereof to the member states of that Organization. 
[…] 
 
CHAPTER VIII - INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
[…] 
Section 3, Procedure 
[…] 
Article 68 
1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in 
any case to which they are parties. 
2. That part of the judgment that stipulates compensatory damages may be executed in the 
country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing the execution of 
judgments against the state.‟ 
 
According to article 62 (1), state parties to be bound by, may recognise „as binding ipso facto 
and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court, on all matters relating to 
the interpretation or application of this Convention.‟508  In the case of Chile‟s recognition as 
provided by article 62 (1), Court verdicts are binding internally in the country involved 
without the need of further statutory action, Parliament‟s sanction, or judicial exequatur.  By 
ipso facto recognition the international jurisdiction of the Court is recognised as if pronounced 
by a municipal court.   
Chile‟s ipso facto binding recognition is a reflection of the recognisable basis of the politica 
exterior of Chile of absolute respect to international law and especially to the treaties signed 
                                                 
507 We will not analyse state vs. state controversies because it is beyond our interest of person vs. state cases. 
508 Also see article 62 (2) which to us is not relevant since Chile‟s recognition was done in the terms of the article 62 
(1). 
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by Chile.  Former president Bachelet recently declared to the media509 that Chile „has a basic 
rule which is to fulfil all its international undertakings‟ and that Chile „is fully committed to 
complying‟ with Inter-American Court sentences. 510 
IACHR and The Court 
 
On the one hand, according to article 1 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the IACHR is „an autonomous organ of the Organization of 
American States whose principal functions are to promote the observance and defense of 
human rights and to serve as an advisory body to the Organization in this are.‟511 Equally, 
according to article 1 of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
the IACHR „is an organ of the Organization of the American States, created to promote the 
observance and defense of human rights and to serve as consultative organ of the 
Organization in this matter.‟512 According to article 41 of the ACHR, the main function of 
the IACHR is the promotion of „respect for and defense of human rights‟.  
  
„Article 41 
The main function of the Commission shall be to promote respect for and defense of human 
rights. In the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following functions and powers: 
(a)    to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America; 
(b)    to make recommendations to the governments of the member states, when it considers such 
action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within the 
framework of their domestic law and constitutional provisions as well as appropriate measures to 
further the observance of those rights; 
(c)    to prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the performance of its duties; 
(d)    to request the governments of the member states to supply it with information on the 
measures adopted by them in matters of human rights; 
(e)    to respond, through the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, to 
inquiries made by the member states on matters related to human rights and, within the limits of 
its possibilities, to provide those states with the advisory services they request; 
(f)    to take action on petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority under the 
provisions of Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention; and 
(g)    to submit an annual report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American 
States.‟ 
 
                                                 
509 According to Shaw (N. 317, 78) „…the obvious way to find out how countries are behaving is to read the 
newspapers […]‟. 
510 Chile tiene como regla básica cumplir todos sus compromisos internacionales […] en la comunidad internacional se ha entendido con 
claridad que la soberanía tiene como límite los derechos esenciales que nacen de la naturaleza humana. De ahí nuestro compromiso con 
cumplir a cabalidad lo que la Corte sentencia respecto de nuestro país, por norma y por convicción. See “Bachelet ratifica respeto 
de Chile a fallos de la Corte Interamericana de derechos Humanos” in La Tercera online. URL: 
http://www.latercera.cl/contenido/23_67922_9.shtml . 
511 N. 493. 
512 STATUTE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, approved by Resolution 
Nº 447 taken by the General Assembly of the OAS at its ninth regular session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, October 
1979. URL http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic17.Statute%20of%20the%20Commission.htm . 
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The competence of the Commission is set out in article 44 of the ACHR and complemented 





Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or 
more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party. 
 
RULES OF PROCEDURES IACHR, 
Article 23.  Presentation of Petitions  
Any person or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more of 
the Member States of the OAS may submit petitions to the Commission, on their behalf or on 
behalf of third persons, concerning alleged violations of a human right recognized in, as the case 
may be, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on 
Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol of 
San Salvador”, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death 
Penalty, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, the Inter-American 
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, and/or the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do 
Pará”, in accordance with their respective provisions, the Statute of the Commission, and these 
Rules of Procedure.  The petitioner may designate an attorney or other person to represent him 
or her before the Commission, either in the petition itself or in a separate document.‟ 
 
According to article 51 (2) of the ACHR, 
„where appropriate, the Commission shall make pertinent recommendations and shall prescribe a 
period within which the state is to take the measures that are incumbent upon it to remedy the 
situation examined.‟ 
 
Article 1 and 2 of the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights513 rules on the 




Article 1 Nature and Legal Organization 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is an autonomous judicial institution whose purpose 
is the application and interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court 
exercises its functions in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Convention and 
the present Statute. 
 
Article 2 Jurisdiction 
The Court shall exercise adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction: 
1. Its adjudicatory jurisdiction shall be governed by the provisions of Articles 61, 62 and 63 of the 
Convention, and 
2. Its advisory jurisdiction shall be governed by the provisions of Article 64 of the Convention.‟ 
 
                                                 
513 STATUTE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, adopted by the General Assembly 
of the OAS at its Ninth Regular Session, held in La Paz Bolivia, October 1979 (Resolution Nº 448). URL 
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic19.Statute%20of%20the%20IA%20Court.htm . 
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According to article 61 of the ACHR, only states parties and the IACHR have the right to 
submit cases to the Court. The Court only receives cases submitted by the IACHR or by 
state parties.  According to article 63 (1) of ACHR, if the Court finds that any right or 
freedom protected by the ACHR has been violated, it shall rule „that the injured party be 
ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom […]‟ and also if appropriate shall rule „that 
the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or 
freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.‟ 
 
Persons or group of persons do not have the right to petition directly to the Court. 
According to articles 48 to 50 of the ACHR, a series of procedures must be followed before 
the case reach to the Court.  Article 61 (2) of the ACHR refers to them.  Article 63, refers to 
how the state involved should proceed after the verdict of the Court. 
 
The extent of Chile’s recognition and the Advisory Opinion OC-1/82514 
 
According to article 44, and Chile‟s 1990-reservation, Chile recognised the IACHR 
competence to receive denunciations or complaints from any person or group of persons 
for events occurred in Chile „subsequent to the date of deposit of this instrument of 
ratification or, in any case, to events which began subsequent to 11 March, 1990.‟ 
In the case of the adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction of the Court, Chile did not make 
reservation of conditionality.  Chile recognised the jurisdiction of the Court as binding ipso 
facto.  The question is whether Chile ipso facto accepted as binding an Advisory Opinion done 
in 1982, eight years before Chile ratified the ACHR.  Could it be said that without any 
reservation from Chile, the jurisdiction of the Court was integrated into the Chilean legal 
order? Would the previous jurisprudence of the Court come to be automatically part of the 
Chilean legal system?  According to article 62 (3) of the ACHR,  
 
„The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States 
Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration 
pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement.‟ 
 
                                                 
514 “Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, September 24, 1982. „Other Treaties‟. Subject to the consultative jurisdiction of the 
Court (Article 64 American Convention on Human Rights)” pp. 1-13, by Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
1982, URL: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_01_ing1.pdf . 
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In 1982 the Inter-American Court gave an advisory opinion on the scope of 
application of article 64 (1) of the ACHR.  The meaning of the phrase “other treaties”.  
By following the provisions of article 64 (1) the Peruvian Government requested the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights the following legal interpretation: 
 
„How should the phrase “or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the 
American states” be interpreted? 
With respect to this matter, the Government of Peru requests that the opinion cover the 
following specific questions:  
Does this aforementioned phrase refer to and include:  
a) Only treaties adopted within the framework or under the auspices of the inter-American 
system? Or 
b) The treaties concluded solely among the American states, that is, is the reference limited to 
treaties in which only American states are parties? Or 
c) All treaties in which one or more American states are parties?‟515 
 
The Court‟s Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 was: 
 
„Firstly:  By unanimous vote, that the advisory jurisdiction of the Court can be exercised, in 
general, with regard to any provision dealing with the protection of human rights set forth in any 
international treaty applicable in the American States, regardless of whether it be bilateral or 
multilateral, whatever be the principal purpose of such a treaty, and whether or not non-Member 
States of the inter-American system are or have the right to become parties thereto.‟516 
Point number 42 of the Opinion is an example of how the Court founded its decision on the 
matter and article 29 of the ACHR: 
„42. It is particularly important to emphasize the special relevance that Article 29 (b) has to the 
instant request. The function that Article 64 of the Convention confers on the Court is an 
inherent part of the protective system established by the Convention. The Court is of the view, 
therefore, that to exclude, a priori, from its advisory jurisdiction international human rights 
treaties that are binding on American States would weaken the full guarantee of the rights 
proclaimed in those treaties and, in turn, conflict with the rules enunciated in Article 29 (b) of the 
Convention.‟517 
 
According to Shaw, the Court „took the view that the object of the Convention was to 
integrate the regional and universal systems of human rights protection and that, therefore, 
                                                 
515 N. 514, 2 – 3. 
516 N. 514, 12. 
517 N. 514, 10. 
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any human rights treaty to which American states were parties could be the subject of an 
advisory opinion.‟518 
Hierarchy of formal sources of international law 
In the hypothetical case of the Inter-American Court considering whether Chile has 
breached the law on self-determination, it will be based on its own 1982 Advisory Opinion.  
It should decide based on the norms related to self-determination of peoples which as 
human rights are said to be imprescriptible and inalienable as much as of erga omnes universal 
applicability. 
 “Judicial decisions” are „to be utilized as a subsidiary means for the determination of the 
rules of law‟519 (which would be the case for the Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 when 
interpreting the scope of article 64 of the ACHR520). “Law-making treaties” or the 
„agreements whereby states elaborate their perception of international law upon any given 
topic or establish new rules which are to guide them for the future in their international 
conduct‟521 when interpreted in the light of “custom”, are the primordial sources of 
international law522. Then, when this is complemented with “state practice” or „how states 
behave in practice‟523 and “opinion juris” 524 it is clear that members of the OAS should 
comply with the dispositions established in other treaties where international obligations for 
states have been set forth.  
According to Shaw, the Inter-American Court has said that525,  
„[…] human right treaties were different in nature from traditional multilateral treaties, since they 
focused not upon the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting 
                                                 
518 N. 317, 360. 
519 N. 317, 103. 
520 I am not discussing here on the binding force or simply auctoritas of the Advisory Opinion. I am pointing out that 
the Court‟s interpretation on article 64 of the ACHR may not be binding but it serves as basis for the imaginary 
case of OAS-Rapa Nui decolonisation. Thanks to Dr. Joel Colon-Rios, for his feedback.  
521 N. 317, 90.    
522 N. 317, 116. 
523 N. 317, 78. 
524 „The belief that a state activity is legally obligatory, is the factor which turns the usage into a custom and renders it 
part of the rules of international law‟.  N. 317, 80. 
525 See the sentence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Effect of Reservations, n. 317, 360 footnote 
249. 
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states, but rather upon the protection of the basic rights of individuals.  The obligations were erga 
omnes, rather than with regard to particular other states.‟526  
In terms of hierarchy of sources, according to Shaw, treaties and custom are the most 
prevalent sources but „a treaty will be void “if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law”‟527, that is a norm of jus cogens: Norms which 
are „“nonderogable and peremptory, enjoy the highest status within customary international 
law, are binding on all nations, and cannot be preempted by treaty”‟.528  According to Shaw, 
the ICJ has qualified the right of self-determination as unquestionably of erga omnes character.  
„The Court emphasised that the right of peoples to self-determination was “one of the essential 
principles of contemporary international law”‟.529  
This is interesting in the scenario of Rapanui people under OAS scrutiny.  Should the 
imprescriptible right of collective self-determination of Rapanui as of erga omnes character be 
considered to this case? 
According to OC-1/82, the extension of the human rights rationale is not confined to the 
ACHR but also embraces any human right treaty under which the American state members 
are committed through the international human rights system. The right of self-
determination of peoples even though non-explicitly recognised by ACHR is incorporated, 
by integration, in the ACOHR according to both the text of article 29 (b) and according to 
the Advisory Opinion OC-1/82.  In my opinion, since Chile recognised the ipso facto 
jurisdiction of the Court without reservations, it is possible to use this jurisprudence to 
imagine a case of Rapanui OAS decolonisation.  Since the Court wants to signify that other 
universal treaties concerning human rights are part of the OAS system despite the fact of 
their “legal origin”.  For us, this is true not only by taking the advisory opinion of the Court 
but also following the statements contained in article 5 of the CPR. 
Dualism and Monism 
 
                                                 
526 N. 317, 360. 
527 N. 317, 117 quoting article 53 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
528 N. 317, 117 footnote 208, quoting the US v. Matta-Ballesteros case.  
529 N. 317, 229. 
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A propos of the role of municipal rules vis-à-vis international law and between international 
and domestic spheres, a conflict may emerge when, 
 
„the state within its own domestic spheres does not act in accordance with its obligations as laid 
down by international law. In such case, the domestic position is unaffected (and is not overruled 
by the contrary rule of international law) but rather the state as it operates internationally has 
broken a rule of international law and the remedy will lie in the international field, whether by 
means of diplomatic protest or judicial action.‟530 
 
 
This eclectic view of Shaw is extracted from dualism and monism. On the one hand, the 
“state dissidence” is respected by international law but, on the other, opens the doors in 
international arenas for „denunciations or complaints‟531 against state dissidence. There are 
theoretical and practical difficulties generated by state refusal of compliance with 
international law. The question turns on legal hierarchies and supremacies between 
international and national spheres of jurisdiction532 which from a human rights perspective is 
of fundamental importance. 
 
From a dualist perspective, the supremacy of the state is assumed as the basis upon which 
two different orders, national and international, function.  It „[…] stresses that the rules of 
the two systems […] exist separately and cannot purport to have an effect on, or overrule, 
the other.‟  On the other hand, of the monists who believe in a unitary law, there are two sub-
categories: the naturalist stance of Lauterpacht who „upholds a strong ethical position […] 
and others, like Kelsen, who maintain a monist position on formalistic grounds.‟  
 
„Thus, Kelsen emphasises the unity of the entire legal order upon the basis of predominance of 
international law by declaring that it is the basic norm of the international legal order which is the 
ultimate reason of validity of the national legal order.‟ 533 
 
                                                 
530 N. 317, 123. 
531 Paraphrased from article 44 of the ACHR. 
532 „With the rise and extension of international law, questions begin to arise paralleling the role played by the state 
within the international system and concerned with the relationship between the internal legal order of a particular 
country and the rules and principles governing the international community as a whole.‟ N. 317, 121. 
533 N. 317, 123. 
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The Lauterpacht approach is „characterised by deep suspicion of an international system 
based upon the sovereignty and absolute independence of states…‟ whereas Kelsen‟s 
approach „utilises the philosophy of Kant as its basis‟. 534 
 
The article 5 of the CPR535 
 
The article 5 of the CPR, contains two paragraphs (incisos): 
The first paragraph reads, 
 
„La soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nación. Su ejercicio se realiza por el pueblo a través del plebiscito y de 
elecciones periódicas y, también, por las autoridades que esta Constitución establece. Ningún sector del pueblo ni 
individuo alguno puede atribuirse su ejercicio.‟ 
 
„Sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. It is exercised by the people by means of plebiscite 
and periodical elections and, also, by the authorities established by the Constitution. No sector of 
the people or individual may claim for itself the exercise of that sovereignty.‟ 
 
The second paragraph of article 5 of the CPR originally had only one sentence: „The exercise 
of sovereignty recognises, as a limitation, respect for the essential rights emanating from 
human nature‟.  Nine years after its formulation, a second sentence was added.  Today, the 
second paragraph or inciso segundo reads, 
„El ejercicio de la soberanía reconoce como limitación el respeto a los derechos esenciales que emanan de la 
naturaleza humana.  Es deber de los órganos del Estado respetar y promover tales derechos, garantizados por esta 
Constitución, así como por los tratados internacionales ratificados por Chile y que se encuentren vigentes.‟ 
„It is the duty of state organs to respect and promote those rights, guaranteed either through the 
Constitution or by international treaties ratified and in force in Chile.‟ 
In 1989 fifty-four constitutional amendments were negotiated just before the regime of 
Pinochet (1973-1990) came to an end.536  Basically, the 54 reformas were aimed to democratize 
institutions established in the Pinochet‟s original constitution of 1980 without having to 
                                                 
534 N. 317, 122 – 123. 
535 CPR in Dto. 100 de fecha que fija el texto refundido, coordinado y sistematizado de la Constitución Política de la Republica de 
Chile, promulgada el 17 de septiembre de 2005 y publicada en el Diario Oficial el 22 de septiembre de 2005, 
Originalmente Constitución Política de la Republica de Chile de 1980, URL: 
http://www.bcn.cl/leyes/pdf/actualizado/242302.pdf . 
536 The so called transición a la democracia began soon after the Pinochet regime was defeated in the urns through 
the plebiscite of 1988. The People exercised sovereignty and voted against Pinochet‟s continuity in office.  Thus, 
the right-wing administration and the centre-left wing parties (also called the Concertación de Partidos por la 
Democracia, CPD) negotiated the so called “54 reforms” and one of these was the second part of the article 5. 
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replace the entire charter: to build a peaceful transition from a dictatorial regime to a 
participative democracy of left-wing parties. 537  The Ley de Reforma Constitucional numero 18.825 
had one article. It reads: 
 
„1. — En el artículo 5º, agrégase la siguiente oración final a su inciso segundo: 
―Es deber de los órganos del Estado respetar y promover tales derechos, garantizados por esto Constitución, así 
como por los tratados internacionales ratificados por Chile y que se encuentren vigentes.‖‟538 
Hence, the constitutional amendment of article 5 prescribed the conditions through which 
international laws on human rights would come to be integrated into the CPR: As long as 
the treaty in question had been ratified and the treaty is in force.  By 1989 there were several 
“ratified and non in force” treaties.  The ICCPR was one of them. 
Writers or „the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations‟ are, 
according to article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, subsidiary ways for the determination of the 
rules of international law.  According to a Chilean writer, Jorge Tapia, by saying „guaranteed 
either through the Constitution or by international treaties ratified and in force in Chile‟, the 
drafters of the amendment wished to stress that the constituent power was actually aware of 
the existence of human rights treaties at the date of the constitutional reform in 1989.539  In 
consequence, the government could not obliterate, by any means, the validity of those 
instruments within Chile regardless of their lack of entry in force.  Constitutionally, to be in 
force as law of the republic, international treaties have to be promulgated and published.540  
However, in the 1989 reformers‟ travaux préparatoires541 it seems that the drafters wanted to 
signify that treaties ratified by Chile are binding on the state organs even before their internal 
entry in force.  Thus, by “ratified” they meant to signify that the state accepted the rights 
guaranteed in those ratified-not-in-force instruments as binding despite the absence of 
promulgation and publication in Chile. 
                                                 
537 The CPD coalition, by that date, was integrated by left-centre wings parties. Christian Democrats, Socialists, 
Humanists, Radicals and Communists were amongst others. Some of these parties which were willing to enact a 
new charter represented all that Pinochet detested.  But, since the CPR allowed Pinochet to keep his position as 
Commander in Chief of the Army and, quorums for constitutional amendments were too high (still they are) the 
winning coalition had to consent with Pinochet in a political loophole to balancing the reformist spirit. 
538 Ley de Reforma Constitucional numero 18.825 Publicada en el Diario Oficial con fecha 17 de agosto de 1989. URL: 
http://www.bcn.cl/histley/lfs/hdl-18825/HL18825.pdf . 
539 “Efectos de los Tratados sobre Derechos Humanos en la jerarquía del orden jurídico y la distribución de 
competencias: Alcances del nuevo inciso segundo del articulo 5º de la CPR de 1980” by Jorge Tapia Valdes, Revista 
Ius et Praxis, Vol. 9, no 1, 2003: 355. URL http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/197/19790117.pdf . 
540 N. 535, articles 72 and 75. 
541 N. 317, 141 
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This well-intentioned goal, according to one of the 1989 reform drafters Francisco 
Cumplido542, which was the way out negotiated with Pinochet‟s jurists, came to challenge 
several legal aspects related to the harmony of the constitutional precepts.  Like Tapia, he 
also argues that the drafters expressly did not resolve the uncertainty between international 
and internal dates of entry in force.  Mainly by reason of the regime‟s systematic violation of 
civil and political rights during the previous years, they did not wish to jeopardise the 
reform.543  In other words, the drafters realised the legal inconsistency of the literal reading 
of the draft and the difficulties which a theoretical issue like this could generate later, but 
they insisted in keeping it because vague meanings would give tribunals the opportunity to 
interpret the meaning of the norm and perhaps incorporate ratified-not-in-force treaties into 
the legal system. 
As a result of the former reasoning, and analysing the binding force and applicability in Chile 
of the rights and guarantees established in the ICCPR, it was adopted on 16 December 1966, 
subscribed and signed the 16 December 1969.  Chile deposited the instrument of ratification 
in the UN on 10 February 1972. The decree of promulgation in Chile dates from 30 
November 1976 and its publication as law of the republic on 24 April 1989.544 
The right of political self-determination in the CPR 
The acquisition of Easter Island by means of prescription or effective occupation, is 
occurring in the midst of the post-colonial legal era.  From the perspective of acquisitive 
prescription or effective occupation without complaints of any nature, every day which 
passes affirms the Chilean presence in Rapanui playing against Rapanui autonomy demands.  
However, since I argue the contemporaneity of Chilean colonialism of Easter Island, the 
length of time plays in favour of Rapanui self-determination demands because the greater 
                                                 
542 Also Minister of Justice during the government of P. Aylwin (1990-1994). 
543 Having in mind the systematic violation of fundamental human rights during Pinochet‟s regime, the left-centre 
wing experts who negotiated the drafting of the article 5 amendment wanted to guarantee that human rights, 
especially the right to life and the fundamental freedoms, were going to be respected even though some of them 
were not published yet. See “La Reforma Constitucional de 1989 al inciso 2º del articulo 5º de la Constitución: 
Sentido y alcance de la reforma. Doctrina y Jurisprudencia” by Francisco Cumplido Cereceda, Revista Ius et Praxis, 
Vol. 9, no 1, 2003: 371. URL http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_issuetoc&pid=0718-
001220030001&lng=es&nrm=iso. 
544 “DTO 778 que promulga el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos adoptado por resolución No 






the length of time the greater Chilean international responsibility for not taking measures to 
remedy it.  Likewise, albeit manifested in different ways, the constant struggle for self-
government and recovery of land ownership impedes the definitive concretisation of 
colonisation.  Also, the right protected here is imprescriptible and inalienable hence no 
prescription runs to the detriment of Rapanui people‟s rights. 
On the issue of applicability in Chile of the ICCPR and a propos of the Rapanui case, the 
discussion on whether the ICCPR is law since 1976 or 1989 is irrelevant.  The right of 
political self-determination is internal law since 1976 or 1989 and for our case of political 
decolonisation we are also arguing contemporaneity and continuous transgression of the 
norm by acts or omissions of the state organs of Chile. Unlike others rights and guarantees, 
the right of self-determination consecrated in several UN bodies of norms such as the 
ICCPR cannot be found in the CPR, or in its 1989 reform.  Chapter III of CPR (De los 
Derechos y Deberes Constitucionales) which enumerates the constitutional rights and duties of 
inhabitants of the republic makes no mention of the political right of self-determination of 
peoples. 
One explanation might be the fact that even though the ICCPR mostly guarantees human 
rights of the “first generation”545 the collective right of self-determination is considered to be 
of the “third generation” which is something supposedly new.546  Another explanation might 
be strictly cultural.  
Part of the Chilean self-understanding, the mestiza identity, is to cling to the idea of seeing 
itself as “the nation”547 inhabiting the territory called Chile: a territory which once used to 
belong to the indios, first peoples, who together are today pieces of the ethnic mosaic of 
European settlers, immigrants and Indians. Part of the imaginario colectivo as nation is the 
mestizo notion of mixed-blood inheritance. 548 As a result, the collective right of the Rapanui 
nation to politically determine its future collides, at constitutional level, with the Chilean 
                                                 
545 Thanks to Dr. Joel Colon-Rios for feedback and clarification on this issue. 
546 Not to Chile though since its C-24 membership since 1962. N. 497. 
547 New World nationalism originated in the aristocratic elites of eighteenth century‟s Europe and sought settler 
nationhood. Local Creole officials developed a sense of distinctiveness and the notions of citizenship, national 
flags, anthems and ideals of egalitarianism were first developed in the Americas. N. 13, 19. 
548 The descendants of European settlers laid claim to a quasi-indigenous identity in relation to Europeans „back 
home‟ which meant an ambiguous imaginary relationship with the indigenous colonized. On the one hand, they 
constitute basis for claims of national distinctiveness, yet on the other the cultures of the indigenous colonized 
were regarded as obstacles in the path of achieving a nationhood that followed European models. N. 13, 20. 
 119 
republican national assertion of one nation inhabiting the republic.  The CPR denies the 
hypothesis on which the case of judicial decolonisation is built: the premise of depicting the 
Rapanui as a nation struggling for self-determination in the middle of a process of unseen 
colonialism. Instead of that, Rapanui nationhood is constitutionally ignored by Chile.   
By Chilean Acts Easter Islanders are portrayed as ethnic Chileans or as just another piece of 
the cultural-racial mosaic called Chile.  Moreover, the ethnic depiction determines the 
starting point to rationalise the issue.  As covered by ethnicity they fall under the principle of 
territorial integrity and any attempt at talking of autonomy is turned down.  But, beyond the 
discussion of why the right of self-determination of peoples is not mentioned in the 
constitution, in practical legal constitutional terms, the starting point of article 5 of the CPR 
is sovereignty residing, essentially, in “the” Nation.  This makes sense for the absence of 
reference to the indigenous populations, ethnicities or communities, in the CPR.  The “one” 
Chilean nationhood assumption is coherent.  Article 3 of the CPR when stating that Chile is 
an estado unitario reinforces the unilinear concept of one-nation one-state: there is only one 
political corpus within the republic.  It also has been reinforced by the argumentation of the 
consultant John H. Gómez.549   
Accordingly to J. H. Gómez interpretations, with the Chilean state‟s unitario character (in 
contrast to federal) there is no space for political decentralization towards regions and 
provinces.550   
‗CPR 
Artículo 3 
El Estado de Chile es unitario. 
La administración del Estado será funcional y territorialmente descentralizada, o desconcentrada en su caso, de 
conformidad a la ley.‟ 
                                                 
549 “Consultoría Internacional para el asesoramiento en la elaboración del Estatuto Especial para Isla de Pascua. 
Informe primera visita” by John Harold Gómez, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, BID-Chile. December 2006, 
unpublished, personal archives. Refer to John Harold Gomez Vargas, jhgv@etb.net.co . 
550  The core argument for Chilean‟s government rejection for political autonomy of the island is based on a 
constitutional argumentation. It is not possible to grant Easter Island political autonomy due to constitutional 
impediments: No obstante la constitución Chilena ordenar la descentralización territorial y funcional, no hace lo mismo en materia 
de descentralización política (con excepción de la administración comunal por expresa o disposición de los artículos 107 y 108 de la 
Constitución), lo que en principio impide la elección del ejecutivo regional o provincial mediante sufragio universal. En este sentido se 
pronuncian los artículos 100 y 105 de la Carta Política Chilena, al establecer que ―El gobierno de cada región reside en un intendente 
que será de la exclusiva confianza del Presidente de la República‖; y ―En cada provincia existirá una gobernación que será un órgano 
territorialmente desconcentrado del intendente. Estará a cargo de un gobernador, quien será nombrado y removido libremente por el 
Presidente de la República.‖ Ante lo anterior es imperativo concluir, que regímenes de autonomía o descentralización que contemplen la 
elección por voto popular de la cabeza del ejecutivo en lo Regional o Provincial, no son posible en el caso Chileno, debido a las 
disposiciones vigentes que regulan el tema, a menos que se apruebe por el Legislador cambios estructurales en el modelo de Estado que 
permita a los entes territoriales entre otras, gobernarse por autoridades propias. N. 549. 
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Apparently when the original constitution was drafted this was not an issue. However, today, 
there is a counterargument for the interpretation of article 3 of the CPR.  According to 
Eliseo Aja, who was commenting a propos of the political autonomies currently developing 
in Spain, the doctrine of estado unitario does not refer to concepts such as patria or nation but 
rather to the territorial organization of the state. The concepts of unitary and federal state, as 
he affirms, do not constitute closed and homogenous models but models with variants and 
nuances and as Kelsen proposed years ago, international states may be arranged between 
two polar regions of extreme centralism and maximum decentralization.  The doctrine of the 
unitary state, Aja concludes, is but the doctrine of the territorial organisation of the state.551  
Although arguable, the article 3 doctrine of the unitary state still impedes steps towards 
political autonomy, we still have the strong constitutional statement made by article 5 of the 
CPR and the constitutional considerations reminded by J. H. Gómez. 
Let us reconsider the discussion on international and municipal law integration, how article 5 
of the CPR should be interpreted, and whether the right of political self-determination may 
be found, implicitly, in the Constitution.  Since the 1989 reform, doctrinal and jurisprudential 
debate is prominent amongst Chilean experts on constitutional law. As Shaw has argued, the 
„teachings of the most highly qualified publicists‟ are subsidiary means for determining 
sources of law and are important to influence opinions and interpretations and means of 
rules.552 The scope of application of international treaties in constitutional law, the 
hierarchical prevalence between these and the rights guaranteed in the constitutional body, 
the organs and prerogatives affected by potential application of “foreign” laws are, in one 
sense, all matters of the hierarchy of sources namely international laws on human rights vis-
à-vis constitutional guarantees established by municipal laws. 
The constitutionalisation of human rights is a point of view shared by most of respected 
publicists in Chile.553  They say that international laws concerning human rights are supra 
constitutional that is, by mandate of the constitution they are hierarchically above the Chilean 
Constitution; therefore, if there are any conflicting issues on rights or organs‟ competences, 
                                                 
551 Los conceptos de estado unitario y federal no constituyen modelos cerrados y homogéneos sino que dentro de cada categoría existen 
variantes y numerosos matices[…] como propuso Kelsen hace muchos años, que entre los dos polos extremos de máximo centralismo y 
máxima descentralización se pueden ir colocando todos los estados existentes.  EL ESTADO AUTONOMICO, federalismo y 
hechos diferenciales by Eliseo Aja, Alianza editorial, España, 1999, 19.  
552 N. 317, 105 quoting article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
553 Amongst others: Santiago Benadava, Cecilia Medina, Rodrigo Diaz Albonico, Paulino Varas, Salvador Mohor, 
Jose Luis Cea, Claudio Troncoso, Enrique Evans. N. 543, 372. 
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international laws on human rights prevail over the CPR.  Even more, Jose Luis Cea Egaña, 
one of original CPR drafters has affirmed that, when applied in Chile, the jus cogens has supra-
constitutional character.554  The leading scholar defending the position of implicit integration 
of the constitutional text by international human rights laws is Humberto Nogueira.  He 
argues that article 5 of the CPR has established a „double-source system of fundamental 
rights‟ because it makes possible the entry of essential rights, not explicitly guaranteed by the 
constitutional text, into its materiality.555  Furthermore, he argues that there is a sort of 
retroalimentación between municipal law and international law bearing in mind that the later 
comprehends not solely human rights treaties but also, norms of jus cogens, and customary 
international law. 556 
 
On the other hand, there are some sceptics.  The idea of implicit aggregation of international 
instruments materially into the CPR is not shared by some authors.  To Lautaro Ríos, for 
example, the pretension of raising international treaties to the supreme rank of the 
Constitution is inadequate. He argues against this desmesurada, or „extreme‟, interpretation of 
international treaties material integration into the Constitution. He argues that it is 
incompatible with the system of control of constitutionality (both preventive and repressive) 
established by the CPR.557  According to Ríos, on the one hand, the system would not 
operable if treaties on human rights “per se” had constitutional rank and, on the other, it 
would be against the rigid mechanism of constitutional amendment.558  It is interesting to 
note though that even with nuances the majority of doctrine follows the Nogueira doctrine. 
 
Two tribunals of the Republic had given judgments in constitutional matters related to 
article fifth; the Corte Suprema [CS] and the Tribunal Constitucional [TC].  Judgments bind only 
the parties.  For other cases they represent no more than guidelines for constitutional 
interpretation.  Thus, when a particular interpretation prevails, rather than being binding law, 
it has auctoritas or the potential of keeping that view for future analogous cases.  According to 
                                                 
554 N. 543, 372. […] el ius cogens tiene un carácter supraconstitucional, es decir, jerarquía superior a la carta fundamental. 
555 This system […] posibilita el ingreso a la Constitución material de derechos esenciales no asegurados explícitamente por el texto 
constitucional. See “Los derechos contenidos en tratados de derechos humanos como parte del parámetro de 
control de constitucionalidad: la sentencia. Rol N° 786-2007 del Tribunal Constitucional” by Humberto Nogueira. 
Estudios Constitucionales, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales de Chile, Universidad de Talca, año 5, Numero 2, 
2007: 457, URL www.cecoch.cl/htm/revista/docs/estudiosconst/5n_2_5_2007/20_Los_derechos.pdf. 
556 N. 555, 459. 
557 N. 543, 372-373 quoting Lautaro Ríos (Ius et Praxis Año 2 No 2). 
558 …los que no serian operables si los tratados de derechos humanos tuvieran un rango constitucional ―per se‖ y, atentarian tambien 
contra el mecanismo rígido de reforma de la Constitución by Lautaro Ríos quoted in N. 543, 373. 
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Nogueira, unlike earlier cases, the CS and TC adopted the view closest to the majority of 
opinio juris.  He argues that the CS adopted the “double-source system” concept in four 
recent judgments.559  According to this approach, human rights laws as assured by 
international treaties ratified by Chile are part of the material Constitution.  International 
treaties set up limits to the actions of the organs and authorities of the state of Chile.  The 
internal sovereignty of the state is limited by the essential rights of the human person.560  All 
in the light of the pro homine principle by which human rights guaranteed by both 
international and national bodies may not be compartmentalised but are assumed in a 
integrative and complementary form.561 
 
Nogueira continues that the CS judged that the integration of international law and 
municipal law is not only guaranteed by article 5 of the CPR but also by article 1, paragraph 
1562 and 4 and by article 19 No 26563 of the CPR.564 Article 19 No 26 provides for the security 
of the constitutional precepts that is it guarantees the essence of the rights.  This means that 
constitutional guarantees enumerated in Chapter III of CPR cannot be affected by statutory 
limitations, prerequisites or conditions of any kind.  Legal norms which complement the 
constitutional guarantees cannot affect the constitutional rights in their essence. 
 
In the past the TC (which is the only tribunal dealing with constitutional issues565) used to 
sustain that treaties on human rights were divided Solomon-like between statutory laws and 
                                                 
559 N. 555, 461 – 462. Sentencia de la Corte Suprema, Rol Nº 469-98, de fecha 9 de septiembre de 1998; Sentencia de 
la Corte Suprema, Rol Nº 559-04, de fecha 13 de diciembre de 2006, considerando 22°; Sentencia de la Corte 
Suprema de Justicia, Sala Penal, Rol Nº 3125-04, de fecha 13 de marzo de 2007; Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de 18 de abril de 2007. Rol N° 4.183-06, considerandos noveno y décimo. 
560 N. 555, 461 – 462 commenting two CS sentences: “Sentencia de la Corte Suprema, Rol Nº 559-04, de fecha 13 de 
diciembre de 2006, considerando 22°” and; “Sentencia de la Corte Suprema, Rol Nº 469-98, de fecha 9 de 
septiembre de 1998, citado por CEA EGAÑA, José Luis, Derecho Constitucional Chileno, tomo I, p. 236. 
561 ...[L]a soberanía, incluido el poder constituyente y todo órgano o autoridad, está limitada por los derechos esenciales de la persona 
humana […] los derechos humanos asegurados por tratados internacionales forman parte de la Constitución material, constituyendo 
límite a las normas y actuaciones emanadas de órganos o autoridades estatales. N. 555, 458 – 459. 
562 N. 535, Artículo 1: Las personas nacen libres e iguales en dignidad y derechos. […] Es deber del Estado resguardar la seguridad 
nacional, dar protección a la población y a la familia, propender al fortalecimiento de ésta, promover la integración armónica de todos los 
sectores de la Nación y asegurar el derecho de las personas a participar con igualdad de oportunidades en la vida nacional. 
563 N. 535, Articulo 19, La Constitución asegura a todas las personas: No 26: La seguridad de que los preceptos legales que por 
mandato de la Constitución regulen o complementen las garantías que ésta establece o que las limiten en los casos en que ella lo 
autoriza, no podrán afectar los derechos en su esencia, ni imponer condiciones, tributos o requisitos que impidan su libre ejercicio. 
564 N. 555, eg. Sala Penal Rol Nº 3125-04, 13.03.2007. 
565  Here it is worth recalling that until the constitutional amendment of 2005 the preventive control of 
constitutionality of statutory laws was realised by the TC whereas the repressive control of constitutionality lay 
with the CS.  The constitutional amendment of 2005 united both controls in favour of the former to the 
detriment of the latter, therefore today both controls repressive and preventive are exercised by the TC.  
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constitutional laws: they were represented as posited at supra legal level and also at infra 
constitutional level.566 However, in 2007, and apparently following the Nogueira doctrine, the 
TC started to accept the perspective already assimilated by the doctrine though not without 
introducing new elements to the equation.  To Nogueira, „what limits sovereignty and 
municipal law are not the treaties as formal sources of law but the fundamental or essential 
rights guaranteed or assured by them by means of substantive content.‟567   
 
The TC perspective accommodated the discussion and rather than being centred on the 
objective hierarchy of sources between international and municipal spheres it focused on the 
subjective right consecrated in the former. By objective hierarchy the international law became 
to be part of the material constitutional text.  By subjective hierarchy, the international law 
treaty does not become part of the material constitution but only the right consecrated in the 
former.  In other words, there is no more need to sustain that treaties on human rights are 
supra constitutional or even at the constitutional level but solely that the subjective right 
guaranteed by the human right treaty is.  On the one hand, human rights guarantees 
constitute subjective rights of persons and, as such, are part of the objective right contained 
in the material constitution.  On the other, the objective (material) instrument which 
contains the subjective right it is as such not part of the CPR. 
 
This interpretation saves the debate from stagnation in two strong positions and also solves 
some but all the apprehensions of Lautaro Ríos as explained above.  The “Nogueira 
doctrine” (and its TC variant) is recently starting to be followed by the Constitutional 
Tribunal.  Nogueira argues that the novel perspective assumed by the TC has contributed, in 
these respects, to the development of one unique parameter of control of constitutionality 
and, likewise, by doing so it has contributed as well to legal security and equality in the 
interpretation and application of the fundamental rights of persons.568 
                                                 
566 …que los tratados de derechos humanos se encontraban en un nivel infraconstitucional y supralegal…  N. 555, 463, footnote 15, 
“Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional sobre el Estatuto de Roma del Tribunal Penal Internacional”, Rol N° 346, 
de 8 de abril de 2002. 
567 Lo que limita la soberanía y al derecho interno, no son los tratados en cuanto fuente formal del derecho sino los 
derechos esenciales o fundamentales asegurados o garantizados por ellos como contenido sustancial. N. 555, 463. 
568 „La sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional, Rol N° 786-2007, de fecha trece de junio de 2007, asume por primera 
vez esta perspectiva asimilada por la doctrina y por la jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, 
contribuyendo con ello al desarrollo de un parámetro único de control de constitucionalidad en la materia, como 
asimismo contribuyendo a otorgar seguridad jurídica e igualdad en la interpretación y aplicación a las personas de 
los derechos fundamentales.‟ N. 555, 464. 
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By following this novel perspective and through systematic interpretation of the CPR, 
ACHR and ICCPR, we could not say then that Rapanui has the right of political self-
determination by means of objective materialisation of the ICCPR in the CPR, but that the 
subjective right (of every Rapanui person) contained in it, is protected at the constitutional 
level.  Hence, at this stage we may state that as ordered by article 5 of the CPR, as soon as 
human rights treaties were ratified and in force in Chile, the subjective right guaranteed in 
international treaties on human rights protects Chilean citizens and all the inhabitants of the 
Republic at the constitutional level by limiting the exercise of its sovereign power. 
Building the OAS decolonisation 
 
The key question here emerges from imagining the IACHR (and later the Inter-American 
Court) deciding whether Chile has the duty or not to solicit of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, the inclusion of Easter Island in the C-24 list.  If the Commission would 
recommend that Chile to transmit information under article 73 (e) of the UN Charter, it 
should do it by arguing both the constitutionalisation of the right by means of article 5 of the 
CPR, and the provisions as interpreted by the Court on the application of “Other Treaties” 
according to article 63 of the ACHR.  In the OAS hypothetical scenario the IACHR and the 
Court would exhort Chile to transmit information according to article 73 (e) of the UN 
Charter in order to recognise that Easter Island is a colonial territory not subject to the 
territorial integrity rationale. 
 
Hence, the OAS organs might perfectly pronounce by IACHR-recommendations or Court-
binding verdicts based upon the law of decolonisation.  According to Shaw, the “law of 
decolonisation” became “right” in 1966 through Resolution 2200 (XXI), which had begun as 
“principle” in the 1960 colonial declaration, and complemented by the “Declaration on 
Principles of International Law” in 1970.569 
Nevertheless, the reality of Rapanui politics is that the state of Chile through its Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has not declared before the General Assembly its will to include Easter 
Island in the C-24 list.570  Chile is aware of the existence of the law of decolonisation at least 
                                                 
569 N. 317, 230. 
570  Viewpoint confirmed by the Chilean ambassador of Chile in New Zealand, Sr. Luis Lillo, personal 
communication, April 2010. 
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since it became a member of the Committee on Decolonisation in 1962.571  The inscription 
of the colonial territory belongs to the General Assembly which needs a majority of votes 
(no less than 96). 572  Before that, the C-24 could do it, in theory, but the Committee acts on 
the principle of consensus and since Chile is one of the members, it would be impossible to 
get Rapanui on the list without Chile‟s agreement. 573 
In parallel, and following the same thinking the Ministry of Home Affairs, in Chile, has not 
manifested any openness to the desired political autonomy regardless of the Commission of 
Truth and New Deal recommendations and the insistent demand of local people.  This is 
partly explained by reason of J. H. Gómez conclusions explained above.  By conferring 
political autonomy Chile could be complying with the UN GA resolutions 1514 and 1541 of 
1960 and 2625 of 1970. The latter has established four modes for the implementation of the 
right of self-determination of peoples: the establishment of an independent state; free 
association or integration in another state, or the emergence into any other political status 
freely determined by the people involved. 
The implicit rejection by the state organs of Chile is not backed by law because it goes 
against the principles, norms and spirit of the UN Charter‟s articles 1; 55; 73 (e) and several 
resolutions of the General Assembly.574 
                                                 
571 N. 497. 
572 Sergei Cherniavsky, Secretary Special Committee of 24, United Nations, NY, personal communication, April 
2010.  
573 Ibid. 
574 „UN Charter, Article 1, The Purposes of the United Nations are: […] 2. To develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; CHAPTER IX, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL CO-OPERATION, Article 55 With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full 
employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international 
economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion; CHAPTER XI, DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING 
TERRITORIES, Article 73 Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the 
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the 
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the 
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the 
present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end: […](e) to transmit regularly 
to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional 
considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and 
educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to 
which Chapters XII and XIII apply.‟ 
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Amongst the General Assembly‟s resolutions on decolonisation which apply to the case of 
Rapanui are: 
1. Res. No: 637 (VII) of 1952, which announces that the right of self-determination of 
peoples is prerequisite to the full enjoyment of fundamental human rights. 
2. Res. 742 (VIII) of 1953, which establishes the factors indicative of the attainment of self-
government. 
3. Res. 1514 (XV) of 1960 or the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
people, which is the base for the implementation of the right of self-determination and the 
establishment of the Committee on Decolonisation.575 
4. Res. 1541 (XV) of 1960, which asserts the principles „which should guide members in 
determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under 
article 73e of the Charter.‟  For my purposes principle IV576 is relevant since Easter Island is 
geographically 3,750 kilometres away from Chile‟s mainland and it is not an adjacent island 
as Juan Fernandez archipelago.  Ethnically and culturally Rapanui was nearly completely 
unconnected to Chile until 1966.  Moreover, Chilean culture and ethnicity is related to 
American indigenous and European background whilst the people of Easter Island have a 
Polynesian ancestry. 
The importance of principle IV when establishing the prima facie factor is highlighted in 
principle V: 
„Once it has been established that such prima facie case of geographical and ethnical or cultural 
distinctness of a territory exists, others elements may then brought into consideration.‟ 
The meaning of this is quite clear. The determinant elements to consider whether or not an 
obligation to transmit information under article 73 e) exists are the geographical, cultural and 
ethnic.  
5. Res. 1654 (XVI) of 1961 which set up the Special Committee of seventeen members to 
„examine the application of the Declaration, to make suggestions and recommendations on 
                                                 
575 The subjugation of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental 
human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world 
peace and cooperation. It also declared that all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
576 „prima facie there is an obligation to transmit information in respect to a territory which is geographically separate 
and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.‟ 
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the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration, and to report to the 
general Assembly at its seventeenth session. 
6. Res. 2200 (XXI) of 1966 or the „International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights‟. This treaty is probably the most 
important body in regard to the Rapanui case because it binds the state of Chile at the 
constitutional level. 
7. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970 or the „Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, which established the principle of Equal rights and self-
determination of peoples‟. One of the aims of it is to „bring a speedy end to colonialism, 
having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned.‟  It established the 
modes of implementing the right of self-determination of peoples: the establishment of an 
independent, free associated or integrated state or „the emergence into any other political 
status freely determined‟ by the people involved. 
The right of self-determination is clearly stated in the ICCPR article 1.577 
Is this right of political self-determination part of the American Convention? Yes, it is.  Can 
I find any essential, subjective right, guaranteed, indirectly, by the law of American States 
through which we might build a case for political decolonisation in favour of Rapa Nui 
autonomy demands? Yes, I can.  Should the state of Chile solicit the General Assembly the 
inclusion of Rapa Nui in the C-24 list?  Yes, it should. And, since this is unlikely to occur; 
could I relieve Chile of this duty by replacing its will by the recommendations or binding 
force of OAS judiciary? Yes, I could.  Should not first internal remedies being exhausted? 
Yes, they should, therefore; why am I stating that there is an impossibility of raising this 
                                                 
577 N. 320 „Article 1 (1) All the peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. […] (3) The 
State Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration on Non-Self-
Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect 
that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.  Article 4, The States Parties to 
the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with 
the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only so 
far as this may be compatible with the nature of threes rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society. Article 5 (1) Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group of persons any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of 
any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the 
present Covenant. (2) No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or 
existing in any country by virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that 
the present Covenant does not recognize them to a lesser extent.‟ 
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before municipal tribunals? Because the feasible procedural municipal routes by which the 
right of self-determination may be alleged before a Chilean court are difficult and present 
challenges. 
 
The requisite of internal remedies exhaustion 
 
In this part the possible mechanisms that might be used in Chile prior to consideration by 
the OAS organs.  If the internal mechanisms in Chile can afford due process of law, the 
IACHR will examine the admissibility of the matter by verifying whether those internal 
remedies have been exhausted.  Then, it will also verify whether the petition was or not 
lodged within six months from the notification of domestic remedies exhaustion. 
 
The constitutional channels in Chile do not afford due process of law, for the protection of 
the right alleged by interpretation of articles 31 (2) (a) of the Rules of Procedure of the 
IACHR578 and 46 (2) (a) of the ACHR.579 
 
Having in mind the necessity to act promptly because the Second International Decade for 
the Eradication of Colonialism finishes in 2010580, according to articles 31 (2) (c) of the Rules 
of procedures of the IACHR and 46 (2) (c) of the ACHR, the possible actions in municipal 
courts of Chile to allege the right of self-determination, would delay a final judgment. Hence, 
in the hypothesis contemplated by article 32 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, that is as an 
exception to the need for internal remedies exhaustion, the IACHR will determine „a 
reasonable period of time‟ within which the petition should be presented.  To do that the 
IACHR „shall consider the date on which the alleged violation of rights occurred and the 
circumstances of each case.‟ 581  Chile would probably argue that the era of Chilean state‟s 
colonialism ended in 1966; this destroys the OAS judicial decolonisation case from its 
beginning. 
 
This thesis argues continuous state breach of the right of self-determination on a daily basis 
because the fact of colonialism restarts every day.  In legal terms the Chilean colonisation 
                                                 
578 N. 493. 
579 N. 491. 
580 UN GA Resolution 55/146 of 8 December 2000 URL www.un.org/documents/resga.htm 
581 N. 493, article 31.2.a. 
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counts from 1966 but for judicial purposes it applies to the Chilean legal order only from 
1976, 1989 or 1990.  In 1976 the ICCPR was promulgated.  In 1989 the ICCPR was  
published.  Depending on the interpretation of article 5 of the CPR either of both dates 
would apply to determine the date from which the Chilean colonialism restarts on a daily 
basis.  The year 1990 is important to consider because the government of Chile recognised 
the competence and jurisdiction of the IACHR for events which began subsequent to 11 
March 1990.  Therefore, in the end, even though the ICCPR is in force since 1989, the 11 
March 1990 determines the practical point of departure for the judicial case.  Chile can be 
violating the ICCPR from 1976 but the recognition of competence of the IACHR only 
counts from 1990, therefore for the judicial case the fact of colonialism starts the 11 March 
1990.  
 
By reference to indisputable historical facts, and according to article 32 (1) of the Rules of 
Procedure of the IACHR and article 46 of the ACHR, the IACHR could admit the case.  
The fact of continuous colonialism in Rapanui is evidenced by the constant struggle of its 
people and the centralized control from the state of Chile.  Likewise, the timing of Chilean 
legal colonialism has been uninterrupted occurring since 1966; it is therefore 
contemporaneous.  The premise of article 32 (2), applies for „those cases in which the 
exceptions to the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies are applicable‟. 582 
And in our case, the applicability is governed by article 31 (1) and 31 (2) (a) of the ACHR. 
 
The impossibility of lodging a petition before a municipal court is explained firstly due to the 
fact of the nature of the right alleged. As already explained the premise of article 5 of the 
CPR is arbitrary and therefore arguable in terms of human rights laws.  The concept of just 
one nation inhabiting the territory, in practical terms, determines the constitutional ways by 
which an inhabitant of the republic can demand protection from state organs‟ acts and 
omissions.  It is illogical to demand before a Chilean tribunal that “I am not a national 
Chilean but on the contrary a Rapanui national”.  The “ethnic depiction” confirms this view.  
Analysis of articles 1 and 2 of the Indigenous Act No 19.253 of 1993 shows, from the 
beginning, that an ethnic Chilean is firstly Chilean and then culturally indigenous. 583 This is 
critical in the light of the principle of internal self-determination and the principle of 
territorial integrity of states. 
                                                 
582 N. 493, article 32.2. 
583 N. 5.  
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According to article 1 of the Ley Indigena, the state of Chile recognises that the indigenous 
peoples of Chile are the descendants of the human groups which have existed in the territory 
since pre-Columbian times […]. The state of Chile recognises as one of the main indigenous 
ethnicities of Chile the Rapa Nui o Pascuense people […].584 
 
Potential mechanisms to allege the right of self-determination before the municipal 
courts of Chile 
 
There are two potential constitutional mechanisms through which a case could be filed in 
Chilean courts.  The first is the Recurso de Protección of article 20 of the CPR.  The second is 
contained in article 93 number 6 of the CPR by means of petition before the Tribunal 
Constitucional [TC]. 
 
Chapter III of the CPR “De Los Derechos y Deberes Constitucionales‖ is dedicated to the 
establishment of constitutional guarantees and constitutional protection by superior courts.  
A Court of Appeal examines the allegations concerning the protection of some of the 
guarantees established in article 19.  The Supreme Court reviews appeals against the 
resolutions of the respective Court of Appeal. Article 19 enumerates the rights and article 20 
determines which of those are protected constitutionally through the so-called Recurso de 
Protección.585 
 
According to article 20 of the CPR, 
 
„Who by cause of arbitrary or illegal acts or omissions suffer privation, disturbance or menace on 
its legitimate exercise of rights and guarantees established in article 19, numbers 1, 2, […] 24 […] 
can appear […] before the respective Court of Appeal, which will adopt immediately the 
necessary measures to re-establish the rule of law and to assure the due protection of the affected, 
                                                 
584 N. 5, artículo 1, El Estado reconoce que los indígenas de Chile son los descendientes de las agrupaciones humanas que existen en el 
territorio nacional desde tiempos precolombinos, que conservan manifestaciones étnicas y culturales propias siendo para ellos la tierra el 
fundamento principal de su existencia y cultura. 
 El Estado reconoce como principales etnias indígenas de Chile a: la Mapuche, Aimara, Rapa Nui o Pascuenses, la de las 
comunidades Atacameñas, Quechuas, Collas y Diaguita del norte del país, las comunidades Kawashkar o Alacalufe y Yámana o 
Yagán de los canales australes. El Estado valora su existencia por ser parte esencial de las raíces de la Nación chilena, así como su 
integridad y desarrollo, de acuerdo a sus costumbres y valores. 
 Es deber de la sociedad en general y del Estado en particular, a través de sus instituciones respetar, proteger y promover el  desarrollo de 
los indígenas, sus culturas, familias y comunidades, adoptando las medidas adecuadas para tales fines y proteger las tierras indígenas, 
velar por su adecuada explotación, por su equilibrio ecológico y propender a su ampliación.‟ 
585 Not every one of the constitutional guarantees established in article 19 is protected by the Recurso de Protección of 
article 20. 
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without prejudice of other rights capable to be claimed before the authority or the appropriate 
courts.‟  
 
I argue the possibility of using paragraphs 1º, 2º and 24º as being linked to the right of 
external self-determination of peoples.  Article 19 of the CPR guarantees, 
 
„1º, El derecho a la vida y a la integridad física y psíquica de la persona.‟ 
 
„1º, the right to life and the right to the physical and moral integrity of persons:‟ 
 
 
By following the logic of the ICCPR preamble, a state organ‟s denial of the collective right of 
self-determination constitutes an attack on the moral integrity of Easter Islanders.  People 
are not happy when spiritually deprived of the enjoyment of their collective right.  Culturally, 
the indigenous peoples of Easter Island cannot be viewed as complete as individuals until 
collectively their social well-being is achieved. An individual‟s well-being is associated with 
the welfare of their kin. 
 
2º.- La igualdad ante la ley. En Chile no hay persona ni grupo privilegiados. En Chile no hay esclavos y el que 
pise su territorio queda libre. Hombres y mujeres son iguales ante la ley. Ni la ley ni autoridad alguna podrán 
establecer diferencias arbitrarias; 
 
„2º, Equality before law. In Chile there is no privileged person or groups.  In Chile there are no 
slaves and any who arrives on its territory will be freed. Men and women are equal before law.  
Neither statutory act not any authorities are allowed to establish arbitrary differences;‟ 
 
This guarantee is linkable to the “first” generation right of political freedom.  Even though it 
seems clear that the reference is to individual rather than collective freedom, the 
constitutional right established in this paragraph could be interpreted in the wider collective 
sense. 
 
„24º.- El derecho de propiedad en sus diversas especies sobre toda clase de bienes corporales o incorporales.‟ 
 
„24º, The right to property or ownership in all its diverse forms over all class of corporal or 
incorporeal goods.‟ 
 
This includes having property rights in tangible and intangible things.  Since the enactment 
of the CPR lawyers have through the Recurso de Protección of article 20 and article 19 No 24, 
taken legal actions based upon the assertion there are rights of property (or ownership) in 
abstract rights. This means “two rights”: the right itself in any incorporeal goods and then 
the right of ownership of right.  The interpretation of having rights in rights is novel in terms 
of Roman law notions. For Romans, property was exercised over real things rather than 
abstractions.  
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To some this interpretation might have denaturalised paragraph 24 while to others, it means 
giving constitutional protection not only to rights in objects such as land or moveables but 
also in cultural and political rights which are abstract things.586 Through this constitutional 
remedy a case of political decolonisation may be built.  The Rapanui have a property right in 
their abstract political right of self-determination. 
 
Finally, the other possible route is more intricate. It would begin with a demanda civil ordinaria, 
which is the appropriate procedure in default of alternative special one.  In the hypothetical 
scenario, after receiving a negative response from the defendant state of Chile, the plaintiff 
Rapanui side would then lodge a Recurso de Inaplicabilidad por Inconstitucionalidad before the 
TC.587  Article 93 number 6 of the CPR and, paragraph 6th of the Constitutional Organic 
Law No 17.997 regulate this constitutional action.588 
 
„Articulo 93 
Son atribuciones del Tribunal Constitucional: 
 
6° Resolver, por la mayoría de sus miembros en ejercicio, la inaplicabilidad de un precepto legal cuya aplicación en 
cualquier gestión que se siga ante un tribunal ordinario o especial, resulte contraria a la Constitución;‟ 
 
 
According to this provision of the CPR, one of the attributions of the TC is to pronounce 
on the inapplicability of legal precepts whose application if followed before any especial or 
ordinary tribunal, might result contrary to the constitution.  Ley No 17.997 come to regulate 
the procedures followed before the TC by means of the Recurso de Inaplicabilidad por 
Inconstitucionalidad. 
 
I imagine that before such legal action (the demanda civil ordinaria) the defendant would 
respond by saying that the Rapanui are not entitled to the right of external self-determination 
of peoples by reason of the Chilean Constitution, Chilean statutes and history.  The state of 
Chile would probably say that the Rapanui are not a people or a nation entitled to the right 
of external self-determination but an ethnicity as ruled by the Indigenous Act of 1993.  The 
state of Chile would surely claim that the colonial era finished in 1966 and therefore that the 
                                                 
586 I learnt this from one of the most leading professors I had the privilege to hear in the law school of the University 
of Valparaiso, Chile: the professor of Civil Law Rene Moreno Monroy between the years 1994-1998. Even though 
his teachings were amazing he never allowed anyone to record his lecturers. All my knowledge on this issue of 
article 19 No 24 and article 20 of the CPR comes solely from my memory. 
587  This is the mechanism of repressive control of constitutionality I mentioned already when analysing the 
jurisprudence of the CS and the TC. 
588 “Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Tribunal Constitucional”, numero 17.997, URL 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar/?idNorma=29427&idVersion=2009-10-28&idParte.  
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ICCPR is not applicable to the case.  It would also appeal to the principle of the territorial 
integrity of states on the basis that the Rapanui people are seen as of the ethnicity of Chile.  
On the other side, the plaintiff should claim that the Rapanui are entitled to that right by 
reason of integration of international laws, specially those related to human rights, into the 
Chilean Constitution and according to the ACHR. It would also affirm that the Advisory 
Opinion of the Inter-American Court of 1982 and articles 64 and 29 of the ACHR support 
that and that article 5 of the CPR authorises it.  The plaintiff would present the historical 
facts by placing the time of Chilean colonialism from 1966.  This would make the case 
winnable.  
 
Having here reviewed the feasible municipal routes through which a petition of such nature 
might be alleged before a Chilean court of law, my position is that there are ways to lodging 
directly before the IACHR without having to exhaust internal remedies because they are not 
proper to protect the right alleged (external self-determination). In the other hypothesis (by 
previous exhaustion of remedies) a case may be built too. To do that, internal remedies 
should be exhausted previously.  After final judgment and notification in Chile, the Rapanui 
could demand within the period of six months or a reasonable period after the notification 





I got here by flying, eight years ago.  (I didn‟t sail because modern canoes are dark and sad) I 
dreamt of a bright place in Fiji.  I was in the airport albeit asleep.  Dreams not real? I was 
here!  But I woke up and I went to Rapanui.  I followed the unknown awakening and I 
bought an ibook g4 (the Mac is dying like the writing of Rodrigo). 
 
I also sailed, but fifteen years ago. (I didn‟t fly I had no wings) I dreamt amid gloomy 
present.  She left me and I was sad.  The professor wanted me to march but I mesmerised 
his thinking.  I demanded of him “ask me what I want to hear” and he said “your wish is my 
command”.  I wandered for another seven years until I revived. 
 
The game isn‟t over, but only developing.  Rapanui and international law are today the 
ethnographical representations of my mystical experience.  What else can I do but to follow 
the brightness and wishes? (Lighting bolts welcomed me in Rapanui as when I arrived in 
Wellington). 
 
You are a people as amazing as the Moai, I said.  Yes but we run on petrol to keep going, 
they replied.  Well I can give you Law, if you want. Yes they barked but you are just a 





Explorers and missionaries open the jungle (as always the undesirable ones followed).  After 
the burning, the region, if anything, became fertile ground… “of what? Of Pacific Studies 
my dear”.  Indeed, ethnographers, anthropologists, legal historians, social scientists, and 
today lovely economists, political scientists, advisors, developers of strategies, thinkers of 
how to think, developing studies of how to develop the studies to then develop the people? 
What the hell is that! … what about law bro? Law is not here even though it is probably the 
oldest of disciplines. “Who need lawyers! Only problems they bring! Why bother… Well, 
excuse me darling but this looks quite messy, doesn‟t it?” 
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Exploration, studies, religion, displacement, beliefs, peoples, first peoples, modern mixed-
blood diasporas, more exploration and studies, empires, money, power, politics, policies, 
social policies, health policies, and law?… still awaiting to be called.  “Hey! Here I am, ask 
me, ask me! Mr. Law said”. 
 
Dismissed as futile and troublemaking, Law wants to speak and Oceania needs to listen.  
“Law is old man! Elders need to be listened and respected.  Nobody told you that sweetie?  
Oh, okay so we do not have time to discuss about the heart or the mind.  We do not need a 
lawyer we need a cardiologist, a neurologist!  Oh! So you say it‟s too late? Nobody wants to 
stop in legal nature because is boring and fruitless, isn‟t it? You are wrong!  
 
Law as philosophy has the ability to reach the core of meanings, if any.  Law, as the closer 
representation of justice, lies beneath the rest of human sciences.  Perhaps, as a modern 
discipline, Law has the capacity to seek inter-disciplinary solutions when the rest fail in the 
attempt. 
The Rapañol rebellion 
 
„Awareness, no matter how confused it may be, develops from every act of rebellion;‟589 
 
I was born on the mainland but I was adopted as son of Rapanui… “what can your law say 
about that? You are not Rapanui conchatuma‘re! Haha, you are different. Your blood has 
another colour!! Jaja there is your stupid indigenous law! (They said). And then I retorted, I 
know that culia‘o no soy tan aweona‘o, just let me wake up again amid your ashes of arrogance 
and colonialism.  I can make fire with your ashes. And then I said softly, come on let us 
unify the law, one law for all. Let us start with ourselves and the polities will follow. 
 
But I am tired and I proved what I wanted to proved. In football good players know exactly 
when to assist and retreat. Here I am, leaving, flying back and in an awaking dream. Some 
changes… well I am still 6 feet tall.  Bringing the voice of the noisy silent? Awaken, but just 
a dreamer. 
 
                                                 
589 The Rebel. An essay on Man in Revolt by Albert Camus (1951), translated by Anthony Bower, Vintage International 
Books, New York, USA, 1991: 14 
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“They see their henua differently Sir! What else young man? Well, heaps of what else Sir! The 
law is there and plays in their favour.  The law has imperium by the way. We know that. Okay, 
well… this case is so special, never seen! It will be in the news and in the 48th edition of Mr. 
Shaw‟s treatises…maybe, but, do you think that your Rapañol sprit will have an effect in the 
souls of ius soli fellows? Well, I know politicians are not visionaries because they usually wear 
horse blinkers and cannot see the horizon. Very likely young man they will stay in their 
chairs.  Yes! but after this their stupefaction will rise up to their roofs of sovereignty rather 
than simply to their chair postures. Perhaps an ambitious lawyer will come to lodge some 
petitions.  Do you think that another seat can be set-up in the United Nations headquarters 
in order to restart again the never-ending game? Well, I don‟t know sir I am just a dreamer 
from Oceania. 
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Appendix 1, the Deed of Cession and Proclamation 1888 
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Appendix 2, Antipoetic fieldwork 
 
 
 
 
